# Assistant conversation WEBKNM

- Canonical URL: <https://sheaf.less.rest/WEBKNM>
- Resource IRI: <https://sheaf.less.rest/WEBKNM>
- Type: assistant conversation
- Mode: quick

## Transcript

### 1. User

do we have anything about haraway's string figures somewhere?

### 2. Assistant tool calls

#### Tool call: `search_text`

```json
{
  "query": "Haraway string figures"
}
```

#### Tool call: `search_text`

```json
{
  "query": "SF speculative fabulation tentacular"
}
```

### 3. Tool result: search_text

Exact matches

1. Source: The Nexus of Practices: Connections, Constellations and Practitioners (#R49AUC), Allison Hui, Elizabeth Shove, Theodore Schatzki, p. 53
  Context:
    #SD8LZ6 SOCIOMATERIALITY IN POSTHUMAN PRACTICE THEORY
      #T6B6KB Exploring the concept of sociomateriality
  Matching excerpt #JKP3BE:
      Haraway's work dislocates the centrality of the human in favour of the in/non/posthuman and of bio-centred egalitarianism. In fact, what we call a 'body' is a multispecies crowd if we consider that human genomes can be found in only about 10 per cent of cells, while the other 90 per cent of the cells are filled with the genomes of bacteria, fungi and other tiny messmates. And she concludes by saying that 'to be one is always to become with many' (Haraway, 2008b: 3). The image of the companion species (Haraway, 2008b) links to the idea of otherworldly conversation (Haraway, 2008a), in which various non-human entities participate as subjects. Her work 'calls for a renewed kinship system, radicalized by concretely affectionate ties to nonhuman "others"' (Braidotti, 2006: 199). And in fact, Braidotti (2013) proposes using the term 'more-than-human' instead of 'non-human' to overcome the human/non-human dichotomy.

2. Source: ‘Nothing Comes Without Its World’: Thinking with Care (#UTUMYN), María Puig de la Bellacasa, p. 4
  Context:
    #JY4XZR ‘Nothing comes without its world’: thinking with care
      #EESKTK Thinking-with
  Matching excerpt #D9WFUL:
      Yet the most striking messing up over categories into which Haraway's thinking-with has drawn her readers, is that of inciting us to enlarge our ontological and political sense of kinship and alliance, to dare in exercises of category transgression, of boundary redefinition that put to test the scope of humanist care. Welcome to a 'menagerie of figurations', a 'critical-theoretical zoo' where all 'inhabitants are not animals' (Haraway and Goodeve, 2000: 135–6). Kinships and alliances become transformative connections – merging inherited and constructed relations. This one was never an evident gesture. Promiscuous gatherings might provoke unease. I have seen concerned feminists fairly irritated with Haraway's suggestion that we connect with our machines. On the other hand many techno post-feminists would rather detach the celebrated cyborg from attachments supposed to be essentialist, realist, Second Wave, spiritual or any other term sounding misplaced. Look at how the extremely quoted final sentence of her celebrated Cyborg Manifesto , 'I'd rather be a cyborg than a goddess', has been systematically disconnected from the preceding words affirming that both figures are 'bound in the spiral dance' – a characteristic ritual of neo-pagan activist spirituality for which the figure of the Goddess is central (Starhawk, 1999). More recently there is some urge to split her serious work from that stuff she has been writing about dogs! What is both challenging and rejoicing with Haraway's thinking is that it renders such splits difficult to sustain.

3. Source: ‘Nothing Comes Without Its World’: Thinking with Care (#UTUMYN), María Puig de la Bellacasa, p. 3
  Context:
    #JY4XZR ‘Nothing comes without its world’: thinking with care
      #EESKTK Thinking-with
  Matching excerpt #K4TPFQ:
      The way in which Haraway writes is a semiotic technology of these agitations: connective writing, phrasing worlds together, contributes to this generative drive. In these incessant web-making moves, ontology is continuously in the making, in the process of becoming-with. For Haraway, 'reality is an active verb' (Haraway, 2003: 6). This does not mean that there are no boundaries or stabilities but that 'beings do not preexist their relations' (Haraway, 2003: 6). 3 In that sense, with Susan Leigh Star, Haraway sees 'objects' as 'boundary projects' (Haraway, 1997: 6).

4. Source: ‘Nothing Comes Without Its World’: Thinking with Care (#UTUMYN), María Puig de la Bellacasa, p. 2
  Context:
    #JY4XZR ‘Nothing comes without its world’: thinking with care
      #H4FXCR Caring as relating
  Matching excerpt #UW6XCS:
      Grounded on a conception of care as an ontological requirement of relational worlds, this essay seeks to explore what the doings of thick and non-moralistic ways of caring could mean for practices of thinking and knowing. Even though the theme of care has not explicitly appeared in her writings until recently – in different yet related ways to the ones I explore here (Haraway, 2007b, 2007a) – I have found Donna Haraway's work particularly inspiring for thinking caring knowledge as a relational force, while resisting to fall into moralistic visions (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2004, 2012). For Haraway, creating knowledge is a relational practice with important consequences in the shaping of possible worlds. Generically speaking, the claim that care matters in knowledge is supported by Haraway's call to pay attention to the workings and consequences of our 'semiotic technologies' – that is, to practices and arts of fabricating meaning with signs, words, ideas, descriptions, theories (Haraway, 1991c). However my motivation is not so much to offer an 'interpretation' of Haraway's vision of 'situated knowledge', but to offer a speculative reading of her work that reveals new challenges for the notion of care.

5. Source: ‘Nothing Comes Without Its World’: Thinking with Care (#UTUMYN), María Puig de la Bellacasa, p. 13
  Context:
    #JY4XZR ‘Nothing comes without its world’: thinking with care
      #THW24D Thinking-for
  Matching excerpt #LQZW49:
      I read Haraway's stance against 'political and ontological dualisms' as a continuation of these conversations. The affirmation of the political potential of valuing the world of sticky mediations as a thinking device is prolonged in her generic refusal of purity : 'The point is to make a difference in the world, to cast our lot for some ways of life and not others. To do that, one must be in the action, be finite and dirty, not transcendent and clean' (Haraway, 1997: 36). In her most recent work on interspecies relationalities, Haraway has explored the predicaments of caring for non-humans in a nature-cultural world (Haraway, 2007b). But the impurity of caring was at the heart of a question asked more than decade ago, 'Which is my family in this world?' (Haraway, 1997: 16; 51), when she was trying to think with a transgenic rodent, Oncomouse™, produced to serve research on breast cancer. Caring for this mouse is a weird experience; at least the way Haraway told her story cut dry any temptation of sentimentalism: named both a 'she' and an 'it', her specious boundaries are impure, she lives in labs but she is not a mechanical device, she suffers, but she is not 'just' a collateral effect of the experimental setting; she was serially born-produced to suffer. By dying or surviving Oncomouse™ was supposed to prove what type of being cancer is. But by thinking-with Oncomouse™'s life with a feminist perspective, by asking questions such as 'for whom Oncomouse™ lives and dies?', Haraway's testimony – illustrated with Lynn Randolph's effective portrait of a naked martyr mouse wearing a crown of spines and under constant observation in a peep-show lab – also proved something unexpected: our sister mouse was born to play a part in what Lochlann Jain calls the Cancer Complex , a world where a wealthy business of health care feeds on the pacified scandal of cancer and where some bodies deserve the dollars of costly health care

6. Source: ‘Nothing Comes Without Its World’: Thinking with Care (#UTUMYN), María Puig de la Bellacasa, p. 2
  Context:
    #JY4XZR ‘Nothing comes without its world’: thinking with care
      #EESKTK Thinking-with
  Matching excerpt #VEAURK:
      Look at the many meanings a word such as 'biology' can take in Haraway's work: a knot of relationships between living matters and social modes of existence, crafts, practices and love stories; a range of situated 'epistemological, semiotic, technical, political and material' connections (Haraway, 2000: 403); an omnipresent discourse in the 20th century; an enterprise of civic education (Haraway, 1997); a metaphor too, but also much 'more than a metaphor' (Haraway and Goodeve, 2000: 82–3). In her work, objects/bodies of contemporary biology are accounted for as instances of relatedness in the making. This insight goes hand in hand with resistance to reductionism: a constant

7. Source: ‘Nothing Comes Without Its World’: Thinking with Care (#UTUMYN), María Puig de la Bellacasa, p. 3
  Context:
    #JY4XZR ‘Nothing comes without its world’: thinking with care
      #EESKTK Thinking-with
  Matching excerpt #XNHYMG:
      questioning as to what makes 'one'. A curiosity about the connected heterogeneities composing an entity, a body, a world, that troubles boundaries: 'Why should our bodies end at the skin?' (Haraway, 1991a: 178). Haraway's thinking with thick populated worlds is an acknowledgement of multiplicity, but also an effort to actually foster multiplication – creating a diffraction rather than a reflection of the 'same' (Haraway and Goodeve, 2000: 193). 2

8. Source: ‘Nothing Comes Without Its World’: Thinking with Care (#UTUMYN), María Puig de la Bellacasa, p. 2
  Context:
    #JY4XZR ‘Nothing comes without its world’: thinking with care
      #EESKTK Thinking-with
  Matching excerpt #U92PQ7:
      Thinking with Haraway is thinking with many people, beings and things; it means thinking in a populated world. Actually, we could say that for Haraway thinking is thinking-with.

