# Assistant conversation QC3YG4 - Canonical URL: - Resource IRI: - Type: assistant conversation - Mode: quick ## Transcript ### 1. User tell me about schatzki and heidegger and aristotle ### 2. Assistant tool calls #### Tool call: `search_text` ```json { "query": "Schatzki practice theory" } ``` #### Tool call: `search_text` ```json { "query": "Heidegger" } ``` #### Tool call: `search_text` ```json { "query": "Aristotle" } ``` ### 3. Tool result: search_text Exact matches 1. Source: The Dynamics of Social Practice (#5AXAEJ), Elizabeth Shove, Matt Watson, Mika Pantzar, p. 20 Context: #MV5P3X THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL PRACTICE #XKXCG8 INTRODUCING THEORIES OF PRACTICE Matching excerpt #N2KKAS: Through these routes, theories of practice entered the vocabulary of social scientific enquiry. Although notions of practice figure in different strands of social science through the 1980s and 1990s, they gained fresh theoretical impetus towards the close of the twentieth century, primarily through the work of philosopher Theodore Schatzki. His exposition of a Wittgensteinian theory of practice (Schatzki, 1996) helped bring practices back into the firmament of ideas as the influence of the linguistic turn in social theory began to fade. In retrospect, The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (Schatzki et al., 2001) did not define a neat manoeuvre in social theory, but it did mark the start of what has become a diffuse movement, the shape and extent of which remains to be seen. 2. Source: The Habits of Consumption: Introduction (#72GVQ9), Alan Warde, Dale Southerton, p. 8 Context: #FVQG84 Introduction #9MNUCP Consumption in practice Matching excerpt #TR25BL: Recent reformulations of theories of practice, associated with what has been called 'the practice turn' in social theory (Schatzki et al 2001), have been adapted 3. Source: Materials changing the performance of the household energy consumption practices (#ARE7AL), Eliisa Kylkilahti, Henna Syrjälä, Liisa Kääntä, Sara-Ellen Laitinen, p. 4 Context: #QLT6TK Materials changing the performance of the household energy consumption practices #FAQAPC Materiality in social practices Matching excerpt #ZJEPPA: The human-centric practice theory considers materials as enablers of human practices . This approach relies heavily on Schatzki, who posits that 'human coexistence transpires as arrangements of people, artifacts, organisms, and things' (2002: 149). As this approach regards practices as human practices, and agency assigned to humans, with non-human materials playing a significant role in enabling humans to perform these practices, we term this a human-centric approach to practice theory. According to Schatzki (2010), materiality is a part of society, but material things are not part of practices; instead, materials form arrangements co-produced with practices (ibid.: 135). Materiality is defined by Schatzki (2019: 53) as a physical-chemical composition of entities. Material entities are connected to human actions; they are determinants of continuity and longevity in practices, mediating and enabling practices and exerting causal effects (Schatzki, 2010). This means that material arrangements prefigure human practices. 4. Source: If I Don't Do It, It Feels Wrong: Embodying Environmental Ethical Reflexivity through Cultivation and Enactment of Practices (#EDFB5G), Anne Sofie Møller Askholm, p. 2 Context: #LSKR5Q “If I don’t do it, it feels wrong”: embodying environmental ethical reflexivity through cultivation and enactment of practices #5N8WU9 Conceptual framework Matching excerpt #LYRQZP: Second-generation practice theories define consumption as happening while everyday practices are performed (Warde 2005). Practices are organized nexuses of actions that are socially shared across space and time and are linked and held together by different elements (Gram-Hanssen 2011; Roepke 2009; Schatzki 2002; Shove, Pantzar, and Watson 2012). In Schatzki's (2002) practice-theory model, these elements consist of practical understandings , meaning abilities or competences required to perform the actions of a practice; rules that instruct people to perform particular actions; teleoaffective structures that describe the ends, tasks, and projects normatively and hierarchically arranged and connected to normativized emotions to varying degrees; and general understandings that span different practices and define the manner in which practices are carried out according to certain convictions or beliefs (Schatzki 2002, 2019). While Schatzki analytically separates materiality from practices, some theorists understand materiality as a constituting element (Gram-Hanssen 2011; Shove and Pantzar 2005; Warde 2005). Within this configuration of elements, practices are produced, reproduced, and changed, 5. Source: My Journey within Practice-Based Approaches Bandwagon (#FYWZFY), Mika Pantzar, p. 3 Context: #DANDVD My Journey within Practice-Based Approaches Bandwagon #NU62PX Acknowledgements Matching excerpt #964DQV: We characterized cumulative forms of integration with terms like “normalization, routinization, habit-formation, practice formation.” Practice innovations (and practices) proceed through various integrations. In this way, practitioners are innovators. Practices figure as something that actual and potential practitioners can participate in or withdraw from. At the same time, practices are constituted through performance. On one side of the coin, practitioners are “captured” by practices that make demands of those who do them. On the other side of the coin, practices are constituted through participation and defined by the activities of those who “do” them. This reminds of general evolutionary dynamics suggesting that systems participate in the building of their own environments. It was especially important to me, as an economist, that practice theory is opposed to any theory arguing for givens such as exogenous preferences or technology (in mainstream economics). Schatzki’s (as well as our) version of practice theory recognized the importance of both performativity and networks. It was also important that practice theory opposes dualistic thinking, which manifests in such dualisms as mind-body, action-structure and human-nonhuman. Contrary to Schatzki, in the spirit of ANT, we suggested that also 6. Source: What future for collaborative consumption? A practice theoretical account (#LB72BP), Gert Spaargaren, Walter Fraanje, p. 1 Context: #AF6QDV What future for collaborative consumption? A practice theoretical account #NQ9PXZ 2. A practice theoretical account of social change Matching excerpt #Z3SFSH: In the remainder of this section, we will outline a practice theoretical model of social change based on Schatzki's practice theory and Collins' theory of interaction ritual chains. In our analysis, we use the distinction between practices as performances and practices as embedded entities (Schatzki, 1996; Shove et al., 2012). Underpinning our conceptual model is the idea that practices follow trajectories, which consist of changes in how they are performed and embedded. To substantiate this claim, we first discuss performances (2.1), then the embeddedness (2.2) and, lastly, trajectories of social practices (2.3). 7. Source: The Nexus of Practices: Connections, Constellations and Practitioners (#R49AUC), Allison Hui, Elizabeth Shove, Theodore Schatzki, p. 195 Context: #5CGWLY HOW SHOULD WE UNDERSTAND 'GENERAL UNDERSTANDINGS'? #3GLKAJ Introduction Matching excerpt #YULEJL: Practice theory is increasingly prominent in social scientific analysis. Hence, its virtues and its defects are being subjected to greater scrutiny. As part of that exercise, we examine the conceptualisation of widespread cultural understandings in the social scientific use of practice theory. Schatzki's (1996; 2002) schema of practice components has proved generative, particularly as adapted by Warde (2005) and Shove et al. (2012). However, virtually no attention has been paid to Schatzki's (2002) concept of 'general understandings', which is one potentially relevant instrument to address this challenge. 1 In The site of the social , Schatzki (2002) introduces the category of general understandings into his schema of components of practice, an addition to his earlier tripartite model of 'practical understandings', 'rules' and 'teleoaffective structures' (1996). In this chapter, we seek to open up issues posed by general understandings as a category within a schema of generic practice components. The concept of general understandings promises to deal with broad cultural conceptions which transcend the boundaries between 'integrative practices' (Schatzki, 2002). 8. Source: The Nexus of Practices: Connections, Constellations and Practitioners (#R49AUC), Allison Hui, Elizabeth Shove, Theodore Schatzki, p. 190 Context: #HWFWXX PLACING POWER IN PRACTICE THEORY #ARCLGB How is the conduct of conduct practised? Matching excerpt #LJPJB7: In writing about action over distance, Nicolini (2012: 179) also introduces Latour's work, doing so as a means of overcoming the limits he identifies within practice theory – particularly the work of Schatzki. While recognising fundamental differences between Schatzki and Latour, Nicolini nevertheless sees the potential for linking the two approaches. Indeed, Schatzki (2015b) has himself engaged with Latour's work in the cause of better understanding the constitution of large social phenomena. While restating points of difference with actor-network theory (ANT) – whereas ANT sees the social as comprised only by associations, Schatzki sees it as comprised of practices and arrangements – Schatzki recognises commonalities in the flat ontologies underlying both approaches. Based upon such commonalities, he appropriates concepts from ANT to help illuminate how large social phenomena like governments, corporations or universities can emerge from the plenun of practices and arrangements. 9. Source: The Nexus of Practices: Connections, Constellations and Practitioners (#R49AUC), Allison Hui, Elizabeth Shove, Theodore Schatzki, p. 181 Context: #HWFWXX PLACING POWER IN PRACTICE THEORY Matching excerpt #5H398S: Practice theory must be able to account for power. This imperative has two sides, one intellectual and the other pragmatic. The intellectual side of the imperative comes from the ubiquity of power as a part of social relations. For practice theory, all social relations are constituted and reproduced through practices. As Schatzki states, 'both social order and individuality... result from practices' (1996: 13). Therefore, practice theory must be able to account for how power works. The pragmatic side of the imperative may be less compelling, as it relies on a conviction that social theory should, in part, be valued for its capacity to make a positive difference in the world. For practice theory to inform future change meaningfully (or to account convincingly for past change), it must be able to account for power. 10. Source: The Assembling of Circular Consumption: A sociomaterial practice approach (#Y3CFPX), Christian Fuentes, Elina Närvänen, Nina Mesiranta, p. 1 Context: #3EVMWL An introduction to practice theory Matching excerpt #4VBYJG: Practice theory is a school of thought developed and broadly used in the social sciences and philosophy that focuses on practices (rather than discourse, interactions, understandings, attitudes, or values) and makes these the central units of analysis. Practice theory scholars argue that diverse social phenomena, such as ethics, sustainability, consumption, and organisations could and should be understood by examining social practices (Reckwitz, 2002; Schatzki et al., 2001). Therefore, practice theory offers a theoretical framework, a lens, if you will, for seeing and approaching social phenomena. It is what could be called a perspective theory; rather than Approximate matches 1. Source: Keeping It Moving and Holding It Together: An Ethnography of Brīvbode, a Riga Swapshop [MIKAEL] (#4V8VH7), Ieva Lange, Mikael Brockman Context: #L759F3 Practice Theory and Consumption Work #2MV3XY Sites of Interacting Practices Score: 0.677 Related paragraph #MR6SKV: Schatzki’s central claim is that social life always goes on as part of a mesh of practices and material arrangements. Practices are “carried on amid and determinative of, while also dependent on and altered by, material arrangements” (Schatzki 2017: 44). A practice is an organised manifold of doings and sayings; a material arrangement is composed of “interconnected human bodies, organisms, artifacts, and things” (Schatzki 2002: 38) through which practices unfold. Practices presuppose arrangements, and arrangements take their character from the practices that incorporate them. Schatzki calls these “practice-arrangement nexuses… sites of the social” (2017: 44). On this view, practices are “not merely ‘sites’ of interaction but… ordering and orchestrating entities in their own right” (Shove and Walker 2010: 471, characterising Schatzki). 2. Source: The Advent of Practice Theories in Research on Sustainable Consumption: Past, Current and Future Directions of the Field (#5FD8BE), Filippo Corsini, Francesco Paolo Appio, Franziska Meinherz, Luca Mora, Rafael Laurenti, p. 1 Context: #9UFH98 The Advent of Practice Theories in Research on Sustainable Consumption: Past, Current and Future Directions of the Field #GZ5XB5 2. Theoretical Background: Practice Theories and Their Development #8HZQ5L 2.1. Practice Theories: Their Origin and Intellectual Legacy Score: 0.667 Related excerpt #HQL2R9: Practice theories can be traced back to philosophers such as Wittgenstein, and more prominently the interpretations of his work by Schatzki, as well as to sociologists Bourdieu and Giddens. They are the result of the endeavour to overcome the structure–agency dualism, which for a long time characterised and divided social theory. With this, practice theories marked a departure from individualist, structuralist and poststructuralist approaches, as well as from the opposition between constructivism and essentialism [21]. Practice theory overcomes this traditional duality of 3. Source: Sustainable Consumption and Practice Theories: Connecting Elements of Clothing Sharing (#EPZXEW), Marcia de Freitas Duarte, Minelle E. Silva, Márcia R. Cavalcante Costa, p. 6 Context: #LVDEMW 3. COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION AND PRACTICE THEORIES Score: 0.675 Related excerpt #9LCWU9: Schatzki (2019) is one of the theorists who stands out in the discussion of practices as components of the social. Its approach is based on the assumption that all social phenomena are rooted in practical. A practice is defined as “an open and temporary set of actions and sayings, linked by practical understandings, rules, tele-affective structure and general understanding” (Schatzki, 2002, p. 8). The concept of material arrangements, which includes humans, artifacts, organisms and things of nature (Schatzki, 2005, 2012) is useful in recognizing a range of more extensive material relationships between which practices take place. Reckwitz (2002) provides more details, stating that a practice presupposes the interconnection of elements with each other: “forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, ‘things’ and their use, know-how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge” (Reckwitz, 2002, p. 249). As the social is the field of practices, they are, inevitably, imbricated in material arrangements that they corroborate to create, in which they are realized and through which they (practices) exist (Schatzki, 2005). Practices and arrangements are thus always linked in one or more ways, forming an inseparable amalgam (Schatzki, 2002, 2012), a set of practices results in a constellation of practices (Schatzki, 2019). 