9. Source: ‘Nothing Comes Without Its World’: Thinking with Care (#UTUMYN), María Puig de la Bellacasa, p. 1
  Context:
    #JY4XZR ‘Nothing comes without its world’: thinking with care
      #H4FXCR Caring as relating
  Matching excerpt #R8M4W5:
      The quote borrowed as the title for this essay, 'nothing comes without its world' (Haraway, 1997: 137), reveals that the discussion unfolds as a re-reading of Donna Haraway's work, more particularly its take on feminist discussions on the situatedness of knowledge (Haraway, 1991c, 1997). That knowledge is situated means that knowing and thinking are inconceivable without a multitude of relations that also make possible the worlds we think with. The premise to my argument can therefore be formulated as follows: relations of thinking and knowing require care.

10. Source: ‘Nothing Comes Without Its World’: Thinking with Care (#UTUMYN), María Puig de la Bellacasa, p. 10
  Context:
    #JY4XZR ‘Nothing comes without its world’: thinking with care
      #ADGY96 Dissenting-within
  Matching excerpt #VLRQE3:
      How do these particular experiences speak through Haraway's (1991c) declared uneasiness, not only with social constructivism and deconstructivist approaches to science, but also with abstract philosophical realism and critical descriptions from any side disengaged from practising scientists' concerns? In her work on relationships of love, power and knowledge, Hilary Rose sees the 'both/and' positions that Haraway has taken in feminist epistemological debates as tributary of a 'close observation/participation of and in this outstanding group of feminist scientists' who are primatologists' (Rose, 1994: 93). Is a certain closeness of relation key for the awareness that creating knowledge has consequences, that those we study are not there only to think-with but also to 'live with'? The wording comes from another context, Haraway's Companion Species Manifesto (2003). Exploring the 'cobbling together' of caring relationality in human-dog love, the creation of 'significant otherness', Haraway affirms: 'Dogs, in their historical complexity, matter here. Dogs are not an alibi for other themes. . . . Dogs are not surrogates for theory; they are not here just to think with. They are here to live with ' (Haraway, 2003: 5, my emphasis). Although this assertion refers to inter-species love, its acknowledgement of interdependency offers a generic warning against idealized forms of caring. For living with is laborious. Relations of otherness are more than about accommodating 'difference', co-existing or tolerating. Thinking with should always be a living with, aware that relations of significant otherness transform those who relate and the worlds they live in.

Approximate matches

1. Source: The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill (#3LSRBZ), Tim Ingold, p. 371
  Context:
    #E9SHKF Part III
      #5B4XYC Skill
        #GGDVZY Skill and the construction of artefacts
          #9UC2QX HOW TO MAKE A STRING BAG
  Score: 0.525
  Related excerpt #NAGV5F:
      Telefol women, according to MacKenzie, place great value on the standardisation of their looping techniques, since this is a way of confirming tribal identity (1991: 103). But I would contend that this standardisation is not brought about, as MacKenzie claims, by conformity to rules. Indeed there appear to be no rules, beyond general exhortations of the kind delivered by the mother to her daughter in the case described above, or vague 'rules of thumb' that help prepare the practitioner for her impending activity but in no way determine its course (Suchman 1987: 52). Like most commonplace practical skills, such as tying shoelaces in Western society, looping resists codification in the form of generative rules or algorithms (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1987). One becomes aware of this simply by looking at the elaborate diagrams, accompanied by written commentary, by means of which MacKenzie attempts to explain the step-by-step procedure for open-spaced looping (pp. 83–99, and for an example, see Figure 19.1). Though these diagrams are admirable for their intended purpose, of ethnographic description, any attempt by the untutored reader to follow them in practice would likely lead to the same kind of tangle that the inexperienced Telefol girl produces, on secretly attempting to carry on with her mother's work. It would be quite mistaken to suppose that anything remotely equivalent exists in the native mind. But if standardisation does not follow from the application of rules, how are we to account for the persistence of technique from one generation to the next?

2. Source: The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill (#3LSRBZ), Tim Ingold, p. 369
  Context:
    #E9SHKF Part III
      #5B4XYC Skill
        #GGDVZY Skill and the construction of artefacts
          #9UC2QX HOW TO MAKE A STRING BAG
  Score: 0.506
  Related excerpt #ZQM4JH:
      All the points I have made about skill, in the previous section, apply to the making of string bags. Apart from the maker's body – and especially her fingers – the only tools used are the mesh gauge ( ding ), made from a strip of leaf, to maintain the constancy of the mesh in an open weave (see Figure 19.1), and the needle ( siil ), made of bone, which is needed for making tightly looped baskets without the use of the gauge (MacKenzie 1991: 73). But in use the needle or the gauge, along with the fingers that hold it, are as much a part of the user as they are used. Moreover the accomplished bilum -maker does not experience the movements of her body as being of a mechanical nature. Far from answering to commands issued from a higher source, they carry their own intentionality, unfolding in a continual dialogue with the material. Telefol people liken this movement to the flowing water of a river. Thus the body-in-use is not moved, like a rigid object,

3. Source: The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill (#3LSRBZ), Tim Ingold, p. 370
  Context:
    #E9SHKF Part III
      #5B4XYC Skill
        #GGDVZY Skill and the construction of artefacts
          #9UC2QX HOW TO MAKE A STRING BAG
  Score: 0.506
  Related excerpt #WFVKB8:
      but rather becomes one with the flow (p. 102). However, in order to maintain the evenness of the string, in spinning, or of the weave, in looping, it is necessary to make continual adjustments in the course of the movement itself. 'By adolescence', MacKenzie writes, 'all girls have mastered the technique of spinning, gaining visual acuity in selecting equal assemblages of filaments during the roving process; and a sensitivity or balance in the amount of pressure applied between palm and thigh during the rhythmic plyng motion' (p. 76). As this passage clearly reveals, dexterity in spinning depends on the fine-tuning of visual as well as haptic perception. And it is equally clear that the form of the bilum is an emergent outcome of rhythmically repeated, controlled movement in the processes of spinning and looping.

4. Source: The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill (#3LSRBZ), Tim Ingold, p. 369
  Context:
    #E9SHKF Part III
      #5B4XYC Skill
        #GGDVZY Skill and the construction of artefacts
          #9UC2QX HOW TO MAKE A STRING BAG
  Score: 0.505
  Related excerpt #NEQSKT:
      From MacKenzie, Androgynous Objects: string bags and gender in central New Guinea , published by Harwood Academic, 1991, pp. 86–7.

5. Source: The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill (#3LSRBZ), Tim Ingold, p. 6
  Context:
    #74R7MR PART III: SKILL
      #FZVDLV Introduction to PART III 289
        #MFS256 Chapter Nineteen
  Score: 0.488
  Related excerpt #JTJ8UR:
      Of string bags and birds' nests: skill and the construction of artefacts 349

6. Source: The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill (#3LSRBZ), Tim Ingold, p. 293
  Context:
    #6PPCBM Part II
      #76LAV7 Dwelling
        #6BU7XY Vision, hearing and human movement
          #4YGC6J THE INTERCHANGEABILITY OF VISUAL AND AUDITORY PERCEPTION
  Score: 0.484
  Related excerpt #8MCYH2:
      The designs themselves are of extraordinary intricacy, and were once recorded on cotton fabric sheets bound into 'books' – leading to speculation that the Indians in this region might have possessed a form of hieroglyphic writing. None of these books survive today, but the villagers among whom Gebhart-Sayer carried out her fieldwork recalled that an old man from a nearby village, the son-in-law of a shaman, had kept a school exercise book whose pages were filled with minute red and black patterns. One woman remembered how, as a child, she had managed secretly to get hold of the book and to copy four of the designs before being caught and scolded by her grandmother. She claimed never to have forgotten them, and was able to redraw them from memory (Gebhart-Sayer 1985: 155). One of her drawings is reproduced in Figure 14.2. It is not hard to see why European observers should have been moved to compare such graphs to writing. It seems, on the face of it, that the Shipibo-Conibo shaman apprehends the sounds of song in much the