4. Source: Theories of Practice and Sustainable Consumption (#KWZ2A4), Alan Warde, Daniel Welch, p. 8 Context: #STMANK Theories of Practice and Sustainable Consumption #6U6DVD 5.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEORIES OF PRACTICE #UQZN9F 5.4 AGENCY, CHANGE AND CONVERGENCE Score: 0.668 Related excerpt #ET8H3W: Central to the further development of theories of practice for sustainable consumption has been the work of Schatzki (especially 1996, 2002). Schatzki has rigorously elaborated a social ontology of practice, in critical dialogue with the practice theories of Bourdieu, Foucault and Giddens, by way of the philosophies of Wittgenstein and Heidegger. This ontology establishes a 'strong' version of practice theory in which both social order and individuality result from practices. It asserts that there is no macro level beyond the realm of social practices, which are 'not merely "sites" of interaction but are, instead, ordering and orchestrating entities in their own right' (Shove and Walker 2010, p. 471). 5. Source: Consumption and Practice (#QRRZP2), Benjamin Julien Hartmann, p. 65 Context: #F4KA5L 2. Theoretical perspectives #7FDH2N 2.3 Approaching Practice Moments #AFNUJ7 2.3.2 Productive moments #P4WSKH Embedding production within practices Score: 0.689 Related excerpt #ZDCRVA: Here, Schatzki's (2005) illustration of educational practices, which can be seen as a form of interpersonal practice, gains relevance. Schatzki (2005, 472) notes that such interpersonal practices contain chains of actions and reactions: 6. Source: Consumption and Practice (#QRRZP2), Benjamin Julien Hartmann, p. 96 Context: #QGJ7DX 4. Findings and Discussion #ZAHQPV 4.1 Unfolding Consumption as Practice Moments #ND76AC 4.1.1 Consumption and performativity: Deriving conceptualizations of consumption as practice moments #QESRAQ 4. Findings and Discussion Score: 0.673 Related excerpt #Y7BTF6: Schatzki (1996) asserts that practices have effects on their carriers; their performances act on the actions, thoughts, and sense of self of their carriers and create teleoaffective experiences. Consumptive moments taking place within practices appear as mediators enjoined with this performativity not only for practice carriers, but also for doings, meanings, and objects. 7. Source: The Nexus of Practices: Connections, Constellations and Practitioners (#R49AUC), Allison Hui, Elizabeth Shove, Theodore Schatzki, p. 43 Context: #U8ANZK QUALITIES OF CONNECTIVE TISSUE IN HOSPITAL LIFE #JWCJBK Introduction #DPWJZK Temporal qualities Score: 0.682 Related excerpt #2YB2QL: Schatzki's position developed in The timespace of human activity (2010b) helps us develop a more persuasive account of how complexes of practice form and change. In that work he argues that the dimensions of practices that orient activity within a sequence represent one means through which practices hold together. These sequences constitute activity timespaces that are multiple and interwoven. This activity timespace forms a kind of backbone or temporal-spatial landscape that orders social phenomena. He writes: '... interwoven timespaces form an infrastructure that runs through and is essential to social affairs' (2010b: 65). 8. Source: Consumption and Theories of Practice (#RZ8QTE), Alan Warde, p. 2 Context: #XRLTMB Consumption and Theories of Practice #42VC2R AN ABRIDGED ACCOUNT OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE Score: 0.685 Related excerpt #5WY5TY: Schatzki identifies two central notions of practice: practice as a co-ordinated entity and practice as performance. The first notion is of 9. Source: Through the practice lens: Where is the bandwagon of practice-based studies heading? (#XDUQVM), Gessica Corradi, Luca Verzelloni, Silvia Gherardi, p. 1 Context: #JYFU6N Through the practice lens: Where is the bandwagon of practice-based studies heading? #3LLF5S The bandwagon analogy Score: 0.704 Related excerpt #L278BH: 'Practice', Schatzki (1996, 2001) argues, is a term that seeks to be descriptive of fundamental phenomena in society, as encountered, for example, in the writings of philosophers and sociologist like Bourdieu (1972), Lyotard (1979), Foucault (1980), Taylor (1995), as well as ethnomethodologists (Garfinkel, 1967). In Bourdieu's case the deeper-lying structures that organize general social practices are self-reproducing dispositions; in Lyotard's discursive moves or language games; in 10. Source: The Assembling of Circular Consumption: A sociomaterial practice approach (#Y3CFPX), Christian Fuentes, Elina Närvänen, Nina Mesiranta, p. 1 Context: #3EVMWL An introduction to practice theory Score: 0.676 Related excerpt #4VBYJG: Practice theory is a school of thought developed and broadly used in the social sciences and philosophy that focuses on practices (rather than discourse, interactions, understandings, attitudes, or values) and makes these the central units of analysis. Practice theory scholars argue that diverse social phenomena, such as ethics, sustainability, consumption, and organisations could and should be understood by examining social practices (Reckwitz, 2002; Schatzki et al., 2001). Therefore, practice theory offers a theoretical framework, a lens, if you will, for seeing and approaching social phenomena. It is what could be called a perspective theory; rather than ### 4. Tool result: search_text Exact matches 1. Source: The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (#6J5MKL), Eike von Savigny, Karin Knorr Cetina, Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 163 Context: #MTDRS9 Part III #AZ29RJ Posthumanist challenges #BFYA8N How Heidegger defends the possibility of a correspondence theory of truth with respect to the entities of natural science #ZHKHLP Heidegger's attempt at robust realism Matching excerpt #7DAR8R: 1962:412, Heidegger's emphasis). 7 Our practices for coping with the available are significantly different from our practices for dealing with the occurrent. Thus, Heidegger understands this changeover from dealing with things as available to dealing with them as occurrent as discontinuous. This changeover is crucial for Heidegger's answer to deflationary realism. 2. Source: The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (#6J5MKL), Eike von Savigny, Karin Knorr Cetina, Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 161 Context: #MTDRS9 Part III #AZ29RJ Posthumanist challenges #BFYA8N How Heidegger defends the possibility of a correspondence theory of truth with respect to the entities of natural science #ZHKHLP Heidegger's attempt at robust realism Matching excerpt #DJS75E: Like Davidson, Heidegger answers the skeptic by showing that our practices and the everyday world are inextricably intertwined. Indeed, he argues at length that 'Dasein is the world existingly' (Heidegger 1962:416). 4 Moreover, Heidegger seems to agree with the deflationary realists that, while entities show up as independent of us, the being or intelligibility of entities depends on our practices. So any talk of things in themselves must be put in scare quotes. Thus, Heidegger says of natural entities: 3. Source: The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (#6J5MKL), Eike von Savigny, Karin Knorr Cetina, Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 161 Context: #MTDRS9 Part III #AZ29RJ Posthumanist challenges #BFYA8N How Heidegger defends the possibility of a correspondence theory of truth with respect to the entities of natural science #ZHKHLP Heidegger's attempt at robust realism Matching excerpt #CZR8QA: The first two phenomena Heidegger calls to our attention are two different ways of being. He points out that normally we deal with things as equipment. Equipment gets its intelligibility from its relation to other equipment, human roles, and social goals. Heidegger calls the equipmental way of being availability ( Zuhandenheit ). But Heidegger also points to another equally important phenomenon; we sometimes experience entities as independent of our instrumental coping practices. This happens in cases of equipmental breakdown. 4. Source: The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (#6J5MKL), Eike von Savigny, Karin Knorr Cetina, Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 161 Context: #MTDRS9 Part III #AZ29RJ Posthumanist challenges #BFYA8N How Heidegger defends the possibility of a correspondence theory of truth with respect to the entities of natural science #ZHKHLP Heidegger's attempt at robust realism Matching excerpt #8RKMUD: Joseph Rouse, in his book Knowledge and Power (1987), sees the parallel between Heidegger's and Davidson's holistic answer to the skeptic and wonders why I fail to see that Heidegger must therefore be a deflationary realist. But, as I will now seek to show, in Being and Time Heidegger describes phenomena that enable him to distinguish between the everyday world and the universe and so claim to be a robust realist about the entities discovered by natural science. Moreover, he has the conceptual resources to turn his description of these phenomena into a persuasive defense of robust realism. 5. Source: The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (#6J5MKL), Eike von Savigny, Karin Knorr Cetina, Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 164 Context: #MTDRS9 Part III #AZ29RJ Posthumanist challenges #BFYA8N How Heidegger defends the possibility of a correspondence theory of truth with respect to the entities of natural science #ZHKHLP Heidegger's attempt at robust realism Matching excerpt #HH9A44: In addition, when Heidegger later investigates how scientific research as an institution works, he claims that research is based on what he calls the projection of a total ground-plan (Heidegger 1977b). Research, he claims, is a modern way of studying nature that proceeds by setting up a total theory of how nature works and then dealing with the anomalies that show up when the theory is assumed to cover all phenomena. Thus, normal science has, for Heidegger, the ongoing job of trying to account for anomalies, while revolutionary advances in science occur when resistant anomalies lead scientists to propose a new ground-plan. 12 6. Source: The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (#6J5MKL), Eike von Savigny, Karin Knorr Cetina, Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 189 Context: #MTDRS9 Part III #6FS2RF Practice and posthumanismSocial theory and a history of agency #26M2QV Objectal practice #BXQMJZ The relational undergirding of epistemic practice Matching excerpt #ZJPE85: When Heidegger analyzed our instrumental being-in-the-world as a form of un-self-conscious but nonetheless goal-directed employment of equipment in its referential context he also pointed out what happens when equipment becomes problematic (Heidegger 1962:98ff.); then we go from 'absorbed coping' to 'envisaging,' 'deliberate coping' and to the scientific stance of 'theoretical reflection' on the properties of entities. This characterization recaptures the ones I have given, with perhaps one difference. Heidegger came to characterize knowledge in terms of a theoretical attitude that entails 'withholding' of practical reason. He gave an important characterization of how the project of science appears derivative of the primordial stance of taking things for granted in everyday life. But, at the same time, his characterization provided less than an adequate account of knowledge processes—in which the presence of equipment is massive, instrumentality prevails, and theorizing rather appeals to us as being itself a form of practice. With the notion of a theoretical attitude, Heidegger brought back into the picture the subject-object differentiation which he had wanted to drive out of the philosophical discourse with his definition of 'Dasein' as a form of concerned coping ('Self and world belong together in the single entity, Dasein. Self and world are not two entities, like subject and object': cf. Dreyfus 1995:67ff.). But perhaps as a consequence of his larger project, Heidegger never quite gave situations of subject-object distanciation the same consideration and attention that he gave to concerned coping. Theoretical knowledge, for Heidegger, remained a form of 'thematizing' that objectifies 7. Source: The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (#6J5MKL), Eike von Savigny, Karin Knorr Cetina, Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 169 Context: #MTDRS9 Part III #AZ29RJ Posthumanist challenges #BFYA8N How Heidegger defends the possibility of a correspondence theory of truth with respect to the entities of natural science #86PS3T Notes Matching excerpt #R5Y6W7: already in Being and Time , that without Dasein there would be no before and after. But Heidegger also says in a lecture given in 1928 and published in 1978: 'The question of the extent to which one might conceive the interpretation of Dasein as temporality in a universal-ontological way is a question which I am myself not able to decide—one which is still completely unclear to me' (Heidegger 1984: 210). I think Heidegger should have realized that the occurrent time of nature escapes idealism since it can be understood not in terms of our everyday sense of a before and after but only as an asymmetrical ordering of states. 8. Source: Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social (#VKBZ23), Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 237 Context: #Y39Y67 Notes #DK2B4G Chapter 4 Matching excerpt #W5497X: 40. For greater explication and contextualization of the following interpretation of Heidegger's notion of signifying, see my "Wittgenstein + Heidegger on the Stream of Life," Inquiry 36, no. 3 (September 1993), pp. 307–328. I explain there that Heidegger does not present his views on understanding and Befindlichkeit as a contribution to an analysis of action, and that my interpretation, as suggested by the translation of Befindlichkeit as "attunement," abstracts from many of his central concerns in Being and Time . I also try in that article to explain in detail why Wittgenstein's account of life conditions and Heidegger's description of signifying are not merely compatible with one another but, in an important sense, coextensive. For a propitious account of understanding and Befindlichkeit that construes their relation to action differently, but not too differently from how it is sketched here, see Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time , Division I, chap. 10 and 11. 9. Source: Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social (#VKBZ23), Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 227 Context: #Y39Y67 Notes #X6DAB4 Chapter 2 Matching excerpt #KXCJMR: 7. This latter formulation is Heidegger's "formal" definition of a phenomenon. See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time , tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Oxford, Blackwell, 1978, pp. 51–55. The notion of an arena in which unvarnished reality presents itself unites – and is partly definitive of – twentieth-century phenomenology. The connections of Husserl's, Heidegger's, and Merleau-Ponty's conception of a phenomenal realm with Wittgenstein's use of the terms Erscheinungen and Phänomene cannot be further explored here. Unfortunately, this parallel is not examined in the one book that compares Wittgenstein to these thinkers in detail, Nicholas F. Gier, 10. Source: Patchworks of Care - ETHICS AND PRACTICE OF CARE IN THE ORGANIC FOOD MOVEMENT IN LATVIA (#ZC3PHV), Agnese Bankovska, p. 26 Context: #6HSN74 Chapter 1Introduction #AGS84E Research questions and main theoretical discussions #F9LFBK What care? Matching excerpt #QHNQ3X: Care has been largely overlooked in the development of Western thought, lingering on the margins of the bigger philosophical, moral and ethical debates if present at all. A rare exception to this is the work of phenomenologist Heidegger who spoke about care as being-in-the-world and being-together-with-things . To Heidegger, the concept of care was primarily a 'primordial structural totality' and 'an existential a priori '. He also saw it as a phenomenon that prioritises the 'practical' (quotation marks in original) rather than theoretical behaviour. Heidegger argued that Approximate matches 1. Source: The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill (#3LSRBZ), Tim Ingold, p. 361 Context: #E9SHKF Part III #5B4XYC Skill #RLW3J5 On weaving a basket #SWJ2J4 MAKING AS A WAY OF WEAVING Score: 0.637 Related excerpt #M5T9PZ: The philosopher Martin Heidegger expressed the very same point through an exploration of the notions of building and dwelling (see Chapter Ten, pp. 185–6). Opposing the modernist convention that dwelling is an activity that goes on within, and is structured by, an environment that is already built, Heidegger argued that we cannot engage in any kind of building activity unless we already dwell within our surroundings. 'Only 2. Source: The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill (#3LSRBZ), Tim Ingold, p. 199 Context: #6PPCBM Part II #76LAV7 Dwelling #KGP8HK How animals and people make themselves at home in the world #9PKKJV THE DWELLING PERSPECTIVE Score: 0.594 Related excerpt #3GE86B: Heidegger tackles the issue through an exercise in etymology. The current German word for the verb ‘to build’, bauen , comes from the Old English and High German buan , meaning ‘to dwell’. Though this original meaning has been lost, it is preserved in such compounds as the English ‘neighbour’, meaning one who dwells nearby. Moreover, this sense of dwelling was not limited to one sphere of activity among many – to domestic life, say, as opposed to work or travel. Rather it encompassed the whole manner in which one lives one’s life on the earth; thus ‘I dwell, you dwell’ is identical to ‘I am, you are’. Yet bauen has another sense: to preserve, to care for, or more specifically to cultivate or to till the soil. And then there is the third sense: to construct, to make something, to raise up an edifice. Both these modern senses of building – as cultivation and as construction – are thus shown to be encompassed within the more fundamental sense of dwelling. In the course of time, however, this underlying sense has fallen into disuse, such that bauen has come to be reserved exclusively for cultivation and construction. Having forgotten how the latter activities are grounded in dwelling, modern thought then redis-covers dwelling as the occupation of a world already built. 3. Source: The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill (#3LSRBZ), Tim Ingold, p. 183 Context: #6PPCBM Part II #76LAV7 Dwelling #4P9JNF Culture, perception and cognition #TBRWCX COGNITIVE SCIENCE #KHXT42 PHENOMENOLOGY Score: 0.588 Related excerpt #4PAVQW: entities – to render them intelligible – by categorising them, and assigning to them meanings or functions, before they can be made available for use. Heidegger, however, reverses this order of priority. For a being whose primary condition of existence is that of dwelling in the world, things are initially encountered in their availability, as already integrated into a set of practices for 'coping' or getting by. To reveal their occurrent properties, things have to be rendered unintelligible by stripping away the significance they derive from contexts of ordinary use. This, of course, is the explicit project of natural science, which seeks to describe and explain a world which the rest of us are preoccupied with living in. Yet the scientist, like everyone else, is a being-in-the-world, and scientific practice, as any other skilled activity, draws unselfconsciously upon the available. Thus even science, however detached and theoretical it may be, takes place against a background of involved activity. The total disengagement of the subject from the world, from which Cartesianism charts a process of building up from the occurrent to the available, is therefore a pure fiction which can only be reached by extrapolating to the point of absurdity a progressive reduction from the available to the occurrent. 4. Source: The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (#6J5MKL), Eike von Savigny, Karin Knorr Cetina, Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 161 Context: #MTDRS9 Part III #AZ29RJ Posthumanist challenges #BFYA8N How Heidegger defends the possibility of a correspondence theory of truth with respect to the entities of natural science #ZHKHLP Heidegger's attempt at robust realism Score: 0.62 Related excerpt #DJS75E: Like Davidson, Heidegger answers the skeptic by showing that our practices and the everyday world are inextricably intertwined. Indeed, he argues at length that 'Dasein is the world existingly' (Heidegger 1962:416). 4 Moreover, Heidegger seems to agree with the deflationary realists that, while entities show up as independent of us, the being or intelligibility of entities depends on our practices. So any talk of things in themselves must be put in scare quotes. Thus, Heidegger says of natural entities: 5. Source: The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (#6J5MKL), Eike von Savigny, Karin Knorr Cetina, Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 163 Context: #MTDRS9 Part III #AZ29RJ Posthumanist challenges #BFYA8N How Heidegger defends the possibility of a correspondence theory of truth with respect to the entities of natural science #ZHKHLP Heidegger's attempt at robust realism Score: 0.611 Related excerpt #7DAR8R: 1962:412, Heidegger's emphasis). 7 Our practices for coping with the available are significantly different from our practices for dealing with the occurrent. Thus, Heidegger understands this changeover from dealing with things as available to dealing with them as occurrent as discontinuous. This changeover is crucial for Heidegger's answer to deflationary realism. 6. Source: The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (#6J5MKL), Eike von Savigny, Karin Knorr Cetina, Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 166 Context: #MTDRS9 Part III #AZ29RJ Posthumanist challenges #BFYA8N How Heidegger defends the possibility of a correspondence theory of truth with respect to the entities of natural science #ZHKHLP Heidegger's attempt at robust realism Score: 0.608 Related excerpt #NMYZJG: Thus, Heidegger held that reference need not commit one to any essential features; rather, it binds one to investigate, in whatever way is appropriate to the domain, which features, if any, of an object referred to by its inessential features are essential. Heidegger continues: 7. Source: The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (#6J5MKL), Eike von Savigny, Karin Knorr Cetina, Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 164 Context: #MTDRS9 Part III #AZ29RJ Posthumanist challenges #BFYA8N How Heidegger defends the possibility of a correspondence theory of truth with respect to the entities of natural science #ZHKHLP Heidegger's attempt at robust realism Score: 0.6 Related excerpt #37R3C5: Heidegger clearly wants to embrace robust realism, for he exceeds the limits of deflationary realism when he writes: '[T]he fact that reality is ontologically grounded in the being of Dasein, does not signify that only when Dasein exists and as long as Dasein exists, can the real be as that which in itself it is' (Heidegger, 1962:255, my italics). 8. Source: The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (#6J5MKL), Eike von Savigny, Karin Knorr Cetina, Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 190 Context: #MTDRS9 Part III #6FS2RF Practice and posthumanismSocial theory and a history of agency #26M2QV Objectal practice #BXQMJZ The relational undergirding of epistemic practice Score: 0.588 Related excerpt #DLKV2R: objects from a position of detachment. Heidegger did not develop the idea that this 'detachment' simultaneously makes possible relationships in which one can dwell and which can be extended and unfolded through relational mechanisms and resources. I take the position that Heidegger's detachment should rather be recast in terms of the notion of differentiation (between subject and object); that differentiation entails the possibility of a nexus between differentiated entities which provides for our integration in the world (for a form of being-in-the-world); and that this form of being-in-relation also defines a form of 'practice'—in particular, it defines epistemic practice. 9. Source: Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social (#VKBZ23), Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 226 Context: #Y39Y67 Notes #6M6KJP Chapter 1 Score: 0.628 Related excerpt #QE7RLX: 15. These words are borrowed from Martin Heidegger, Being and Time , tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Oxford, Blackwell, 1978, sec. 18 and 34. 10. Source: Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social (#VKBZ23), Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 236 Context: #Y39Y67 Notes #DK2B4G Chapter 4 Score: 0.596 Related excerpt #H59RW4: 26. Cf. Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," in Basic Writings , ed. David Krell, New York, Harper and Row, 1977, p. 193. ### 5. Tool result: search_text Exact matches 1. Source: The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill (#3LSRBZ), Tim Ingold, p. 261 Context: #6PPCBM Part II #76LAV7 Dwelling #6BU7XY Vision, hearing and human movement #W78CVP THE WRITTEN WORD AND THE SOUNDS OF SPEECH Matching excerpt #4AG9VN: Nowhere is the ambivalence surrounding attitudes to vision and hearing more evident than in Western ideas about language, and above all about the distinction between speech and writing. The distrust of writing is a recurrent theme throughout the history of Western thought. Ever since Plato and Aristotle, philosophers have tended to regard writing as an exterior, visible facade for the inner sonic reality of spoken words. Plato, in the Phaedrus (274–7), has Socrates declare that writing provides no more than 'the appearance and not the reality of wisdom' (Plato 1973). For Aristotle, only the spoken word truly represents mental experience, while the written word stands for the spoken one (Aristotle 1938: 115). Rousseau, for whom writing was 'nothing but the representation of speech', complained bitterly (in writing of course) about the prestige and attention accorded by his contemporaries to writing when it was no more than a contrived and inauthentic cover for the real thing (Derrida 1974: 36). And two of the giants of twentieth-century linguistics held to much the same opinion. For Bloomfield (1933: 21) writing was 'merely a way of recording language by visible marks', while according to Saussure (1959: 23), 'language and writing are two distinct systems of signs; the second exists for the sole purpose of representing the first'. In a famous image (Figure 14.1), Saussure located language at the interface between thought and sound, as though human consciousness – the realm of ideas – hovered over an ocean of sound like air over water (1959: 112). 2. Source: The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (#6J5MKL), Eike von Savigny, Karin Knorr Cetina, Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 170 Context: #MTDRS9 Part III #AZ29RJ Posthumanist challenges #BFYA8N How Heidegger defends the possibility of a correspondence theory of truth with respect to the entities of natural science #86PS3T Notes Matching excerpt #BLJ5NY: Here Heidegger is obviously trying to counter the claim that Galileo has refuted Aristotle. But he is not doing so, as Kuhn does in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , by holding that neither theory is true of nature, but rather by holding that both are true. This could be the innocuous observation that both are 'illuminating,' but in the context of another of Heidegger's remarks, namely, 'that what is represented by physics is indeed nature itself, but undeniably it is only nature as the object-area, whose objectness is first defined and determined through the refining that is characteristic of physics' (Heidegger 1977c: 173-4), it must be the stronger claim that different theories can reveal different aspects of nature. Of course, if one thinks of Aristotle's theory of natural place as an account of physical causality meant to explain, for example, why rocks fall, in the same sense that modern physics claims to explain that phenomenon, his position is untenable. The law-like gravitational account given by modern physics, as far as we know, is right and Aristotle is simply wrong. It may well be, however, as Heidegger holds, that Aristotle and Galileo were asking different kinds of questions , and so each could be right about a different kind of causality. 3. Source: The Simple Bare Necessities- Scales and Paradoxes of Thrift on a London Public Housing Estate (#7RVN6J), Catherine Alexander, p. 2 Context: #NVBVQ9 The Simple Bare Necessities: Scales and Paradoxes of Thrift on a London Public Housing Estate #G8D4LE INTRODUCTION Matching excerpt #J7PLJP: The more normative cultural-historical accounts (Hulme 2019a; Yates and Davison Hunter 2011; and Yarrow 2014) usefully highlight two distinct meanings of thrift. In its premodern appearances it was coterminous with its cognate "thriving," not in the etiolated sense of economic wealth but, as Alison Hulme nicely suggests (2019a), more akin to Aristotle's eudaimonia : human flourishing (Aristotle 2004; see also Fischer 2014: 2). This sense echoes through Thoreau's commitment to simplicity and heightened awareness of being-in-the-world, as well as twentieth-century anti-capitalist movements that emphasized steady state economies (Daly 1973) degrowth and ecological sustainability (Kallis, Kerschner, and Martinez-Alier 2012). Such thriving chimes with Gudeman and Rivera's idea of household replenishment (1990). There is more to this premodern thrift, however. It was a condition rather than a virtue or trait, appearing in this form as late as 1679 when John Bunyan used it to refer to "a state of being ... of blessedness" (Yates and Hunter 2011: 11). Chaucer uses thrift variously to mean "luck" in Troilus and Criseyde , Book III (1957: 434, line 1249), "skill" in The Reeve's Tale ( ibid. : 57, line 4049), "suitability" in The Man of Law's Tale ( ibid. : 62, line 46), and "prosperity" in The Canon Yeoman's Tale ( ibid. : 215, line 739). Thrift qua profit appears once, alongside these other meanings (Cady 2019: 137). Chaucer's fourteenth century marked the start of the early modern period when an urban, merchant, middle class became established and thrift in the service of profit emerged as a quintessentially bourgeois virtue (McCloskey 2006a; 2006b) and has largely occluded, but not 4. Source: Thrift and Its Paradoxes: From Domestic to Political Economy (#8YF7LY), Catherine Alexander, Daniel Sosna, p. 227 Context: #NQ2SZK Index Matching excerpt #GWH3ZF: oeconomia (Aristotle), 209 5. Source: Thrift and Its Paradoxes: From Domestic to Political Economy (#8YF7LY), Catherine Alexander, Daniel Sosna, p. 45 Context: #Y8JW9E Thrift and Its ParadoxesFrom Domestic to Political Economy #KMKRAQ Making Savings #WW3DSM Early Texts Matching excerpt #HL8J3X: Thrift does not appear in Aristotle's seminal text Politics . He focuses on the management of the household and its internal relationships, such as the relation of master to slave, husband to wife, and parents to children: "the business of household management is concerned more with human beings than it is with inanimate property" (1946: 33). Household economy is not directed to acquisition but to securing necessities, and household life is not a means to an end but a complete action ( praxis ). Aristotle is aware that 6. Source: Thrift and Its Paradoxes: From Domestic to Political Economy (#8YF7LY), Catherine Alexander, Daniel Sosna, p. 46 Context: #Y8JW9E Thrift and Its ParadoxesFrom Domestic to Political Economy #KMKRAQ Making Savings #WW3DSM Early Texts Matching excerpt #T2WT5A: Like Aristotle’s Politics , Xenophon’s fourth-century BCE text on household management (1923) had a formative impact on those to follow. It was translated from the Greek by Cicero and became known among Roman writers on agriculture, who through their texts influenced practices of succeeding centuries. Xenophon speaks of increasing “the estate by showing a balance” (1923: 363), but the recognition of gain is subsidiary to that of running the estate through careful management (1923: 517). 