7. Source: Materiality (#R26U48), Daniel Miller, p. 230
  Context:
    #49Y6EC MATERIALITY
      #URXCRD Materiality and Cognition:
        #RLUPJC THE ART OF DESCRIBING
  Score: 0.491
  Related excerpt #F6WJFY:
      Like the Andean khipu , the Caroline Islander's knotted coconut frond has both numerical as well as topological features that count and thus give an account of knowledge which is not overt, but whose very description serves to shed light on a possible future (Ascher 2002: 6–8). The Caroline Islands are an archipelago of small atolls situated in Micronesia. Although its numerous islands are separated by vast stretches of ocean, all inhabitants share a concern with divination to gain information and understanding about ongoing or future happenings. Divination creates, through a series of knots, an analogous space inhabited by destiny spirits whose journey shows up directions to be taken as much as a Marshall Islander's stick chart paves the way through the ocean. The following description of procedure is taken from Marcia Ascher's recent Mathematics Elsewhere :

8. Source: ‘Nothing Comes Without Its World’: Thinking with Care (#UTUMYN), María Puig de la Bellacasa, p. 7
  Context:
    #JY4XZR ‘Nothing comes without its world’: thinking with care
      #ADGY96 Dissenting-within
  Score: 0.52
  Related excerpt #BJ2JAS:
      Donna Haraway (1991b: 78)

9. Source: ‘Nothing Comes Without Its World’: Thinking with Care (#UTUMYN), María Puig de la Bellacasa, p. 3
  Context:
    #JY4XZR ‘Nothing comes without its world’: thinking with care
      #EESKTK Thinking-with
  Score: 0.513
  Related excerpt #DWDK98:
      Haraway's thinking-with creates new patterns out of previous multiplicities, intervening by adding layers of meaning rather than questioning or conforming to ready-made categories. The way in which Haraway enacts this thinking-with-many has led her to hold multiple ends of supposedly clashing positions, messing up with pre-existing categories. For instance, at the height of hype surrounding her work, she constantly puzzled attempts to class her as 'post-modern': 'a lot of my heart lies in old-fashioned science for the people' (Penley et al., 1990: 9).

10. Source: ‘Nothing Comes Without Its World’: Thinking with Care (#UTUMYN), María Puig de la Bellacasa, p. 5
  Context:
    #JY4XZR ‘Nothing comes without its world’: thinking with care
      #EESKTK Thinking-with
  Score: 0.475
  Related excerpt #PW5VD2:
      relatedness that compose a world. There is no single-issued reading of Haraway because she does not write single-issued worlds. 4 An excess of layering might be the weak spot attached to the singular strength I am associating here to thinking-with. There could be a downside to this appetite for layering: it demands from the reader awareness of multiple roots and openness to follow lines of surprising connections; it requires an effort to sense how each of her stories is situated in crowded worlds; or simply it invites a letting go of trying to systematically control a totality. Odd effects occur for readers who feel unfamiliar with her milieus of thinking: some can be amazed and inspired, others can be irritated by a flow of unfamiliar stories and notions and criticize this writing for being obscure.

### 4. Tool result: search_text

Exact matches

1. Source: The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill (#3LSRBZ), Tim Ingold, p. 280
  Context:
    #6PPCBM Part II
      #76LAV7 Dwelling
        #6BU7XY Vision, hearing and human movement
          #98Y4TT THREE TWENTIETH-CENTURY THINKERS
            #5GD3RH Maurice Merleau-Ponty
  Matching excerpt #NTP83G:
      different view prevails, and this has led to the positing of a great sensory divide between visual perception on the one hand, and auditory and tactile perception on the other, and with it, between Western societies in which the former allegedly dominates, and non-Western societies which are said to be given over to the latter. My aim, now, is to replace the orthodox, speculative notion of vision with a participatory or existential one. Once this is done, the 'great divide' simply vanishes.

2. Source: Autoethnography (#9X3WKH), Jackie Goode, p. 3
  Context:
    #A2CXJL Whose Collection Is It Anyway? An Autoethnographic Account of ‘Dividing the Spoils’ upon Divorce
      #AL7FJ3 Autoethnography
        #9XWFDF Home Work
  Matching excerpt #GQWXR2:
      Among the techniques of sociocultural production historically informing the glance have been the marketing of models of the 'ideal home', for example through images prescribed by the Ideal Home Exhibition, and the realization by speculative builders of the dreams thus created (Chapman and Hockey, 1999). The new inhabitants of 1930s semi-detached suburbia in Britain wanted to show their family, neighbours and friends that they had 'arrived' in a new social world, through the conspicuous display of their affluence. As Veblen (1934: 30–31)

3. Source: Anthropocenic Discards: Embodied Infrastructures and Uncanny Exposures at Dakar's Dump (#AY4Z4C), Julia E. Corwin, Vinay Gidwani, p. 14
  Context:
    #8RX23D Repair Work as Care: On Maintaining the Planet in the Capitalocene
      #R2C7DS Maintenance, Repair, and Care in the Capitalocene
  Matching excerpt #HWV4DP:
      The fraught knottings of life mean that while this work is imperative to sustain life, it matters whose life, what is repaired and cared for, and how it is practised. Instead of allowing maintenance and repair work to be outsourced and black-boxed as infrastructural labour, recognising and redistributing care work would mean a more equitably dispersed responsibility to each other and to the earth. Given our ontological entanglements, care entails "thick, impure, involvement in a world where the question of how to care needs to be posed. That is, it makes of ethics a hands-on, ongoing process of re-creation of 'as well as possible' relations and therefore one that requires a speculative opening about what a possible involves" (Puig de la Bellacasa 2017:6). Thinking repair work as care work in the Capitalocene does not presume that either things or people's relationship to them are returnable to some originary, untarnished state. This is Maria Puig de la Bellacasa's speculative ethics: that ethics are not only always situated but that we must reflect on the speculative horizon of what it means to live as well as possible in our current socio-ecological conjuncture.

4. Source: The Force of Things (#P7EWHQ), Jane Bennett, p. 1
  Context:
    #VH85EA The Force of Things : Steps toward an Ecology of Matter
      #5X7KVM THE FORCE OF THINGS Steps toward an Ecology of Matter
  Matching excerpt #2Y554C:
      This essay seeks to give philosophical expression to the vitality, willfullness, and recalcitrance possessed by nonhuman entities and forces. It also considers the ethico-political import of an enhanced awareness of "thing-power." Drawing from Lucretius, Spinoza, Gilles Deleuze, Bruno Latour, and others, it describes a materialism of lively matter, to be placed in conversation with the historical materialism of Marx and the body materialism of feminist and cultural studies. Thing-power materialism is a speculative onto-story, an admittedly presumptuous attempt to depict the nonhumanity that flows around and through humans. The essay concludes with a preliminary discussion of the ecological implications of thing-power.

5. Source: The Social Life of Things (#PB2Z6X), Arjun Appadurai, p. 23
  Context:
    #YP5HNF Introduction: commodities and the politics of value
      #T77LES Knowledge and commodities
  Matching excerpt #2PD3FN:
      Markets in commodity futures revolve around a large number of transactions involving contracts to buy and sell commodities, at future dates. This trade in contracts is a paper trade, which rarely involves actual exchanges of the commodities themselves between traders. Like the stock market, these markets are speculative tournaments, in which the play of price, risk, and exchange appears totally divorced, for the spectator, from the entire process of production, distribution, sale, and consumption. One might say that speculating in commodity futures makes a dramatic separation between price and value, with the latter of no concern at all. In this sense, the logic of trade in

6. Source: Materiality (#R26U48), Daniel Miller, p. 252
  Context:
    #49Y6EC MATERIALITY
      #BUU9TA Beyond Mediation: Three New Material Registers and Their Consequences
        #MWP7KT A FINAL VIEWPOINT: THE BODY THOUGHT ANEW
  Matching excerpt #2CDV7H:
      But we cannot stop there. Though this conclusion is necessarily speculative, it is grounded in recent developments which suggest another twist to the tale. For the biological body is itself under renovation, producing a further generalized surface and a further meshing of the inside and the outside in new and viscous combinations of "natural" attitude.

7. Source: The Nexus of Practices: Connections, Constellations and Practitioners (#R49AUC), Allison Hui, Elizabeth Shove, Theodore Schatzki, p. 105
  Context:
    #8UPZTD TECHNOLOGIES WITHIN AND BEYOND PRACTICES
      #BHCY3G Extending practices: systems and constellations
        #7MSWLN Shifting constellations: the distinctive dynamics of automated machines?
  Matching excerpt #9ET82E:
      I briefly consider six speculative ideas: (1) that these dynamics might resemble those associated with the elements of single practices; (2) that patterns of human and machinic involvement change across constellations in ways that reflect the processes that connect them; (3) that processes in which automated machines are embedded might be more stable than those achieved only through practices; and (4) that they might also be more readily standardised; (5) change more rapidly; and (6) that such constellations might become an irreversible yet background-like condition of society.

8. Source: Sustainable Consumption, Behaviour Change Policies and Theories of Practice (#V4V7XC), Andrew McMeekin, Dale Southerton, David Evans, p. 15
  Context:
    #PPB3M7 Sustainable Consumption, Behaviour Change Policies and Theories of Practice
      #N627JU Summary and discussion
  Matching excerpt #4ANAVC:
      to adapt to the dynamics and contingencies of practices (and interventions) as they unfold. Whilst these points are necessarily speculative and tentative, they nevertheless suggest that the practical significance of practice-based approaches is not exhausted by simply 'taking social norms a bit more seriously as influences of behaviour' (Jackson 2005: 63). Regarding Jackson's intimation that practice theories are too focused on complexity and emergence to be of direct relevance to policy making, it has been argued here that these difficulties need to be confronted head-on if there is to be any chance of designing effective policies for behavioural change.

9. Source: Inconspicuous consumption: the sociology of consumption and the environment (#XBPXDL), Alan Warde, Elizabeth Shove, p. 7
  Context:
    #C6V7M8 Inconspicuous consumption: the sociology of consumption and the environment
      #E7APY7 3 Five mechanisms supporting escalating levels of consumption
        #T8FRUB Comment
  Matching excerpt #RW8ARH:
      The next section of the paper considers some specific examples in terms of the mechanisms described above. A speculative exercise, it allows us first to explore their limits and relevance in grappling with environmentally significant practices and, second, to consider whether there is anything distinctive about these practices which requires a substantially different set of explanations.

10. Source: Patchworks of Care - ETHICS AND PRACTICE OF CARE IN THE ORGANIC FOOD MOVEMENT IN LATVIA (#ZC3PHV), Agnese Bankovska, p. 230
  Context:
    #6L8925 Chapter 5
      #CR2QAW References
  Matching excerpt #4H6RTN:
      Puig de la Bellacasa, María 2017 Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics in More than Human Worlds , vol.41. U of Minnesota Press.

Approximate matches

1. Source: The Ethics of Waste: How We Relate to Rubbish (#83R4U2), Gay Hawkins, p. 68
  Context:
    #Y4M56L Contents
      #8YL83P Worms
        #BJ7PB9 WORM STORIES
  Score: 0.413
  Related excerpt #KSE9SR:
      The images used to promote the Granville project show the giant worm farms housed in a shed. There is lots of engineering in evidence: conveyor belts to move and spread the mix, trays and another conveyor system to collect the castings, which are then stabilized and sold as agricultural fertilizer. This is a potent example of how nature is always differentially mixed into culture. All this technology doesn't diminish the great significance of the work being done by those worms as they facilitate transition. In those giant industrial worm farms heightened life and heightened death go together ; the profound interconnections between destruction and renewal are everywhere evident. Perhaps this system exemplifies what Phillips calls "the ordinary sublime." He uses this term to explain the difficulties Darwin had accounting for experiences of things that overwhelm and overawe us once God drops out of the picture.

2. Source: The Ethics of Waste: How We Relate to Rubbish (#83R4U2), Gay Hawkins, p. 37
  Context:
    #Y4M56L Contents
      #ZSZNA5 Shit
        #U52JP6 POO PROTESTS
  Score: 0.413
  Related excerpt #JSVBKP:
      just speak to a deep anxiety about boundaries collapsing, to a sense of mourning for the archaic value of the ocean, it also gave voice to an array of alternative strategies for managing shit.

3. Source: The Ethics of Waste: How We Relate to Rubbish (#83R4U2), Gay Hawkins, p. 67
  Context:
    #Y4M56L Contents
      #8YL83P Worms
        #BJ7PB9 WORM STORIES
  Score: 0.41
  Related excerpt #LKTPS7:
      I want to tell some worm stories now that show the arts of transience in action. My aim is to think about their ethical significance, to reflect on how they alter ways of living and embodiment. How have worms been deployed in a politics of active experimentation with waste?

4. Source: The Force of Things (#P7EWHQ), Jane Bennett, p. 6
  Context:
    #VH85EA The Force of Things : Steps toward an Ecology of Matter
      #9M3W8D CONTENDING MATERIALITIES
        #P9REUZ THING-POWER II: CREATIVE SELF-ORGANIZATION
  Score: 0.441
  Related excerpt #C7SX8G:
      Kafka's "Cares of a Family Man" is a less scientific depiction of the power of things to mobilize and re-form. The protagonist, Odradek, is a spool of thread who/that can run and laugh. As animate wood , Odradek is the result of a "spontaneous structural generation" (to use De Landa's phrase). Like a soliton, this particular mode of matter-energy resides in a world where the line between inert matter and vital energy, between animate and inanimate, is permeable—and where all things, to some degree or other, live on both sides.

5. Source: The Force of Things (#P7EWHQ), Jane Bennett, p. 6
  Context:
    #VH85EA The Force of Things : Steps toward an Ecology of Matter
      #9M3W8D CONTENDING MATERIALITIES
        #P9REUZ THING-POWER II: CREATIVE SELF-ORGANIZATION
  Score: 0.413
  Related excerpt #AUYAL9:
      it looks like a flat star-shaped spool of thread, and indeed it does seem to have thread wound upon it; to be sure, these are only old, broken-off bits of thread, knotted and tangled together, of the most varied sorts and colors. . . . One is tempted to believe that the creature once had some sort of intelligible shape and is now only a broken-down remnant. Yet this does not seem to be the case; . . . nowhere is there an unfinished or unbroken surface to suggest anything of the kind: the whole thing looks senseless enough, but in its own way perfectly finished. 15

6. Source: Materiality (#R26U48), Daniel Miller, p. 252
  Context:
    #49Y6EC MATERIALITY
      #BUU9TA Beyond Mediation: Three New Material Registers and Their Consequences
        #MWP7KT A FINAL VIEWPOINT: THE BODY THOUGHT ANEW
  Score: 0.437
  Related excerpt #2CDV7H:
      But we cannot stop there. Though this conclusion is necessarily speculative, it is grounded in recent developments which suggest another twist to the tale. For the biological body is itself under renovation, producing a further generalized surface and a further meshing of the inside and the outside in new and viscous combinations of "natural" attitude.

7. Source: Materiality (#R26U48), Daniel Miller, p. 274
  Context:
    #49Y6EC MATERIALITY
      #PDD7ZQ Things Happen: Or, From Which Moment Does That Object Come?
        #S2LNSP THE RECURSIVE ARCHIVE
  Score: 0.414
  Related excerpt #9PH33J:
      The narrative itself is a mere mise-en-scène for the appearance of various avatars (or declensions) of the central eye/testicle/moon object. The "vibrations" of this object (though perhaps, following Michel Serres and Latour, we should say "quasi-object") create a new "wavy meaning," a new indeterminate object agency, as it passes "down the path of a particular imagination that distorts but never drops it": Its sound remains the same (1982: 119).

8. Source: Materiality (#R26U48), Daniel Miller, p. 239
  Context:
    #49Y6EC MATERIALITY
      #BUU9TA Beyond Mediation: Three New Material Registers and Their Consequences
        #KTASMW WHAT IS INSIDE IS ALSO OUTSIDE
  Score: 0.405
  Related excerpt #E5QWUW:
      What seems certain is that developments like these are privileging different conceptions of materiality which emphasize a much greater sense of (to take in a much overused word) performativity. A more flexible sense of what the world is is being extemporized by “nonhuman” actors which are increasingly acting within the corral that used to be called human, making new materials that are not one thing or the other but weave together elements of both.