7. Source: Thrift and Its Paradoxes: From Domestic to Political Economy (#8YF7LY), Catherine Alexander, Daniel Sosna, p. 46 Context: #Y8JW9E Thrift and Its ParadoxesFrom Domestic to Political Economy #KMKRAQ Making Savings #WW3DSM Early Texts Matching excerpt #98D3D8: monetary gains can be made, and he recounts some of the ways in which fortunes are amassed through monopoly control of resources (1946: 30–31), but household possessions are for use. They are not instruments for the accomplishment of something else nor is the house directed to ceaseless acquisition, which falls within the unnatural realm of exchange. Because the use of currency pertains mostly to “retail trade,” which is not a household function, the house management of money is not Aristotle’s concern. 8. Source: Thrift and Its Paradoxes: From Domestic to Political Economy (#8YF7LY), Catherine Alexander, Daniel Sosna, p. 56 Context: #Y8JW9E Thrift and Its ParadoxesFrom Domestic to Political Economy #KMKRAQ Making Savings #WGGRQA Hoarding and Keynes Matching excerpt #VF2NEH: The anthropologist wonders whether the economist has it back to front, for to judge by the Colombian ethnography it would appear that many of those "voices in the air" come first from the practices and articulations of living folk and are then frantically distilled and transformed by academic economists into textual forms that—as the writings of Aristotle, Xenophon, Cato, Aquinas, Smith, Mill, and Keynes suggest—have their persuasive force on one another and on the long conversation in which we all participate. 9. Source: Thrift and Its Paradoxes: From Domestic to Political Economy (#8YF7LY), Catherine Alexander, Daniel Sosna, p. 218 Context: #Y8JW9E Thrift and Its ParadoxesFrom Domestic to Political Economy #M2EGC2 Afterword Matching excerpt #TV23NN: At the end of his contribution, Stephen Gudeman (Chapter 1) quotes and modifies Keynes: the most powerful ideas of renowned European scholars originate with the people in what Gudeman calls the “house model” of economy. This was the dominant model from Aristotle’s oeconomia to Max Weber’s concept of haushalten . The aim is secure, solid management, not monetary gain (profit). Thrift in the everyday sense of the Colombian peasant, Gudeman shows us, is about muddling through and making ends meet, not the accumulation of capital. 10. Source: Toward an Ecology of Materials (#MB6S7L), Tim Ingold, p. 5 Context: #FBMEJJ INTRODUCTION #JTFQD9 MATERIALS AND MATERIALITY Matching excerpt #NDBG84: Underpinning this notion is a certain understanding of artifacts and of what it means to make things that has pervaded the Western intellectual tradition ever since it was first explicitly formulated by Aristotle. Any thing, Aristotle had reasoned, is a compound of matter ( hyle ) and form ( morphe ), which are brought together in the act of its creation. Accordingly, making begins with a form in mind and a formless lump of “raw material,” and it ends when form and matter are united in the complete artifact. In the history of modern thought, this hylomorphic model of creation was both further entrenched and increasingly unbalanced. Form came to be seen as actively imposed, whereas matter—thus rendered passive and inert—became that which was imposed upon. When, in the late 1960s, biological anthropologist Ralph Holloway (1969, p. 395), following a long line of predecessors, once more reclaimed culture as a distinctively human domain, defined by “the imposition of arbitrary form upon the environment,” we can clearly see this modern version of hylomorphism at work. Culture furnishes the forms, nature the materials; in the superimposition of the one upon the other, human beings create the material culture with which, to an ever-increasing extent, they surround themselves. Approximate matches 1. Source: The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill (#3LSRBZ), Tim Ingold, p. 110 Context: #C3CZAH Part I #SJZFFY INTRODUCTION #Y6FFP4 A circumpolar night's dream #37G5TK LIVING THINGS AND BEING ALIVE Score: 0.392 Related excerpt #UZNZ38: Ever since Plato and Aristotle, it has been customary in the West to envisage the world of nature as made up of a multitude of discrete objects, things, each with its own integrity and essential properties. These things may be grouped into classes of varying degrees of inclusiveness on the basis of selected properties that they are perceived to possess in common. One major class, known as 'animate', comprises all those things that are said to possess the property of life. All remaining things, that do not possess this property, are 'inanimate'. There has been much debate about what it takes for something to be alive: vitalists argued for the existence of some mysterious life-force that they thought was infused into all organisms; mechanists dismissed the idea as unscientific hocus-pocus, but in their enthusiasm to reduce organisms to clockwork they virtually dissolved the animate into the category of the inanimate. The problem was only resolved, after a fashion, by the discovery of the DNA molecule, popularly hailed as the 'secret of life', which seemed to offer a basis for distinguishing living things that satisfied the objective canons of natural science. Throughout all this debate, however, one fundamental idea has remained unquestioned, namely that life is a qualifying attribute of objects. We look for it in a world that already consists of things-in-themselves, whose essential nature is given without regard to their positioning and involvement within wider fields of relations. 2. Source: The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (#6J5MKL), Eike von Savigny, Karin Knorr Cetina, Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 170 Context: #MTDRS9 Part III #AZ29RJ Posthumanist challenges #BFYA8N How Heidegger defends the possibility of a correspondence theory of truth with respect to the entities of natural science #86PS3T Notes Score: 0.463 Related excerpt #FF4PAP: [W]e cannot] say that the Galilean doctrine of freely falling bodies is true and that Aristotle's teaching, that light bodies strive upward, is false; for the Greek understanding of the essence of body and place and of the relation between the two rests upon a different interpretation of entities and hence conditions a correspondingly different kind of seeing and questioning of natural events. No one would presume to maintain that Shakespeare's poetry is more advanced than that of Aeschylus. It is still more impossible to say that the modern understanding of whatever is, is more correct than that of the Greeks (Heidegger 1977b: 117). 3. Source: The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (#6J5MKL), Eike von Savigny, Karin Knorr Cetina, Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 60 Context: #YTXLA2 Part I #NM2CWR Practices and social orders #WE73JT Practice mind-ed orders #D5JRCX Practices and their mental organization Score: 0.392 Related excerpt #MVGQZ8: Rules, however, only intermittently and never simpliciter determine what people specifically do. A more omnipresent determinant of practical intelligibility is thus called for. I incline toward drawing on Aristotelian/Heideggerian intuitions and identifying this third factor as a mix of teleology and affectivity. Teleology, as noted, is orientations toward ends, while affectivity is how things matter. What makes sense to a person to do largely depends on the matters for the sake of which she is prepared to act, on how she will proceed for the sake of achieving or possessing those matters, and on how things matter to her; thus on her ends, the projects and tasks she will carry out for the sake of those ends given her beliefs, hopes, and expectations, and her emotions and moods. Practical intelligibility is teleologically and affectively determined. 4. Source: Thrift and Its Paradoxes: From Domestic to Political Economy (#8YF7LY), Catherine Alexander, Daniel Sosna, p. 45 Context: #Y8JW9E Thrift and Its ParadoxesFrom Domestic to Political Economy #KMKRAQ Making Savings #WW3DSM Early Texts Score: 0.467 Related excerpt #HL8J3X: Thrift does not appear in Aristotle's seminal text Politics . He focuses on the management of the household and its internal relationships, such as the relation of master to slave, husband to wife, and parents to children: "the business of household management is concerned more with human beings than it is with inanimate property" (1946: 33). Household economy is not directed to acquisition but to securing necessities, and household life is not a means to an end but a complete action ( praxis ). Aristotle is aware that 5. Source: The Force of Things (#P7EWHQ), Jane Bennett, p. 23 Context: #VH85EA The Force of Things : Steps toward an Ecology of Matter #9LHZPC NOTES Score: 0.458 Related excerpt #CLR7EX: 31. Lucretius, De Rerum Natura , (II, 216), in John Gaskin, ed., The Epicurean Philosophers (New York: Everyman, 1995). 6. Source: The Force of Things (#P7EWHQ), Jane Bennett, p. 11 Context: #VH85EA The Force of Things : Steps toward an Ecology of Matter #9M3W8D CONTENDING MATERIALITIES #RAH9EU A NAIVE MOMENT Score: 0.455 Related excerpt #QXKWSG: physics, ontology, and ethics. I admire Lucretius's audacity: he claims to describe the world as it is with or without us, for the most part ignoring the mediating role and idiosyncratic status of his perceptions, his Latin, his "paganism." 7. Source: The Force of Things (#P7EWHQ), Jane Bennett, p. 24 Context: #VH85EA The Force of Things : Steps toward an Ecology of Matter #9LHZPC NOTES Score: 0.446 Related excerpt #4P8GXZ: 37. Lucretius, for example, says that "it is right to have this truth . . . surely sealed and to keep it stored in your remembering mind, that there is not one of all the things, whose nature is seen before our face, which is built of one kind of primordia, nor anything which is not created of well-mingled seed. And whatever possesses within it more forces and powers, it thus shows that there are in it most kinds of primordia and diverse shapes" (II, 581). 8. Source: The Force of Things (#P7EWHQ), Jane Bennett, p. 23 Context: #VH85EA The Force of Things : Steps toward an Ecology of Matter #9LHZPC NOTES Score: 0.42 Related excerpt #V6TL73: arbiter in the determination of matter" (p. 75). He wants to pick "the lock that currently bars the literary critic from addressing the problem of material substance" (p. 77). 9. Source: The Force of Things (#P7EWHQ), Jane Bennett, p. 22 Context: #VH85EA The Force of Things : Steps toward an Ecology of Matter #9LHZPC NOTES Score: 0.396 Related excerpt #NRALNC: 19. Spinoza imagines the world as an infinite substance with many, many modes, each of which can be thought of, interchangeably, as a body-in-space or as an idea. Bodies and ideas operate in perfect tandem though also perfectly uncontaminated by each other. Spinoza's parallelism may disqualify him from being classified as a materialist, though bodies and their encounters do occupy a crucial place in his ontological imaginary. Moreover, Spinoza tends to emphasize the special status of human bodies/ideas. Human relations of movement and rest have the unique potential to organize themselves "under the guidance of reason" and be "determined . . . to act in a way required by . . . [one's] own nature considered only in itself" rather than "by things external." Baruch Spinoza, Ethics , trans. Samuel Shirley. (New York: Hackett, 1992), 174. This is why Spinoza says that humans are right to make use of animals as we please and deal with them as best suits us, "seeing that they do not agree with us in nature" (p. 174). (Though Spinoza does say that all bodies are animate in the sense of possessing a conatus or vitalistic drive to persevere.) 10. Source: Materiality (#R26U48), Daniel Miller, p. 167 Context: #49Y6EC MATERIALITY #PQJB2C Does Money Matter? Abstraction and Substitution in Alternative Financial Forms #ZW75L8 NOTES Score: 0.416 Related excerpt #YSD38D: 20. See Shell 1978: 64. In Plato's Philebus (25a), Socrates analogizes "classification and minting: 'We ought to do our best to collect all such kinds as are torn and split apart, and stamp a single character on them'" (Shell 1978: 62n). ### 6. Assistant tool calls #### Tool call: `read` ```json { "blocks": [ "MVGQZ8", "ET8H3W", "MR6SKV" ] } ``` ### 7. Tool result: read PAPER EXCERPT #MVGQZ8 Document: #6J5MKL The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory Context: #6J5MKL The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory #YTXLA2 Part I #NM2CWR Practices and social orders #WE73JT Practice mind-ed orders #D5JRCX Practices and their mental organization #MVGQZ8 excerpt Rules, however, only intermittently and never simpliciter determine what people specifically do. A more omnipresent determinant of practical intelligibility is thus called for. I incline toward drawing on Aristotelian/Heideggerian intuitions and identifying this third factor as a mix of teleology and affectivity. Teleology, as noted, is orientations toward ends, while affectivity is how things matter. What makes sense to a person to do largely depends on the matters for the sake of which she is prepared to act, on how she will proceed for the sake of achieving or possessing those matters, and on how things matter to her; thus on her ends, the projects and tasks she will carry out for the sake of those ends given her beliefs, hopes, and expectations, and her emotions and moods. Practical intelligibility is teleologically and affectively determined. PAPER EXCERPT #ET8H3W Document: #KWZ2A4 Theories of Practice and Sustainable Consumption Context: #KWZ2A4 Theories of Practice and Sustainable Consumption #STMANK Theories of Practice and Sustainable Consumption #6U6DVD 5.