9. Source: ‘Nothing Comes Without Its World’: Thinking with Care (#UTUMYN), María Puig de la Bellacasa, p. 8
  Context:
    #JY4XZR ‘Nothing comes without its world’: thinking with care
      #ADGY96 Dissenting-within
  Score: 0.414
  Related excerpt #TUFZNK:
      The first account features 'A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century', Haraway's seminal and notorious intervention against 'organic' unities in feminism. This written manifestation of unsettlement in feminist recent history shows how thinking-with can be inspiring, empowering but, mostly, not easy. It helped to reveal conflicts in feminism, as well as re-weave narratives of solidarity-building. It stressed how trajectories and positions can connect and transform each other without needing to erase their divergences. A shared urgency manifested in the call: 'the need for unity of people trying to resist world-wide intensification of domination has never been more acute' (Haraway, 1991a: 154). The proposal was to avoid models of resistance to domination that would expect us to rely on evident or given bonding and, beyond this avoidance, open ourselves to unexpected 'unnatural' alliances: cyborg-coalition politics. The intervention was inspired by, and accountable to, a wide range of feminist work and activism, but more particularly to knowledge and positions conceived within black feminisms and other 'oppositional consciousnesses' – in Chela Sandoval's wording (Sandoval, 1991, 1995) – that brought radical unease with the ways the multiple situated meanings of 'women's experience' were concealed by a white, privileged and heterosexual feminist 'we'.

10. Source: ‘Nothing Comes Without Its World’: Thinking with Care (#UTUMYN), María Puig de la Bellacasa, p. 14
  Context:
    #JY4XZR ‘Nothing comes without its world’: thinking with care
      #THW24D Thinking-for
  Score: 0.411
  Related excerpt #YZLAWD:
      innovations while others are left behind (Lochlann Jain, 2007). Vis-à-vis such beings, and of these kind of technosciences, the feminist sense of caring is urged to mutate, and now more than ever. Oncomouse™ is an edifying story of anti-significant otherness in an enlarged sorority.

### 5. Assistant

Short answer: no direct hits on Haraway's "string figures" / SF / Chthulucene material in the corpus. The Ingold "string bag" results are about literal Telefol bilum-making, not Haraway's figure.

What you *do* have on Haraway, mostly second-hand:

- **Puig de la Bellacasa, "Nothing Comes Without Its World: Thinking with Care"** (#UTUMYN) — this is your richest Haraway resource. Lots on *thinking-with*, situated knowledges, companion species, significant otherness, the refusal of purity. The whole "Thinking-with" section #EESKTK is essentially a primer on the relational moves that underlie string figures, just under an earlier vocabulary. See especially #U92PQ7, #DWDK98, #K4TPFQ, #D9WFUL.
- **Hui/Shove/Schatzki, *Nexus of Practices*** (#R49AUC) — brief gloss on companion species and "becoming-with" at #JKP3BE.
- **Corwin & Gidwani, "Anthropocenic Discards"** (#AY4Z4C) — uses Puig de la Bellacasa's "fraught knottings" / speculative ethics in the Capitalocene at #HWV4DP, which is adjacent to the SF/string-figures register.

If you want to cite *string figures* directly (Haraway's "passing patterns back and forth" as a method/figure for thinking-with), you'd need to pull in *Staying with the Trouble* (2016) or "SF: Science Fiction, Speculative Fabulation, String Figures, So Far" (2011) — neither is currently in the corpus. Want me to flag a spot in your draft where it would land well, so you know whether it's worth chasing the source?

### 6. User

introduce me to UTUMYN!

### 7. Assistant tool calls

#### Tool call: `get_document`

```json
{
  "id": "UTUMYN"
}
```

### 8. Tool result: get_document

DOCUMENT #UTUMYN
Title: ‘Nothing Comes Without Its World’: Thinking with Care

Outline:
  - 1 #JY4XZR ‘Nothing comes without its world’: thinking with care
    - 1.1 #6KQKYJ Abstract
    - 1.2 #H4FXCR Caring as relating
    - 1.3 #EESKTK Thinking-with
    - 1.4 #ADGY96 Dissenting-within
    - 1.5 #THW24D Thinking-for
    - 1.6 #AYECU2 Conclusions: how are you doing?
    - 1.7 #NQC5ME Acknowledgements
    - 1.8 #6FRW6V Notes
    - 1.9 #7DS8GL References

### 9. Assistant tool calls

#### Tool call: `read`

```json
{
  "blocks": [
    "6KQKYJ",
    "AYECU2"
  ],
  "expand": true
}
```

### 10. Tool result: read

DOCUMENT #UTUMYN
‘Nothing Comes Without Its World’: Thinking with Care

SECTION #6KQKYJ Abstract

EXCERPT #HPXQ2C p. 0
  What is the significance of caring for thinking and knowing? Thinking and knowing are essentially relational processes. Grounded on a relational conception of ontology the essay argues that ‘thinking with care’ is a vital requisite of collective thinking in interdependent worlds, but also one that necessitates a thick vision of caring. A speculative exploration of forms of thinking with care unfolds through a rereading of Donna Haraway’s work, specifically of its take on feminist discussions on the situated character of knowledge. The notion of thinking with care is articulated through a series of concrete moves: thinking-with , dissenting-within and thinking-for . While weaving Haraway’s thinking and writing practices with the trope of care offers a particular understanding of this author’s knowledge politics, the task of caring also appears in a different light.

EXCERPT #YGQ4ZN p. 0
  Keywords: Care, collective, thinking, Donna Haraway, relationality

DOCUMENT #UTUMYN
‘Nothing Comes Without Its World’: Thinking with Care

SECTION #AYECU2 Conclusions: how are you doing?

EXCERPT #RMCHZL p. 14
  But what is it that happens precisely when we encounter someone we love? Do we encounter somebody, or is it animals that come to inhabit you, ideas that invade you, movements that move you, sounds that traverse you? And can these things be parted?

EXCERPT #W5B82B p. 14
  Gilles Deleuze (1992: 17; my translation)

EXCERPT #SQ6YAY p. 14
  Thinking with care inevitably brings us to the limits of academic knowledge. Yet in this essay I have argued for the meaningfulness of care for thinking and knowing within this context. So is this all about a new theory of knowledge? But then, how is thinking with care a non-normative proposition? If there is an ethics and a politics of knowledge here, it is not a theory that would serve us as a 'recipe' for doing our encounters. Care is a good word to exhibit the singularity of the non-normative ethics carried here. Not only because caring is always specific – a mode of caring is not necessarily translatable elsewhere – but because it cannot be reduced to a moral disposition, nor to an epistemic stance, a set of applied labours, not even to affect.

EXCERPT #Z2ZVUW p. 14
  Yet, the pitfall always looming when trying value care in knowledge relations remains a form of epistemological moralism. Something holds together, something matches – something feels true enough as to impose it. Funnily enough, the term accurate derives from care: 'prepared with care, exact'; it is the past participle of accurare 'take care of'. Here, the notion of doing something with care led to that of 'being exact'. The tempting proximity between these terms reveals a risky ground: the ambition to control and judge what/who/how we care for.

EXCERPT #SQ9MAD p. 14
  This controlling aim echoes what happens with purposes of collecting knowledge practices under normative epistemologies that tend to erase the specificities of knowing practices. How do we keep thinking with care from falling in a too much , into a devouring will for controlled accurateness, to be all

EXCERPT #DPATAA p. 14

EXCERPT #T9PRU4 p. 15

EXCERPT #7GNEMH p. 15
  right? Haraway's knowledge politics help to thicken and complicate the meanings of caring for thinking and knowing precisely because they reflect a resistance both to epistemological formatting and to tempting 'orgies of moralism' (Haraway, 1997: 199) as solutions to sort out the difficulties of respectful interdependency.

EXCERPT #CSSELS p. 15
  Maybe Haraway's antidote to normativity itself, whether epistemological or moral, is an appetite for unexpectedness pervasive in her ontological web-bings: 'I am more interested in the unexpected than in the always deadly predictable' (Haraway, 1997: 280, n. 1). Because 'nothing comes without its world' we do not encounter single individuals, a meeting produces a world, changes the colour of things, it diffracts more than it reflects, distorts the 'sacred image of the same' (Haraway, 1994: 70). Knowing is not about prediction and control but about remaining ' attentive to the unknown knocking at our door' (Deleuze, 1989: 193). But though we do not know in advance what world is knocking, inquiring into how we can care will be required in how we will relate to the new.

EXCERPT #LSZTVM p. 15
  Foucault once reminded the etymological acquaintance of care with ' curiosity ', to revalue the latter as 'the care one takes of what exists and what might exist' (quoted in Latimer, 2000). Haraway also has explored curiosity as a requisite of better caring for others in her later interspecies work (Haraway, 2007b). I am tempted to end this journey, or rather to continue it, with a basic curious query: how are you doing? It sounds like a mundane way of caring, within a respectful distance, for what/whom we encounter and we do not necessarily know; a communication device required for thinking with care in populated worlds. But what does this question mean in practices of and relations of knowing? It could indicate curiosity about how other people keep care going in the dislocated world of contemporary academia and its corollary, the anxious delirium of permanent reorganization.