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEORIES OF PRACTICE #UQZN9F 5.4 AGENCY, CHANGE AND CONVERGENCE #ET8H3W excerpt Central to the further development of theories of practice for sustainable consumption has been the work of Schatzki (especially 1996, 2002). Schatzki has rigorously elaborated a social ontology of practice, in critical dialogue with the practice theories of Bourdieu, Foucault and Giddens, by way of the philosophies of Wittgenstein and Heidegger. This ontology establishes a 'strong' version of practice theory in which both social order and individuality result from practices. It asserts that there is no macro level beyond the realm of social practices, which are 'not merely "sites" of interaction but are, instead, ordering and orchestrating entities in their own right' (Shove and Walker 2010, p. 471). THESIS PARAGRAPH #MR6SKV Document: #4V8VH7 Keeping It Moving and Holding It Together: An Ethnography of Brīvbode, a Riga Swapshop Context: #4V8VH7 Keeping It Moving and Holding It Together: An Ethnography of Brīvbode, a Riga Swapshop #L759F3 Practice Theory and Consumption Work #2MV3XY Sites of Interacting Practices #MR6SKV paragraph Schatzki’s central claim is that social life always goes on as part of a mesh of practices and material arrangements. Practices are “carried on amid and determinative of, while also dependent on and altered by, material arrangements” (Schatzki 2017: 44). A practice is an organised manifold of doings and sayings; a material arrangement is composed of “interconnected human bodies, organisms, artifacts, and things” (Schatzki 2002: 38) through which practices unfold. Practices presuppose arrangements, and arrangements take their character from the practices that incorporate them. Schatzki calls these “practice-arrangement nexuses… sites of the social” (2017: 44). On this view, practices are “not merely ‘sites’ of interaction but… ordering and orchestrating entities in their own right” (Shove and Walker 2010: 471, characterising Schatzki). ### 8. Assistant Here's the philosophical lineage running through your theoretical framework, with sources from your corpus: ## Schatzki's debt to Heidegger and Aristotle Schatzki's social ontology is "rigorously elaborated... by way of the philosophies of Wittgenstein and Heidegger" (Warde & Welch, #ET8H3W). The Heideggerian inheritance shows up in three concrete places that matter for your thesis: **1. Practical intelligibility as teleology + affectivity.** This is where Aristotle and Heidegger fuse explicitly. Schatzki writes: "I incline toward drawing on Aristotelian/Heideggerian intuitions and identifying this third factor as a mix of teleology and affectivity… What makes sense to a person to do largely depends on the matters for the sake of which she is prepared to act… and on how things matter to her" (Schatzki, #MVGQZ8). The Aristotelian bit is *telos* — action oriented toward ends. The Heideggerian bit is *Befindlichkeit* / attunement — how things matter, how moods disclose a world. Together they become Schatzki's **teleoaffective structure**, one of the components organising every practice. **2. Equipment, availability, and arrangements.** Heidegger's distinction between *Zuhandenheit* (availability/ready-to-hand) and *Vorhandenheit* (occurrent/present-at-hand) — equipment "gets its intelligibility from its relation to other equipment, human roles, and social goals" (Dreyfus on Heidegger, #CZR8QA) — is the philosophical ancestor of Schatzki's "material arrangements" through which practices unfold. Your paragraph #MR6SKV is already operating on this terrain: things at brīvbode are intelligible through the practices that incorporate them, not as bare objects. **3. Praxis (Aristotle).** Aristotle's *praxis* — action that is its own end, complete in itself, distinct from *poiesis* (production for an external end) — sits behind practice theory's whole insistence that practices are not just means to outcomes. Alexander notes this directly in the thrift volume: for Aristotle, "household life is not a means to an end but a complete action (praxis)" (#HL8J3X). And Aristotelian *eudaimonia* — flourishing — is what Alexander recovers as the older meaning of thrift (#J7PLJP), which could be useful for you when thinking about what brīvbode participants are *for the sake of*. ## Why this matters for brīvbode You don't need to write a philosophy chapter, but the lineage gives you license to: - Treat the swapshop as a **practice-arrangement nexus** (Schatzki via Heidegger): items become *what they are* — gift, junk, rescue, treasure — through the practices that take them up. - Use **teleoaffective structure** to talk about the shared ends and moods at brīvbode (the "for the sake of which") without flattening them to "values" or "motivations." - If thrift/eudaimonia comes up, you have a clean Aristotelian thread (via Alexander) connecting practice-theoretic ends to a tradition of *flourishing* rather than *saving money*. The most efficient citation chain for a footnote: Schatzki #MVGQZ8 (the Aristotelian/Heideggerian self-description), backed by Warde & Welch #ET8H3W (the secondary characterisation). ### 9. User i wonder how his teleoaffective structure relates to macintyre ### 10. Assistant tool calls #### Tool call: `search_text` ```json { "query": "MacIntyre practice virtue" } ``` #### Tool call: `search_text` ```json { "query": "MacIntyre internal goods telos" } ``` ### 11. Tool result: search_text Exact matches 1. Source: The Dynamics of Social Practice (#5AXAEJ), Elizabeth Shove, Matt Watson, Mika Pantzar, p. 89 Context: #NXZT4D RECRUITMENT, DEFECTION AND REPRODUCTION #8JX39Z COLLAPSE AND TRANSFORMATION: THE DYNAMICS OF DEFECTION Matching excerpt #4P8MD9: The first has to do with the extent and character of what MacIntyre describes as 'internal rewards' (MacIntyre, 1985). In brief, the idea is that performing a practice well, that is in terms of standards that are part and parcel of the definition of a practice itself, is of immediate, internal reward. For example, being an excellent teacher is satisfying in and of itself and not (only) because this role attracts public recognition or a good salary, these being external rather than internal rewards. There are certainly some for whom hula-hooping is, in these terms, internally rewarding. However, hula-hooping's brief career might suggest that self-propelling circuits of satisfaction were limited, or distinctly short-lived. Compared with long-standing leisure pursuits like gardening, home improvement or cooking, all fields in which expertise accumulates through sequences of variously successful accomplishment and in which one project often begets another, hula-hooping appears a little thin. Though capable of retaining a handful of enthusiasts, it seems that the experience was not of itself enough to generate lasting interest nor the reward sufficient to sustain the commitment of the 125 million or more who gave hula-hooping a go. To put this observation the other way around, practices are, perhaps ironically, better able to retain commitment when they afford scope for innovation. 2. Source: The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (#6J5MKL), Eike von Savigny, Karin Knorr Cetina, Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 56 Context: #YTXLA2 Part I #NM2CWR Practices and social orders #WE73JT Practice mind-ed orders #D5JRCX Practices and their mental organization Matching excerpt #6TEVTH: The asseveration that practices embrace activity is truisitic. What more is there, however, to a practice than activity? One might propose that actions compose a practice by virtue of causal connections between them. According to this proposal, acts of, for example, negotiation, making an offer, and buying help compose the practice of economic exchange by way of inducing and responding to one another (cf. Habermas's [1987: Chapter 6, Section 2] conception of systems, as opposed to social, integration). 1 set this suggestion aside for a number of reasons, the most relevant being that causal connections between actions are mediated by what I contend organizes practices, namely, mind. Consider, then, the idea that practices are organized mentally. Stephen Turner (1994) has 3. Source: Theories of Practice and Sustainable Consumption (#KWZ2A4), Alan Warde, Daniel Welch, p. 2 Context: #STMANK Theories of Practice and Sustainable Consumption #6U6DVD 5.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEORIES OF PRACTICE Matching excerpt #MPFAVR: Recently Nicolini (2012) has surveyed in magisterial fashion the full and wide range of practice theories now in circulation. He distinguishes between: the praxeological theories of Giddens (1984) and Bourdieu (1977); practice as tradition and community (Wenger 1998; MacIntyre 1981); practice as activity (Vygotsky and cultural and historical activity theory); practice as accomplishment, in the manner of ethnomethodology; practice as the locus of the social (as in Schatzki's 1996, 2002 reworking of Heidegger and Wittgenstein); and practice as discourse, which he elaborates via conversation analysis and a review of Foucault. It is difficult to specify what these theories have in common. Nicolini (2012) concurs with Schatzki (2001) that there is no unified practice approach. Nevertheless he notes 'a number of family resemblances' among theories from which he isolates some suggestions for how to undertake empirical studies (Schatzki 2001, p. 11). Reckwitz (2002) helpfully observes that while all cultural theories oppose both the utilitarian or rational-choice models of social action and order, and the classical sociological norm-orientated model of social action and order (that is, Durkheim and Parsons), what unites the heterogeneity of practice theories is the contention that social order and action is a feature of, and established through, the field of human practices. Practice theories' central claim is to move beyond problematic dualisms like structure and agency, methodological individualism and holism, determinism and voluntarism, and subject and object. Moreover, as Schatzki (2001, p. 14) suggests, 'these accounts all undermine the traditional individual-nonindividual divide by availing themselves of features of both sides'. Social practices, then, rather than individuals (and their attitudes and preferences), norms, cultural codes, discourses, macro-level trends or social structures become the central unit of analysis; and in policy-oriented accounts of sustainable consumption, they become the central unit of intervention (Shove 2010; Shove and Walker 2010; Spurling et al. 2013). 4. Source: The Nexus of Practices: Connections, Constellations and Practitioners (#R49AUC), Allison Hui, Elizabeth Shove, Theodore Schatzki, p. 14 Context: #JZ9M7V INTRODUCTION Matching excerpt #FN8GXU: In exploring the nexus of practices, contributors address a wide range of issues. However, the approaches they take do not represent all possible strategies. 'Practice' is a rich polysemic word that, in addition to denoting organised arrays of action, also highlights the necessary embeddedness of human activity in social and material contexts and the relentlessly unfolding character of action and sequences of performances. Given these different meanings, it is perhaps not surprising that the range of 'practice approaches' has expanded and diversified over the past 30 years (Nicolini, 2012). This wider field encompasses not just the first and second generation practice theories mentioned above, but also so-called 'practice-based studies' that emphasise the concept of situated action (e.g. Gherardi, 2008), MacIntyrian conceptions that attribute internal goods to practices (MacIntyre, 1981), forms of discourse theory that focus on practices (e.g. Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; Scollon, 2001) and traditions such as ethnomethodology that underline the processional quality of human social activity. Further afield, but not unrelated, lie endeavours such as 5. Source: The Nexus of Practices: Connections, Constellations and Practitioners (#R49AUC), Allison Hui, Elizabeth Shove, Theodore Schatzki, p. 116 Context: #RYNGP9 IS SMALL THE ONLY BEAUTIFUL? #NYECJK Three theory method packages through which to study large-scale phenomena from a practice-based perspective #J5Y9DU Uncovering the interconnection between practices through systematic analysis Matching excerpt #JL434N: colleagues (Kemmis, 2005; 2010; Kemmis and Mutton, 2012; Kemmis et al. , 2014). In a number of works spanning a decade, these authors have developed a sophisticated grammar and set of methodological principles to understand and represent practices and their ecologies. Kemmis and colleagues conceive of practices as socially established cooperative human activities composed of the hanging together of saying, doings and social relations. These activities are organised around projects and by virtue of being reproduced in time, they assume the character of practice traditions. When participants engage in activities in the pursuit of projects, they do the things and they speak the language that are characteristic of the practice and enter relationships building on the 'memory' provided by the practice tradition. Critically, however, doings, saying and relating only become intelligible within the pre-existing set of cultural-discursive, material-economic and social-political conditions. Such conditions both enable the unfolding of a practice (the practice memory, for example, is sedimented in the physical arrangements, language spoken, discourse used, etc.) and constrain them (they establish what can be said and done). Kemmis and colleagues call this intersubjective space, 'the architecture of practice' in effect, Kemmis' Habermasian reinterpretation of Schatzki's 'orders'. To paraphrase Marx, people bring practices into being, but not under conditions of their own choosing. However, in contrast to the traditional Marxian interpretation, the relationship between practices and architectures is two-way (Schatzki (2002) calls this a contextual relationship). When practices happen, they become part of the happening: they take up available doings, sayings and relations; they modify them; and they leave behind traces that in turn become part of the practice architecture of future activities. Activities and the architectures within which they unfold are therefore shaped by other practices and their architectures, and in turn shape them. Practices thus 'feed upon each other' (Kemmis et al. , 2014: 47) and in so doing constitute ecologies understood as 'distinctive interconnected webs of human social activities that are mutually necessary to order and sustain a practice as a practice of a particular kind and complexity (for example, a progressive educational practice)' (Kemmis and Mutton, 2012: 15). 6. Source: Consumption and Theories of Practice (#RZ8QTE), Alan Warde, p. 2 Context: #XRLTMB Consumption and Theories of Practice #42VC2R AN ABRIDGED ACCOUNT OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE Matching excerpt #TKKN3Z: In lieu of a fully integrated theory of practice I present here a minimal set of concepts and precepts to be drawn upon to explore implications for the analysis of consumption. My abridgement is indebted to Bourdieu (especially 1990[1980]), Schatzki (1996), Giddens (1984), and to a much lesser extent MacIntyre (1985), and is oriented by the very useful overview of Reckwitz (2002). A summary version of the core concepts and key minimal propositions involved in a theory of practice selected partly for their relevance to a sociology of consumption follows. 7. Source: Object Relations in Accounts of Everyday Life (#VJ8G58), Elizabeth Shove, Jenny Rinkinen, Mikko Jalas, p. 10 Context: #SYB8LM Object Relations in Accounts of Everyday Life #PWG3FB Evaluating the Material World: How Heating Should be Done Matching excerpt #WFDDS3: This mode of evaluation and implicit judgement revolves around what MacIntyre describes as the internal value of a practice (MacIntyre, 1984). In short, practices sustain and reproduce specific understandings of what it is to do them well. In so far as practices entail the use of objects, forms of material engagement are woven into the normative framework of the practice itself (Thévenot, 2001). As indicated above, practices are not approached in isolation but are instead linked to more abstract and more strategic questions concerning the structural conditions of social action. In this way the diarists remind us that the practicalities and materialities of daily life are enmeshed in webs of moral judgement. 8. Source: Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social (#VKBZ23), Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 240 Context: #Y39Y67 Notes #KT7KEE Chapter 6 Matching excerpt #E7SQB9: 13. Oakeshott construes sociality as the association of "free agents" and distinguishes two basic forms of association: association by virtue of subscription to one and the same practice and association by virtue of partnership in the pursuit of a particular purpose. What marks both as forms of Gesellschaft is that belonging to an association of either type is something fundamentally up to individual choice. See Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct , Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975, chap. 2, sec. 1-2. 9. Source: Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social (#VKBZ23), Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 202 Context: #FBR3HC Practices and Sociality #XV84DW The Sociality Established in Practices Matching excerpt #W2BVFC: A third general medium of sociality is settings of action and the spaces established there. Socialities in this medium divide into those embracing single settings (commonality) and those encompassing multiple ones (orchestration). The lives of participants in a practice often hang together by virtue of taking place within the same or different settings. 10. Source: Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social (#VKBZ23), Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 127 Context: #KZYBTY Social Practices #DJ76GD The Articulation of Intelligibility #KCEQ77 World Intelligibility Matching excerpt #YSE4AH: When a practice, as is usually the case, is carried out in specific settings, the settings are set up to facilitate the efficient and coordinated performance of its constituent actions. The layouts of the settings, as a result, reflect the interwoven meanings that the entities used in these actions possess by virtue of being so used (and talked about). Settings, in other words, are often set up as sites where a given practice or set thereof is to be carried out. When this occurs, their setups derive from the understandings, rules, and teleoaffective structure organizing the practice. The disclosure and layout of equipment within practices also, consequently, exhibits normativity, meaning that things are usually so arranged that they can be easily used in the correct and acceptable ways. 27 Approximate matches 1. Source: The Dynamics of Social Practice (#5AXAEJ), Elizabeth Shove, Matt Watson, Mika Pantzar, p. 89 Context: #NXZT4D RECRUITMENT, DEFECTION AND REPRODUCTION #8JX39Z COLLAPSE AND TRANSFORMATION: THE DYNAMICS OF DEFECTION Score: 0.548 Related excerpt #4P8MD9: The first has to do with the extent and character of what MacIntyre describes as 'internal rewards' (MacIntyre, 1985). In brief, the idea is that performing a practice well, that is in terms of standards that are part and parcel of the definition of a practice itself, is of immediate, internal reward. For example, being an excellent teacher is satisfying in and of itself and not (only) because this role attracts public recognition or a good salary, these being external rather than internal rewards. There are certainly some for whom hula-hooping is, in these terms, internally rewarding. However, hula-hooping's brief career might suggest that self-propelling circuits of satisfaction were limited, or distinctly short-lived. Compared with long-standing leisure pursuits like gardening, home improvement or cooking, all fields in which expertise accumulates through sequences of variously successful accomplishment and in which one project often begets another, hula-hooping appears a little thin. Though capable of retaining a handful of enthusiasts, it seems that the experience was not of itself enough to generate lasting interest nor the reward sufficient to sustain the commitment of the 125 million or more who gave hula-hooping a go. To put this observation the other way around, practices are, perhaps ironically, better able to retain commitment when they afford scope for innovation. 2. Source: The Simple Bare Necessities- Scales and Paradoxes of Thrift on a London Public Housing Estate (#7RVN6J), Catherine Alexander, p. 25 Context: #NVBVQ9 The Simple Bare Necessities: Scales and Paradoxes of Thrift on a London Public Housing Estate #MG2DKU CONCLUSION Score: 0.489 Related excerpt #5MMYFE: Adam Smith declared self-restraint, that classic attribute of thrift, along with respectability and decorum, to be the great and "awful" virtues compared with the "amiable virtues" of compassion and humanity (1976[1759]: 41). Smith, of course, was a theorist of the bourgeoisie with its morally cleft spheres of public and domestic concerns (Davidoff and Hall 1987). By contrast, the thrift, and indeed necessary respectability of low-income, urban households appears as a quintessentially compassionate virtue, expressed through relations of care (The Care Collective 2020) but also profoundly susceptible to dislocation and the careless virtue of austerity. 3. Source: The Ethics of Waste: How We Relate to Rubbish (#83R4U2), Gay Hawkins, p. 17 Context: #Y4M56L Contents #6EJFNY Plastic Bags #LBNA6V LEARNING TO WASTE: THE ETHOS OF DISPOSABILITY Score: 0.486 Related excerpt #ZFS94Z: For Diprose ethics are not about universal principles and transcendent moral positions. They are about modes of being in the world, or the relations between being and the world; this grounds ethics in a constitutive relation between one's habitat and embodied character, or ethos. But it is not only habitat that is implicated in embodiment, it is also relations with others. These force us to take a position, to establish an identity in and through relations of differentiation with others. And, if the recognition of difference from others is implicated in the constitution of an ethos and identity, so too is the recognition of difference from objects. Through habits we manage the circulation of objects into and out of our lives and reestablish the boundaries of the self, and this is how the cultivation of particular habits of waste removal becomes the cultivation of a particular self. 4. Source: If I Don't Do It, It Feels Wrong: Embodying Environmental Ethical Reflexivity through Cultivation and Enactment of Practices (#EDFB5G), Anne Sofie Møller Askholm, p. 2 Context: #LSKR5Q “If I don’t do it, it feels wrong”: embodying environmental ethical reflexivity through cultivation and enactment of practices #5CNCCN Introduction Score: 0.523 Related excerpt #EP5WVL: This article combines practice theory with Michel Foucault's theory of ethical self-cultivation (1988) to ascertain the role of socially constituted environmental ethics in changing everyday practices and 5. Source: If I Don't Do It, It Feels Wrong: Embodying Environmental Ethical Reflexivity through Cultivation and Enactment of Practices (#EDFB5G), Anne Sofie Møller Askholm, p. 6 Context: #LSKR5Q “If I don’t do it, it feels wrong”: embodying environmental ethical reflexivity through cultivation and enactment of practices #Z34QJ9 Methods #B27NN4 Training the bodymind Score: 0.513 Related excerpt #FLP27A: substance of ethics includes not only people's habits and competences, but also their sensorial dispositions. To embody practices and make habits stick requires both learning how to perform them and reshaping one's sensory dispositions so the bodymind experiences the new practices and habits as normal, acceptable, comfortable, and satisfactory. 6. Source: If I Don't Do It, It Feels Wrong: Embodying Environmental Ethical Reflexivity through Cultivation and Enactment of Practices (#EDFB5G), Anne Sofie Møller Askholm, p. 9 Context: #LSKR5Q “If I don’t do it, it feels wrong”: embodying environmental ethical reflexivity through cultivation and enactment of practices #U8PG6J Conclusion Score: 0.51 Related excerpt #HR65XY: The use of Foucault's theory contributes with specific attention to the ways that ethics develop, as well as details on how ethical practices can be embodied through ongoing cultivation and enactment, something that second-generation practice theories have not addressed. This article shows how people can actively influence elements in practices for self-forming activities in order to shape "the substance of ethics," meaning the parts of oneself that need to be worked on, such as consumption habits, competences, and internal sensorial, affective, and perceptual dispositions. Materiality, for instance, is not only imposed on people, but is also selected, molded, and used in ways that people deem useful in sustainable ways of practicing. The way my research participants demonstrate an active reshaping of materials and arrangements to support more sustainable practices speaks not only to the limitations and norms imposed on people and practices by materiality, but also to the interpretations and creative use of such materials for the purpose of carrying out practices in more sustainable ways. We may therefore consider how people – based on their repertoires of practices, capabilities, and understandings learned throughout their life course – are able to mingle with materiality for certain ethical purposes. Similarly, people actively build community and cultivate relationships with others with whom they share sustainable practices and interests in support of their cultivation process. In what Foucault describes as self-forming activities or techniques of the self, these components are essential: people try to compose and navigate between them in order to be able to enact ethical practices. Within a practice theoretical framework this points to how general understandings of environmental ethics can relate to and influence materiality and social relations, and how relations and community play a significant role in the reproduction and change of practices. 7. Source: Consumption and Theories of Practice (#RZ8QTE), Alan Warde, p. 16 Context: #XRLTMB Consumption and Theories of Practice #TFHBDN CONCLUSIONS Score: 0.639 Related excerpt #PTS975: Attention to practices also makes good sense of the existence of both internal and extrinsic rewards from conduct. Practices have their own integrity which is the source of internal goods, that is to say internally generated rewards, as is made most clear by MacIntyre (1985: 187–96). 8. Source: Object Relations in Accounts of Everyday Life (#VJ8G58), Elizabeth Shove, Jenny Rinkinen, Mikko Jalas, p. 10 Context: #SYB8LM Object Relations in Accounts of Everyday Life #PWG3FB Evaluating the Material World: How Heating Should be Done Score: 0.595 Related excerpt #WFDDS3: This mode of evaluation and implicit judgement revolves around what MacIntyre describes as the internal value of a practice (MacIntyre, 1984). In short, practices sustain and reproduce specific understandings of what it is to do them well. In so far as practices entail the use of objects, forms of material engagement are woven into the normative framework of the practice itself (Thévenot, 2001). As indicated above, practices are not approached in isolation but are instead linked to more abstract and more strategic questions concerning the structural conditions of social action. In this way the diarists remind us that the practicalities and materialities of daily life are enmeshed in webs of moral judgement. 9. Source: Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social (#VKBZ23), Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 109 Context: #KZYBTY Social Practices #37BEVG Dispersed Practices Score: 0.502 Related excerpt #GG6A7W: A practice is a set of considerations that governs how people act. It rules action not by specifying particular actions to perform, but by offering matters to be taken account of when acting and choosing. When observed, consequently, it qualifies the how as opposed to the what of actions. For instance, the words "civilly," "punctually," "scientifically," "legally," "morally," and "poetically" do not specify particular substantial actions. The practices of civility, science, law, morality, and poetry for which they stand are sets of considerations and procedures, which if observed qualify whatever is done as civil, punctual, scientific, legal, moral, or poetic (p. 56). The practice of morality, for example, is a "vernacular language of colloquial intercourse" (p. 63), which offers actors notions, standards, uses, rules, and maxims of good and bad conduct that they may or may not observe in acting and deciding what to do. Practices, moreover, can range from relative plasticity to "the firmness of an 'institution'"; they can overlap, form hierarchies, and join to compose more complex practices; and a given performance or choice can be governed by a variety of them (p. 56). 10. Source: Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social (#VKBZ23), Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 235 Context: #Y39Y67 Notes #DK2B4G Chapter 4 Score: 0.497 Related excerpt #D5N62R: 13. Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct , Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975, p. 55. Page references are henceforth in the text. ### 12. Tool result: search_text Exact matches 1. Source: The Dynamics of Social Practice (#5AXAEJ), Elizabeth Shove, Matt Watson, Mika Pantzar, p. 89 Context: #NXZT4D RECRUITMENT, DEFECTION AND REPRODUCTION #8JX39Z COLLAPSE AND TRANSFORMATION: THE DYNAMICS OF DEFECTION Matching excerpt #4P8MD9: The first has to do with the extent and character of what MacIntyre describes as 'internal rewards' (MacIntyre, 1985). In brief, the idea is that performing a practice well, that is in terms of standards that are part and parcel of the definition of a practice itself, is of immediate, internal reward. For example, being an excellent teacher is satisfying in and of itself and not (only) because this role attracts public recognition or a good salary, these being external rather than internal rewards. There are certainly some for whom hula-hooping is, in these terms, internally rewarding. However, hula-hooping's brief career might suggest that self-propelling circuits of satisfaction were limited, or distinctly short-lived. Compared with long-standing leisure pursuits like gardening, home improvement or cooking, all fields in which expertise accumulates through sequences of variously successful accomplishment and in which one project often begets another, hula-hooping appears a little thin. Though capable of retaining a handful of enthusiasts, it seems that the experience was not of itself enough to generate lasting interest nor the reward sufficient to sustain the commitment of the 125 million or more who gave hula-hooping a go. To put this observation the other way around, practices are, perhaps ironically, better able to retain commitment when they afford scope for innovation. 