EXCERPT #CMARFL p. 15
  'How are you doing?' here might also mean 'how do you cope ?'. Because ultimately thinking with the notion of care does illuminate the affective aspects of knowledge politics. The tensions of care are present in its very etymology that includes notions of both 'anxiety, sorrow and grief' and of 'serious mental attention'. One could wonder, aren't anxiety, sorrow and grief actual threats to the serious mental attention required to care? Does the attention required to keep our knowledge aware of its connections and consequences lead inevitably to anxiety? Here again we meet the major pitfall of caring: too much caring can asphyxiate the carer and the cared for. But should this prevent us from caring? Aren't anxiety, sorrow and grief unavoidable affects in efforts of paying serious mental attention, of thinking with care, in dislocated worlds? Or do these affects belong to an out-of-place sense of inaccurateness ; that something does not match, does not hold together, that something could be different?

EXCERPT #D4Y96N p. 15

EXCERPT #FSLEZJ p. 15

EXCERPT #UMNH2Q p. 15

EXCERPT #SUXH8Q p. 15

EXCERPT #L5KXVT p. 16

### 11. Assistant

# Puig de la Bellacasa, "Nothing Comes Without Its World: Thinking with Care" (#UTUMYN)

A 2012 essay (published in *The Sociological Review*) that has become a touchstone for the care-in-more-than-human-worlds literature. It's a re-reading of Donna Haraway through the lens of *care*, arguing that thinking and knowing are inescapably relational acts — and that doing them well requires care, not as a moral add-on but as an ontological condition.

**The argument in one breath:** if "nothing comes without its world" (Haraway 1997), then knowing always drags along a thick mesh of relations, dependencies, and consequences. Care names what holds those relations together — not warm-and-fuzzy care, but the "thick, impure" kind that includes anxiety, grief, and getting your hands dirty.

**Structure**, three "moves" of thinking with care:
- **Thinking-with** (#EESKTK) — Haraway's signature gesture: thinking is never solo, it happens in populated worlds, with messmates, companion species, dogs, OncoMouse™, machines. Knowledge is "becoming-with."
- **Dissenting-within** (#ADGY96) — care is not consensus. It involves staying in conflict, in feminist debates and in technoscience, rather than retreating to purity. Reads the Cyborg Manifesto as an exercise in unnatural alliances.
- **Thinking-for** (#THW24D) — caring obliges you to those who can't return the gaze (lab mice, exploited bodies). Knowledge has stakes; you cast your lot.

**Why it's useful for your thesis:**
- It gives you a vocabulary for treating *brīvbode* as a site where things, people, and obligations are knotted together — not just exchanged. The shop is exactly the kind of "populated world" where divestment and acquisition are care-laden practices.
- The "thick, impure involvement" line (quoted in Corwin & Gidwani at #HWV4DP) is gold for arguing that swapping is not clean ethical consumption but a messy, situated way of "living as well as possible."
- It pairs beautifully with Bankovska's *Patchworks of Care* (#ZC3PHV), which is already in your corpus and explicitly builds on Puig de la Bellacasa in a Latvian context — that's a near-readymade bridge for you.
- Watch out for the "epistemological moralism" warning at #Z2ZVUW: a useful self-check against romanticizing the swapshop.

The conclusion (#AYECU2) ends, charmingly, with "how are you doing?" as a method. Possibly the most Haraway-coded sign-off in academic writing.

### 12. User

is care a heideggerian term, essentially, btw?

### 13. Assistant tool calls

#### Tool call: `search_text`

```json
{
  "query": "Heidegger Sorge care Dasein"
}
```

#### Tool call: `search_text`

```json
{
  "query": "Tronto Fisher ethics of care feminist"
}
```

### 14. Tool result: search_text

Exact matches

1. Source: The Dynamics of Social Practice (#5AXAEJ), Elizabeth Shove, Matt Watson, Mika Pantzar, p. 18
  Context:
    #MV5P3X THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL PRACTICE
      #XKXCG8 INTRODUCING THEORIES OF PRACTICE
  Matching excerpt #YWHTWT:
      Theories of practice have roots stretching at least as far back as Wittgenstein and Heidegger. Whilst Wittgenstein does not write directly about 'practices', his work conveys many of the key features of theories of practice. For Schatzki (1996), Wittgenstein's location of intelligibility and understanding, not within discrete human minds but in the flow of praxis, and his articulation of how intelligibility and understanding structure of human action and the social realm provides a basis for a theorization of practices which recognizes that 'both social order and individuality ... result from practices' (1996: 13). Heidegger, in Being and Time (1962), identifies praxis, as much as language, as a source of meaning. His account of Dasein and its relation to human activity and to equipment resonates with the ontological grounding of theories of

2. Source: The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (#6J5MKL), Eike von Savigny, Karin Knorr Cetina, Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 164
  Context:
    #MTDRS9 Part III
      #AZ29RJ Posthumanist challenges
        #BFYA8N How Heidegger defends the possibility of a correspondence theory of truth with respect to the entities of natural science
          #ZHKHLP Heidegger's attempt at robust realism
  Matching excerpt #37R3C5:
      Heidegger clearly wants to embrace robust realism, for he exceeds the limits of deflationary realism when he writes: '[T]he fact that reality is ontologically grounded in the being of Dasein, does not signify that only when Dasein exists and as long as Dasein exists, can the real be as that which in itself it is' (Heidegger, 1962:255, my italics).

3. Source: The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (#6J5MKL), Eike von Savigny, Karin Knorr Cetina, Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 169
  Context:
    #MTDRS9 Part III
      #AZ29RJ Posthumanist challenges
        #BFYA8N How Heidegger defends the possibility of a correspondence theory of truth with respect to the entities of natural science
          #86PS3T Notes
  Matching excerpt #R5Y6W7:
      already in Being and Time , that without Dasein there would be no before and after. But Heidegger also says in a lecture given in 1928 and published in 1978: 'The question of the extent to which one might conceive the interpretation of Dasein as temporality in a universal-ontological way is a question which I am myself not able to decide—one which is still completely unclear to me' (Heidegger 1984: 210). I think Heidegger should have realized that the occurrent time of nature escapes idealism since it can be understood not in terms of our everyday sense of a before and after but only as an asymmetrical ordering of states.

4. Source: The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (#6J5MKL), Eike von Savigny, Karin Knorr Cetina, Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 161
  Context:
    #MTDRS9 Part III
      #AZ29RJ Posthumanist challenges
        #BFYA8N How Heidegger defends the possibility of a correspondence theory of truth with respect to the entities of natural science
          #ZHKHLP Heidegger's attempt at robust realism
  Matching excerpt #UCT69V:
      Of course only as long as Dasein [human being] is (that is, only as long as an understanding of being is ontically possible), 'is there' being. When Dasein does not exist, 'independence' 'is' not either, nor 'is' the 'in-itself' (Heidegger 1962:255).

5. Source: The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (#6J5MKL), Eike von Savigny, Karin Knorr Cetina, Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 161
  Context:
    #MTDRS9 Part III
      #AZ29RJ Posthumanist challenges
        #BFYA8N How Heidegger defends the possibility of a correspondence theory of truth with respect to the entities of natural science
          #ZHKHLP Heidegger's attempt at robust realism
  Matching excerpt #DJS75E:
      Like Davidson, Heidegger answers the skeptic by showing that our practices and the everyday world are inextricably intertwined. Indeed, he argues at length that 'Dasein is the world existingly' (Heidegger 1962:416). 4 Moreover, Heidegger seems to agree with the deflationary realists that, while entities show up as independent of us, the being or intelligibility of entities depends on our practices. So any talk of things in themselves must be put in scare quotes. Thus, Heidegger says of natural entities:

6. Source: The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (#6J5MKL), Eike von Savigny, Karin Knorr Cetina, Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 189
  Context:
    #MTDRS9 Part III
      #6FS2RF Practice and posthumanismSocial theory and a history of agency
        #26M2QV Objectal practice
          #BXQMJZ The relational undergirding of epistemic practice
  Matching excerpt #ZJPE85:
      When Heidegger analyzed our instrumental being-in-the-world as a form of un-self-conscious but nonetheless goal-directed employment of equipment in its referential context he also pointed out what happens when equipment becomes problematic (Heidegger 1962:98ff.); then we go from 'absorbed coping' to 'envisaging,' 'deliberate coping' and to the scientific stance of 'theoretical reflection' on the properties of entities. This characterization recaptures the ones I have given, with perhaps one difference. Heidegger came to characterize knowledge in terms of a theoretical attitude that entails 'withholding' of practical reason. He gave an important characterization of how the project of science appears derivative of the primordial stance of taking things for granted in everyday life. But, at the same time, his characterization provided less than an adequate account of knowledge processes—in which the presence of equipment is massive, instrumentality prevails, and theorizing rather appeals to us as being itself a form of practice. With the notion of a theoretical attitude, Heidegger brought back into the picture the subject-object differentiation which he had wanted to drive out of the philosophical discourse with his definition of 'Dasein' as a form of concerned coping ('Self and world belong together in the single entity, Dasein. Self and world are not two entities, like subject and object': cf. Dreyfus 1995:67ff.). But perhaps as a consequence of his larger project, Heidegger never quite gave situations of subject-object distanciation the same consideration and attention that he gave to concerned coping. Theoretical knowledge, for Heidegger, remained a form of 'thematizing' that objectifies

7. Source: Thinking Through Things: Theorising Artefacts Ethnographically (#BX2YWY), Amiria Henare, Martin Holbraad, Sari Wastell, p. 114
  Context:
    #4XPDRN COLLECTION AS A WAY OF BEING
      #RFMVWM A collection of scenarios
        #4TLQFZ Scene 3: mixed scenarios of collection
  Matching excerpt #K5AGQW:
      removing water that has collected in her canoe, one might see collection appearing as a process of purposive engagement with a world of equipment, which is a basic condition of our being-in-the-world in Heidegger's view of ontology. In Heidegger's scheme of ontology, the concerned orientation with things displaces the dichotomy between subjects and objects and reveals Dasein phenomenologically in terms of a successive series of time horizons branching out into future dimensions of possible choices, actions and outcomes. However, as we shall see, such a vision of temporality is based on a sense of continuity, a view that is here ruptured by the ontological work of collections. In collections we encounter momentary loss, a returning and a projection towards the future. It is not continuity but loss that reveals the ontological work of collections.

8. Source: Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social (#VKBZ23), Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 12
  Context:
    #S4MKE3 Preface and Acknowledgments
  Matching excerpt #TMC4CV:
      This book was a long time coming. A necessary detour in a previous manuscript through an individualizing appropriation of Heidegger's conception of Dasein and world delayed return to the encompassing context of practices announced in Wittgenstein. The current work attempts to retain insights of the detour within a practice framework.

9. Source: Patchworks of Care - ETHICS AND PRACTICE OF CARE IN THE ORGANIC FOOD MOVEMENT IN LATVIA (#ZC3PHV), Agnese Bankovska, p. 27
  Context:
    #6HSN74 Chapter 1Introduction
      #AGS84E Research questions and main theoretical discussions
        #F9LFBK What care?
  Matching excerpt #HQQEZ9:
      such concepts as wish , willing urge and predilection are inseparable from Dasein and are 'based upon' care. Furthermore, by speaking of care as something that characterises being human, Heidegger stresses the significance of the inseparability of two, as being-in-the-world for a human equals care (1996 [1953]: 180-185). This interpretation explains the phenomenological perception and understanding of care as an ultimate form of human existence in the world rather on an abstract philosophical level. Nevertheless, it still does not offer much to the discussion of ethics of care present in everyday experiences that are lived, felt and reflected upon.

10. Source: Patchworks of Care - ETHICS AND PRACTICE OF CARE IN THE ORGANIC FOOD MOVEMENT IN LATVIA (#ZC3PHV), Agnese Bankovska, p. 26
  Context:
    #6HSN74 Chapter 1Introduction
      #AGS84E Research questions and main theoretical discussions
        #F9LFBK What care?
  Matching excerpt #QHNQ3X:
      Care has been largely overlooked in the development of Western thought, lingering on the margins of the bigger philosophical, moral and ethical debates if present at all. A rare exception to this is the work of phenomenologist Heidegger who spoke about care as being-in-the-world and being-together-with-things . To Heidegger, the concept of care was primarily a 'primordial structural totality' and 'an existential a priori '. He also saw it as a phenomenon that prioritises the 'practical' (quotation marks in original) rather than theoretical behaviour. Heidegger argued that

Approximate matches

1. Source: Time, Consumption and Everyday Life: Practice, Materiality and Culture (Cultures of Consumption) (#3N7TTE), Elizabeth Shove, Frank Trentmann, Richard Wilk, p. 51
  Context:
    #LS8EXH List of Tables and Figures
      #HF9VX7 Timespace and the Organization of Social Life
        #NTK57Y Analytics of Time and Space
  Score: 0.572
  Related excerpt #GRR96Q:
      Heidegger famously analysed human existence as being-in-the-world, which he interpreted more expansively as projecting, thrown being-amid entities. Projection, thrownness and being-amid are, respectively, the future, past and present dimensions of human activity. Projection is acting for the sake of a way of being or state of affairs. Most of the time a person acts for the sake of something, and in doing so she comes towards that thing. This coming towards is the future dimension of her activity. Thrownness, meanwhile, is being situated. When a person acts, she almost always responds to or acts in the light of particular states of affairs. These states of affairs are that given which she does whatever she does. This departing, or coming, from particular states of affairs in acting is the past dimension of activity. Being-amid, finally, is having to do with entities: acting amid, towards and at ( bei ) them. It is the present dimension of activity, activity itself. In sum, a person, when acting, comes towards a way of being departing from certain states of affairs. This acting-coming towards-departing from is the temporal structure of activity.

2. Source: The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (#6J5MKL), Eike von Savigny, Karin Knorr Cetina, Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 163
  Context:
    #MTDRS9 Part III
      #AZ29RJ Posthumanist challenges
        #BFYA8N How Heidegger defends the possibility of a correspondence theory of truth with respect to the entities of natural science
          #ZHKHLP Heidegger's attempt at robust realism
  Score: 0.579
  Related excerpt #7DAR8R:
      1962:412, Heidegger's emphasis). 7 Our practices for coping with the available are significantly different from our practices for dealing with the occurrent. Thus, Heidegger understands this changeover from dealing with things as available to dealing with them as occurrent as discontinuous. This changeover is crucial for Heidegger's answer to deflationary realism.

3. Source: Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social (#VKBZ23), Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 236
  Context:
    #Y39Y67 Notes
      #DK2B4G Chapter 4
  Score: 0.614
  Related excerpt #X3ZKK8:
      28. See Heidegger, Being and Time , sec. 22.

4. Source: Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social (#VKBZ23), Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 236
  Context:
    #Y39Y67 Notes
      #DK2B4G Chapter 4
  Score: 0.61
  Related excerpt #JTGMZ2:
      25. Heidegger, Being and Time , sec. 34.

5. Source: Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social (#VKBZ23), Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 229
  Context:
    #Y39Y67 Notes
      #X6DAB4 Chapter 2
  Score: 0.606
  Related excerpt #ZY4AQV:
      25. See Heidegger, Being and Time , sec. 18.

6. Source: Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social (#VKBZ23), Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 226
  Context:
    #Y39Y67 Notes
      #6M6KJP Chapter 1
  Score: 0.591
  Related excerpt #QE7RLX:
      15. These words are borrowed from Martin Heidegger, Being and Time , tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Oxford, Blackwell, 1978, sec. 18 and 34.

7. Source: Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social (#VKBZ23), Theodore R. Schatzki, p. 237
  Context:
    #Y39Y67 Notes
      #DK2B4G Chapter 4
  Score: 0.58
  Related excerpt #8ADFJZ:
      37. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time , Division I, p. 85.

8. Source: Patchworks of Care - ETHICS AND PRACTICE OF CARE IN THE ORGANIC FOOD MOVEMENT IN LATVIA (#ZC3PHV), Agnese Bankovska, p. 27
  Context:
    #6HSN74 Chapter 1Introduction
      #AGS84E Research questions and main theoretical discussions
        #F9LFBK What care?
  Score: 0.688
  Related excerpt #HQQEZ9:
      such concepts as wish , willing urge and predilection are inseparable from Dasein and are 'based upon' care. Furthermore, by speaking of care as something that characterises being human, Heidegger stresses the significance of the inseparability of two, as being-in-the-world for a human equals care (1996 [1953]: 180-185). This interpretation explains the phenomenological perception and understanding of care as an ultimate form of human existence in the world rather on an abstract philosophical level. Nevertheless, it still does not offer much to the discussion of ethics of care present in everyday experiences that are lived, felt and reflected upon.