2. Source: Thrift and Its Paradoxes: From Domestic to Political Economy (#8YF7LY), Catherine Alexander, Daniel Sosna, p. 105 Context: #Y8JW9E Thrift and Its ParadoxesFrom Domestic to Political Economy #HQ5NN6 Generous Thrift #3WHPVC Postpastoral Cooperation and Fortune-Making among the Torghuts of Mongolia Matching excerpt #UK37XH: We may imagine, then, that holding the internal circulation of goods and labor within a group of households may be protecting them from the necessity of buying goods and taking part in market exchange (“holding the savings may negate market functioning,” writes Gudeman in this vol.). But, in fact, at some point the house economy, through the act of “economizing,” gives way to accumulation in terms of cosmoeconomic growth, which enables a kind of economic “liquidity,” which does not necessarily represent only a form of “coping mechanism” or “resilience.” This is especially important: this chapter goes deeper into the above, quite surprising transfiguration by setting up a social perspective on thrift in order to move beyond the notions of both a continuum and an opposition between the house (the prudent, “closed” unit) and the market economy (the capital- 3. Source: From the Cult of Waste to the Trash Heap of History: The Politics of Waste in Socialist and Postsocialist Hungary (#BJ6B3C), Zsuzsa Gille, p. 89 Context: #94RWTV Contents #9DK6VJ three Metallic Socialism #6FDZFE Discipline and Recycle Matching excerpt #CCGYHL: Documents indicate that knowledge of waste—its amount, its kinds, its potential uses, and the potential savings of its reuse—was more important than making sure that wastes were economically reused, or at least that the goods thus produced were fulfilling real human needs, and it was even more important than ensuring that they were properly distributed. What an official complained about in an internal report was not the actual uses or squandering of wastes but about the lack of sufficient knowledge. 4. Source: Sustainable Consumption and Practice Theories: Connecting Elements of Clothing Sharing (#EPZXEW), Marcia de Freitas Duarte, Minelle E. Silva, Márcia R. Cavalcante Costa, p. 17 Context: #AUG3NS 6. DISCUSSION Matching excerpt #52RWYN: From an individualistic perspective (Belliotti & Mora, 2016), the literature identifies the need for exclusivity (internal) and conscious consumption (external), as determinants of those who adhere to slow fashion (Liu et al., 2018; Erketing & Atik, 2015). Regarding the consumption of second-hand garments, four motivators are identified in hierarchical order: desire for exclusivity, possibility of high-value goods at more affordable prices; the sense of nostalgia that clothes from other times provide (vintage pieces), and sustainability (Roux & Korchia, 2006). It is worth noting that slow fashion proposes the use/sharing of second-hand pieces, in order to prolong their useful life and avoid disposal (Fletcher & Grose, 2012). 5. Source: The Nexus of Practices: Connections, Constellations and Practitioners (#R49AUC), Allison Hui, Elizabeth Shove, Theodore Schatzki, p. 14 Context: #JZ9M7V INTRODUCTION Matching excerpt #FN8GXU: In exploring the nexus of practices, contributors address a wide range of issues. However, the approaches they take do not represent all possible strategies. 'Practice' is a rich polysemic word that, in addition to denoting organised arrays of action, also highlights the necessary embeddedness of human activity in social and material contexts and the relentlessly unfolding character of action and sequences of performances. Given these different meanings, it is perhaps not surprising that the range of 'practice approaches' has expanded and diversified over the past 30 years (Nicolini, 2012). This wider field encompasses not just the first and second generation practice theories mentioned above, but also so-called 'practice-based studies' that emphasise the concept of situated action (e.g. Gherardi, 2008), MacIntyrian conceptions that attribute internal goods to practices (MacIntyre, 1981), forms of discourse theory that focus on practices (e.g. Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; Scollon, 2001) and traditions such as ethnomethodology that underline the processional quality of human social activity. Further afield, but not unrelated, lie endeavours such as 6. Source: Consumption and Theories of Practice (#RZ8QTE), Alan Warde, p. 16 Context: #XRLTMB Consumption and Theories of Practice #TFHBDN CONCLUSIONS Matching excerpt #PTS975: Attention to practices also makes good sense of the existence of both internal and extrinsic rewards from conduct. Practices have their own integrity which is the source of internal goods, that is to say internally generated rewards, as is made most clear by MacIntyre (1985: 187–96). 7. Source: Consumption and Theories of Practice (#RZ8QTE), Alan Warde, p. 17 Context: #XRLTMB Consumption and Theories of Practice #TFHBDN CONCLUSIONS Matching excerpt #NFFPZP: Critics of current levels of consumption have often pointed out that above a certain level of material provision further increments of money, goods and services make very little difference to sense of well-being or degree of happiness (e.g. Lane, 2000). The paradox is that people continue to strive for further material gain, yet those who are apparently comparatively unsuccessful exhibit no loss of well-being. The paradox may be partially explained by noticing that it is not so much things in themselves, but rather the place within different practices that is afforded by the possession or control of goods and services which is the basis of contentment, social acceptability and recognition. Bearing in mind the multiplicity of practices available to people, it becomes a little more clear why many people are not fundamentally discontented despite their lack of access to the most expensive or status-enhancing practices. The metaphor of big fish in small ponds perhaps best conveys the sense that each person can derive self-satisfaction and self-esteem from relative measures of social success in at least some of the practices in which they engage. Stock car racing may not have the same aura as vintage car collecting, but it is unlikely that the experience of improving and becoming expert is very much different in the two separate practices. Someone who values the practice of stock car racing, and has the possibility of engaging in it as a competent or excellent practitioner, probably has access to the psychic rewards that psychologists attribute to the process of self-development. In other words, no matter where a practice fits in a hierarchy of prestige, there are internal goods to be derived from it for individual practitioners. So though the external rewards may be different – by meeting a different sort of person at a vintage car rally, or being able to profit economically by re-selling rare or historic vehicles – there are internal rewards irrespective. Invidious comparison does not in any simple manner reduce the benefits acquired from practices conventionally deemed socially inferior. 8. Source: Clothing Poverty: The Hidden World of Fast Fashion and Second-hand Clothes (#VC6397), Andrew Brooks, p. 199 Context: #Q6AD2R CLOTHING POVERTY #9T3Y7P OTHER NOTABLE EXAMPLES #DDWUVQ Vintage fashion in cities Matching excerpt #99MTPY: price with contemporary designer goods. On Oxford Street in one of Europe's most iconic retail locations, Topshop's flagship store has an internal vintage boutique. Topshop, a mass fast-fashion retail, has attached itself to the perceived authenticity and originality of second-hand clothing. Associations like this can have a halo effect, reflecting positively on the broader brand. Worn items like aged vintage Levi's 501s sold in Topshop's boutique or a Rokit retro store are a prized second-hand purchase. Aged denim encapsulates the symbolic values of authenticity and robustness, which new designers try to re-create through the 'lived-in' manufacturing processes. 9. Source: Clothing Poverty: The Hidden World of Fast Fashion and Second-hand Clothes (#VC6397), Andrew Brooks, p. 206 Context: #Q6AD2R CLOTHING POVERTY #9T3Y7P OTHER NOTABLE EXAMPLES #5PTBH2 Used clothing markets in the global South Matching excerpt #ZVCT75: During the Second World War many Papua New Guineans were first exposed to Western manufactured goods such as canned food, clothing, radios and vehicles, as well as money, but these supplies disappeared after the foreign troops left. Cargo cults materialized as an attempt to explain the origins and circulation of these things, as communities had no experience of capitalism and market relations. Some people believed that this 'cargo' was coming from their ancestors 'but that Europeans have schemed to hijack these shipments so that they fail to arrive'. 21 Prophets prescribed ritualistic behaviour to entice new supplies and cults emerged promising that new cargo would be delivered by Americans or other powerful outsiders. The term 'cargo cult' has grown to become a powerful label for internal cultural dynamism and to explain the enchantment with modernity, but it also signifies an absence of understanding of modes of production. Some Papua New Guineans may feel entitled to steal used clothing and other imported goods, as they deem them to be their rightful inheritance from ancestors. Although not confined to clothing, the prevalence 10. Source: Object Relations in Accounts of Everyday Life (#VJ8G58), Elizabeth Shove, Jenny Rinkinen, Mikko Jalas, p. 10 Context: #SYB8LM Object Relations in Accounts of Everyday Life #PWG3FB Evaluating the Material World: How Heating Should be Done Matching excerpt #WFDDS3: This mode of evaluation and implicit judgement revolves around what MacIntyre describes as the internal value of a practice (MacIntyre, 1984). In short, practices sustain and reproduce specific understandings of what it is to do them well. In so far as practices entail the use of objects, forms of material engagement are woven into the normative framework of the practice itself (Thévenot, 2001). As indicated above, practices are not approached in isolation but are instead linked to more abstract and more strategic questions concerning the structural conditions of social action. In this way the diarists remind us that the practicalities and materialities of daily life are enmeshed in webs of moral judgement. Approximate matches 1. Source: The Dynamics of Social Practice (#5AXAEJ), Elizabeth Shove, Matt Watson, Mika Pantzar, p. 89 Context: #NXZT4D RECRUITMENT, DEFECTION AND REPRODUCTION #8JX39Z COLLAPSE AND TRANSFORMATION: THE DYNAMICS OF DEFECTION Score: 0.559 Related excerpt #4P8MD9: The first has to do with the extent and character of what MacIntyre describes as 'internal rewards' (MacIntyre, 1985). In brief, the idea is that performing a practice well, that is in terms of standards that are part and parcel of the definition of a practice itself, is of immediate, internal reward. For example, being an excellent teacher is satisfying in and of itself and not (only) because this role attracts public recognition or a good salary, these being external rather than internal rewards. There are certainly some for whom hula-hooping is, in these terms, internally rewarding. However, hula-hooping's brief career might suggest that self-propelling circuits of satisfaction were limited, or distinctly short-lived. Compared with long-standing leisure pursuits like gardening, home improvement or cooking, all fields in which expertise accumulates through sequences of variously successful accomplishment and in which one project often begets another, hula-hooping appears a little thin. Though capable of retaining a handful of enthusiasts, it seems that the experience was not of itself enough to generate lasting interest nor the reward sufficient to sustain the commitment of the 125 million or more who gave hula-hooping a go. To put this observation the other way around, practices are, perhaps ironically, better able to retain commitment when they afford scope for innovation. 2. Source: The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (#6J5MKL), Eike von Savigny, Karin Knorr Cetina, Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 75 Context: #YTXLA2 Part I #XHNW8K Pragmatic regimes governing the engagement with the world #SU8XV5 The notion of pragmatic regime and its main features Score: 0.557 Related excerpt #U39JTH: Every regime is built on a delineation of the good. This notion is used to evaluate the state of people and things and judge whether they are appropriately engaged. The extension of the good varies according to the regime. When the evaluation has to meet the requirement of public justification, the good has to be a legitimate common good. The good might be significantly more limited and mundane when it appears in the achievement of some regular planned action. It might be even more personal and localized when it involves some kind of usual attunement with well-known and near-by surroundings. The three scenes sketched in the section entitled 'A scenario of pragmatic versatility' illustrated such variations of the scope of the good. 3. Source: The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (#6J5MKL), Eike von Savigny, Karin Knorr Cetina, Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 218 Context: #MTDRS9 Part III #DN2JPX Derridian dispersion and Heideggerian articulation #HLW8YZ General tendencies in the practices that govern intelligibility #EJNHWL Articulation: Heidegger on the general tendency of practices Score: 0.488 Related excerpt #RVWKKB: Heidegger calls Ereignis this tendency in the practices to bring things into their own in this way. Thus, the practices for dealing with any thing have a kind of telos; they tend to make the thing connected to the rest of a community's life in such a way that the practices and the personal identities involved are taken as worthy. This telos is relational. It depends upon the rest of the practices in a community, the kinds of identities the community supports, the traditions with which people in the community are familiar, and the kinds of uses that the community holds valuable. Also, this telos is only a tendency, or to put it in Heidegger's terms, it is a gentle law (Heidegger 1971a:128). The tendency can be constrained by all sorts of contingent circumstances. In times of severe economic stress, for instance, practices for sharing wine with friends, perhaps even practices for having friends just could not get off the ground no matter how the wine bottle and past familiarization solicited that kind of behavior. But, normally, practices are best understood when they are seen as tending towards the local stability provided by the telos. Such thinking suggests that, as practices elaborate themselves, a stable end is implicit in their elaborations. 4. Source: The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (#6J5MKL), Eike von Savigny, Karin Knorr Cetina, Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 60 Context: #YTXLA2 Part I #NM2CWR Practices and social orders #WE73JT Practice mind-ed orders #D5JRCX Practices and their mental organization Score: 0.487 Related excerpt #MVGQZ8: Rules, however, only intermittently and never simpliciter determine what people specifically do. A more omnipresent determinant of practical intelligibility is thus called for. I incline toward drawing on Aristotelian/Heideggerian intuitions and identifying this third factor as a mix of teleology and affectivity. Teleology, as noted, is orientations toward ends, while affectivity is how things matter. What makes sense to a person to do largely depends on the matters for the sake of which she is prepared to act, on how she will proceed for the sake of achieving or possessing those matters, and on how things matter to her; thus on her ends, the projects and tasks she will carry out for the sake of those ends given her beliefs, hopes, and expectations, and her emotions and moods. Practical intelligibility is teleologically and affectively determined. 5. Source: If I Don't Do It, It Feels Wrong: Embodying Environmental Ethical Reflexivity through Cultivation and Enactment of Practices (#EDFB5G), Anne Sofie Møller Askholm, p. 5 Context: #LSKR5Q “If I don’t do it, it feels wrong”: embodying environmental ethical reflexivity through cultivation and enactment of practices #Z34QJ9 Methods #KHVGG6 Calls to act and striving toward sustainability Score: 0.519 Related excerpt #98C83K: Oscar wants his actions to have a positive impact, but he also emphasizes doing what is right because it is in and of itself the right thing to do: doing what is right becomes as much a part of the aim as making a positive impact. Imagining looking back on life from an advanced age may be a common visualization regarding one's personal life and goals. Yet for Oscar, however, the ecological crisis introduces a different kind of temporal horizon that has a certain ethical value as the risk of temperatures rising by more than 1.5°C is conceivable, and predictions of the consequences are becoming clearer. This reflects on the personal ethical relationship between self, human society, and the environment, which plays an important role in his actively trying to alter everyday practices. The “telos” or mode of being (Foucault 2020, 265) that he strives toward thus means being in an ethical relationship with the environment, defined as acting in ways that impact as positively as possible. Moving toward what he would consider an ethical and sustainable life means diverting from commonly established practices of consumption, and here his bodily participation plays an essential role in its realization. It is through the enactment of practices and ways of living that reduce environmental impact that he can realize an ethical mode of being. 6. Source: If I Don't Do It, It Feels Wrong: Embodying Environmental Ethical Reflexivity through Cultivation and Enactment of Practices (#EDFB5G), Anne Sofie Møller Askholm, p. 3 Context: #LSKR5Q “If I don’t do it, it feels wrong”: embodying environmental ethical reflexivity through cultivation and enactment of practices #5N8WU9 Conceptual framework Score: 0.49 Related excerpt #MWYFQR: are being worked on. Second is the "mode of subjectivation" (Foucault 2020, 264), which concerns how people are called upon or incited to realize their moral obligations. Third is "self-forming activity" (Foucault 2020, 265), which is the process and operations a person performs on the self to become an ethical subject, also labeled "techniques of the self" (Foucault 1988, 39). The final component is "telos" which is the mode of being one aspires to achieve situated in a historically particular model (Mahmood 2011, 30). I apply these concepts in the following analysis. 7. Source: The Force of Things (#P7EWHQ), Jane Bennett, p. 15 Context: #VH85EA The Force of Things : Steps toward an Ecology of Matter #9M3W8D CONTENDING MATERIALITIES #XHAHE6 WALKING, TALKING MINERALS Score: 0.493 Related excerpt #FMFXVA: interest as one motivation for ethical behavior, nor does it think it possible to eliminate completely the conceptual “enframing” that Heidegger criticizes. Rather, it seeks to cultivate a more enlightened self-interest, one cognizant of our embeddedness in a natural-cultural-technological assemblage. Even such an enlightened understanding of interest is not always sufficient to provoke ethical behavior toward other bodies. Ethical motivation needs also to draw upon co-feeling or sympathy with suffering, and also upon a certain love of the world, or enchantment with it. This last source is best inspired, I think, by an onto-tale that enhances one’s awareness of the vitality of the world with which one is enmeshed. Again, it must be said that the relation between an ontology and an ethic is always loose, though the relation is rendered less indeterminate when the temper in which the ontology is lived is considered. 8. Source: Consumption and Theories of Practice (#RZ8QTE), Alan Warde, p. 16 Context: #XRLTMB Consumption and Theories of Practice #TFHBDN CONCLUSIONS Score: 0.665 Related excerpt #PTS975: Attention to practices also makes good sense of the existence of both internal and extrinsic rewards from conduct. Practices have their own integrity which is the source of internal goods, that is to say internally generated rewards, as is made most clear by MacIntyre (1985: 187–96). 9. Source: Object Relations in Accounts of Everyday Life (#VJ8G58), Elizabeth Shove, Jenny Rinkinen, Mikko Jalas, p. 10 Context: #SYB8LM Object Relations in Accounts of Everyday Life #PWG3FB Evaluating the Material World: How Heating Should be Done Score: 0.555 Related excerpt #WFDDS3: This mode of evaluation and implicit judgement revolves around what MacIntyre describes as the internal value of a practice (MacIntyre, 1984). In short, practices sustain and reproduce specific understandings of what it is to do them well. In so far as practices entail the use of objects, forms of material engagement are woven into the normative framework of the practice itself (Thévenot, 2001). As indicated above, practices are not approached in isolation but are instead linked to more abstract and more strategic questions concerning the structural conditions of social action. In this way the diarists remind us that the practicalities and materialities of daily life are enmeshed in webs of moral judgement. 10. Source: Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social (#VKBZ23), Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 235 Context: #Y39Y67 Notes #DK2B4G Chapter 4 Score: 0.483 Related excerpt #D5N62R: 13. Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct , Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975, p. 55. Page references are henceforth in the text. ### 13. Assistant Good instinct — they're cousins, both Aristotelian, but doing different jobs. Here's how I'd line them up: ## What's shared Both inherit Aristotelian *telos*: practices are organised around ends, not just causal chains of behaviour. Both reject the utilitarian/instrumental picture in which action is just means to external rewards. And both are routinely invoked together by practice theorists — Warde explicitly notes his account is indebted to "Bourdieu, Schatzki, Giddens and to a much lesser extent MacIntyre" (#TKKN3Z). ## Where they diverge **MacIntyre is normative; Schatzki is ontological.** For MacIntyre (*After Virtue*, 1981), a practice is defined by its **internal goods** — goods you can only achieve by performing the practice well according to standards of excellence intrinsic to it. Chess has internal goods (the particular kind of strategic insight) distinct from external goods (prize money, status). Practices for MacIntyre are essentially virtue-cultivating; the telos is *ethical*. The framing is normative all the way down. For Schatzki, the **teleoaffective structure** is the organising principle of *any* practice — good, bad, mundane, harmful. It's the descriptive scaffolding: orientations toward ends + how things matter affectively (#MVGQZ8). A practice of bullying has a teleoaffective structure too. Schatzki isn't telling you which practices are excellent; he's telling you what makes a practice the kind of organised manifold it is. So MacIntyre's "internal goods" are a *subset* of what could populate a Schatzkian teleoaffective structure — specifically, the ends and standards of excellence built into a practice. Schatzki's concept is broader and ethically neutral. ## How practice theorists actually combine them Shove uses MacIntyre to explain practice **persistence** — hula-hooping faded because internal rewards were thin, while gardening retains commitment because it offers ongoing internal goods (#4P8MD9). Shove, Rinkinen and Jalas use MacIntyre's "internal value" to explain how heating gets evaluated morally inside the practice itself (#WFDDS3). Warde uses MacIntyre to ground the claim that practices have internal rewards "irrespective" of social hierarchy — stock car racing offers them just as vintage car collecting does (#NFFPZP, #PTS975). The pattern: **Schatzki gives the structure; MacIntyre gives the moral weight.** When practice theorists want to talk about commitment, evaluation, or why people care about doing a practice *well*, they reach for MacIntyre. When they want to specify what holds a practice together as a practice, they reach for Schatzki. ## Why this is useful for brīvbode Your empirical material is unusually rich for this pairing. Brīvbode looks like a place organised around **internal goods** in MacIntyre's sense: the satisfaction of finding a good home for an object, the rightness of rescuing something from waste, the moral pleasure of giving without exchange. These aren't external rewards — there's no money, often no prestige, sometimes not even thanks. They're goods only available by participating in the practice well, on its own terms. You could productively say something like: brīvbode's teleoaffective structure (Schatzki) is partly constituted by *internal goods* (MacIntyre) — care for things, anti-waste commitment, the modest virtue of stewardship — that can't be cashed out in market or status terms. That move lets you describe the moral texture of the place without lapsing into either a market frame or a vague "values" frame. One caveat worth flagging: MacIntyre's full apparatus (virtues, narrative unity of a life, traditions) is heavier than what most practice theorists want. They tend to take just the internal/external goods distinction and leave the rest. You can do the same. ### 14. User oh yeah i think macintyre is far more ontological than he is often thought of! the ethics is kind of downstream of ontology almost i think ### 15. Assistant Yeah, that reading holds up well, and I think it's actually closer to MacIntyre than the standard "virtue ethicist" caricature. A few angles where the ontological priority shows: **Practices are real entities, not contexts for ethics.** When MacIntyre says chess has internal goods, he's not saying "chess is a good arena for cultivating virtues." He's saying internal goods are constitutive of chess *being chess*. If you strip them out you don't get chess minus its ethics — you get something that isn't chess. That's an ontological claim about what kind of social entity a practice is. The "ought" is downstream because it falls out of what the thing already is. **Narrative unity of a life is anthropology before it's ethics.** "Man is in his actions and practice... essentially a story-telling animal" — that's an ontological claim about what kind of being we are. The ethical injunction to live a unified life is downstream of the prior fact that human existence has narrative form. Same move as Aristotle: the *Ethics* presupposes the *Politics* presupposes a metaphysical biology. **Dependent Rational Animals (1999) makes it explicit.** The later MacIntyre grounds everything in our being a particular kind of vulnerable, dependent, embodied creature. Virtues become whatever such creatures need to flourish. That's pretty much continuous with Aristotle's "ethics is part of the science of human nature" — it's biology and metaphysics first. If you read him this way, MacIntyre and Schatzki are doing more similar work than the secondary literature suggests. Both are saying: practices are real social entities with constitutive features (internal goods / teleoaffective structure) that are *part of what they are*, not normative overlays. The difference becomes more about scope: - Schatzki keeps the ontology flat — practices and arrangements, no deeper anchor. - MacIntyre nests practice-ontology inside a thicker philosophical anthropology (we are the kind of animal for whom practices and traditions are constitutive of flourishing). For brīvbode this reading is actually *more* useful than the ethical reading. If you take MacIntyre as ontologist, you can say: the moral texture of brīvbode isn't a value layer on top of object circulation — it's part of what makes it the kind of place it is. Refusing to throw a usable thing away isn't an ethical principle applied to the practice; it's constitutive of the practice. That fits ethnographically with how participants probably talk: not "I believe X is wrong" but "you just don't do that here." Which, incidentally, is also why the practice theorists who only borrow the internal/external goods distinction without the underlying ontology end up with something thinner than MacIntyre intended — they keep the moral vocabulary but drop the claim that makes it more than a preference. ### 16. User i guess for macintyre ethics itself has become a brivbode ### 17. Assistant That's actually a serious idea dressed as a joke. *After Virtue* opens with exactly that image: imagine a catastrophe in which scientific vocabulary survives but the science doesn't — people still say "neutrino" and "mass" but the practices, the traditions, the institutional context that made the words intelligible are gone. That's MacIntyre's diagnosis of moral language. We use "virtue," "good," "duty," "rights" as fragments, picked up from contexts we no longer inhabit, applied in ways their original users wouldn't recognise, mostly serviceable but ungrounded. A swapshop is the perfect material analogy. Items arrive stripped of biography. Their previous lives are unknowable. Someone takes a thing home and gives it a new use that has nothing to do with what it was made for. Things circulate, things work, people manage — but the systems that produced them and gave them place are gone. You're running an economy on orphaned objects. And then there's the second move that makes it more than a joke. MacIntyre's *prescription* — the ending of *After Virtue*, the "new and doubtless very different St Benedict," the small communities that recover practices and traditions in which moral vocabulary becomes intelligible again — is *also* recognisably brīvbode-shaped. A small site where things, having been orphaned by the larger system, regain a kind of intelligibility through the local practice that takes them up. Not by recovering their original meaning, but by being put back into a practice with its own internal goods. The swapshop is at once the diagnosis (fragments adrift) and a tiny piece of the cure (a place where fragments are re-practiced). You could write this. Genuinely. The MacIntyrean reading of brīvbode would be: the place is a small workshop in which orphaned objects — and orphaned ways of relating to objects (care, stewardship, the refusal of waste, the gift without exchange) — get re-embedded in a practice that makes them intelligible again. The internal goods aren't *new*; they're old fragments getting put back into a working context. Brīvbode is what happens when people who can no longer assume a coherent moral economy of stuff build a small one by hand. That's a real thesis sentence, by the way. Don't lose it.