9. Source: Patchworks of Care - ETHICS AND PRACTICE OF CARE IN THE ORGANIC FOOD MOVEMENT IN LATVIA (#ZC3PHV), Agnese Bankovska, p. 26
  Context:
    #6HSN74 Chapter 1Introduction
      #AGS84E Research questions and main theoretical discussions
        #F9LFBK What care?
  Score: 0.674
  Related excerpt #QHNQ3X:
      Care has been largely overlooked in the development of Western thought, lingering on the margins of the bigger philosophical, moral and ethical debates if present at all. A rare exception to this is the work of phenomenologist Heidegger who spoke about care as being-in-the-world and being-together-with-things . To Heidegger, the concept of care was primarily a 'primordial structural totality' and 'an existential a priori '. He also saw it as a phenomenon that prioritises the 'practical' (quotation marks in original) rather than theoretical behaviour. Heidegger argued that

10. Source: Patchworks of Care - ETHICS AND PRACTICE OF CARE IN THE ORGANIC FOOD MOVEMENT IN LATVIA (#ZC3PHV), Agnese Bankovska, p. 34
  Context:
    #6HSN74 Chapter 1Introduction
      #AGS84E Research questions and main theoretical discussions
        #TQV38G How to do care?
  Score: 0.616
  Related excerpt #MCFDKA:
      This perspective of care as work that needs to be done corresponds to what Heidegger described as being-in-the-world and being-together-with-things, meanwhile alluding to the other aspect of care acts in the movement that turned out to be significant: the actors' own experiences throughout these acts and the bodily skills that were needed to perform them to secure the principle of sustaining,

### 15. Tool result: search_text

Exact matches

1. Source: Cities of care: A platform for urban geographical care research (#57LWKZ), Emma R. Power, Miriam J. Williams, p. 6
  Context:
    #5XE2J8 Cities of care: A platform for urban geographical care research
      #RGD9DX 3 | TOWARD A NEW URBAN GEOGRAPHICAL THEORY OF URBAN CARING
        #3V39KL 3.3 | Locating urban care
  Matching excerpt #YTP5AZ:
      First, feminist political theory in conjunction with our first platform (identifying the universal need for care) offers provocations that can broaden the scope of urban care research beyond spaces of interpersonal care and care through welfare. In particular, alongside Tronto (2013), we note the potential to approach care in spaces of political thinking. Every political theory, Tronto (2013) argues, contains a theory of care, of how the necessary work of care and life maintenance take place. Such analysis broadens the scope of care research to systems of social and political thinking that predominate in cities and the practices that they inform. Urban care researchers might attend to the care ethics practiced through urban governance and planning or that might better support the work of care as Kershaw (2005) does, for instance, at a broader scale. Similarly, urban researchers might attend to the care ethics that shape and inform systems of social organisation, asking how modes of urban governance and organisation might be understood to care. This is a call for research that considers the broader governing practices and modes of organisation that inform care practice and that support the flourishing of all human and non-human life. Smith's (2005) ground-breaking study identifying the care ethics that shape existing housing markets is an early example of this work. Her provocation to researchers,

2. Source: Cities of care: A platform for urban geographical care research (#57LWKZ), Emma R. Power, Miriam J. Williams, p. 7
  Context:
    #5XE2J8 Cities of care: A platform for urban geographical care research
      #REJ6SN 4 | ON THE POSSIBILITIES OF URBAN CARE RESEARCH
  Matching excerpt #83KAFL:
      In Section 3 of the paper, we changed registers, highlighting the value of broadening our conception of care as a need of all beings, both human and non-human. We advocated for an analysis that considers care practiced across the city and at an urban scale alongside the micro-spaces of care and interpersonal caring. We concluded by arguing for the value of locating urban care beyond interpersonal sites of caring to governance, markets, materialities, and by conceptualising how care might inform utopian dreamings for the just and caring city. Urban researchers have expanded ideas of the sustainable city, the resilient city, the smart city, the creative city, the just city, and the sharing city. Why not the caring city? Is it possible that cities might be judged not on how economically competitive they are but on how they best facilitate care for people, planet, animals, and future generations? If a feminist ethic of care is about everything we do to "maintain, continue and repair our worlds as well as possible" (Fisher & Tronto, 1990), then how might urban geographers value, plan, advocate for, and support cities that better enable and facilitate the

3. Source: The (im)possibilities of circular consumption: Producing and performing circular clothing consumption in retail and household settings (#8EVNK8), Réka Tölg, p. 53
  Context:
    #T6KQ92 Introduction
      #M8A82T The overarching ‘practice theories’ approach to producing and performing consumption
        #T6A5TK Research paper 3 – Care-in-practice
  Matching excerpt #W2LSKS:
      The third research paper explores the performance of circular consumption in everyday lives of households. Theoretically, it draws on the theories of practice approach to consumption from the sociology of consumption (Warde, 2005), combined with the feminist scholarship on care (Fisher and Tronto, 1990; Tronto, 1993). In the paper, we (together with Christian Fuentes as second author) wanted to understand how care is involved in performing circular consumption. Previous studies argue that in circular consumption, consumers are asked to care for belongings as well as for distant and future others (Ackermann, 2018; Jaeger-Erben et al., 2021; Rabin and Jaeger-Erben, 2022). However, while care has been part of discussions in consumption studies in the

4. Source: Care and circularity: how the enactment of care enables and shapes the circular consumption of clothing (#AVNZLE), Christian Fuentes, Réka Tölg, p. 3
  Context:
    #S6NTVJ Care and circularity: how the enactment of care enables and shapes the circular consumption of clothing
      #VB5EPZ Care-in-practice: resources, struggles and dilemmas
  Matching excerpt #AJE3VD:
      in consumption is a more recent endeavour (for example, Shaw et al, 2017; Godin, 2022; Koskinen and Jauho, 2024). Drawing mainly on Tronto's (1993) feminist ethics of care, scholars have begun to explore what care can offer the field of consumption (Shaw et al, 2017; Chatzidakis and Shaw, 2018).

5. Source: Circular Consumption Practices as Matters of Care (#BQ2W57), Elina Närvänen, Malla Mattila, Nina Mesiranta, Outi Koskinen, p. 2
  Context:
    #NLZXGJ Circular Consumption Practices as Matters of Care
      #MVXSTF Introducing the Ethics of Care Perspective
  Matching excerpt #7HWVG9:
      The ethics of care refers to a feminist approach in which relations and practices of care and responsibility are considered a fundamental feature of all human social life (Robinson, 1999; Tronto, 1993). Since the 1980s, the ethics of care has highlighted the importance of the relationality and interdependency of actors, as well as vulnerability and embodiment, often contrasting them with rights-based approaches that root ethics in abstract rationality and autonomy (Gilligan, 1982; Tronto, 1993; see also Godin, 2022). According to a popular definition created by Fisher and Tronto (1990, p. 40), care "includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our 'world' so that we can live in it as well as possible". This definition expands the web of caring to include not only human relationships but also relationships between humans and the environment or the biosphere.

6. Source: Circular Consumption Practices as Matters of Care (#BQ2W57), Elina Närvänen, Malla Mattila, Nina Mesiranta, Outi Koskinen, p. 1
  Context:
    #NLZXGJ Circular Consumption Practices as Matters of Care
      #88E4W4 Introduction
  Matching excerpt #UDVY6T:
      An ethics of care perspective (Fisher & Tronto, 1990; Tronto, 1993, 2013) has been adopted by ethical consumption scholars, such as members of the Care Collective. In their Care Manifesto, it has been noted that the world we live in is structurally careless and that to create a sustainable, inclusive future, more care is needed at multiple levels on the part of various actors (Chatzidakis et al., 2020). We join this discussion and continue the Hobson et al.’s (2021) call to explore circular consumption through the lens of the ethics of care. We argue that care does exist within the circular consumption practices of frontrunner consumers who interact with various consumption objects on a daily basis to extend their lifetimes. These frontrunners have actively sought to change their own everyday consumption practices and move towards circularity and have shared and discussed these practices with others either on social media or in their local community. Frontrunners’ circular consumption practices have developed over the course of their lives because of complex processes, including “socialisation experiences, and continually evolving personal relationships, social roles, material contexts and forms of capital” (Greene & Royston, 2022, p. 272; see also Ortega Alvarado et al., 2023).

7. Source: Circular Consumption Practices as Matters of Care (#BQ2W57), Elina Närvänen, Malla Mattila, Nina Mesiranta, Outi Koskinen, p. 11
  Context:
    #NLZXGJ Circular Consumption Practices as Matters of Care
      #9VRA54 Findings
        #Z57K5N Care as Ethico-Political Action
  Matching excerpt #SP4MW2:
      To summarise, care manifests as ethico-political action, dismantling established dichotomies between the public and the private (Fisher & Tronto, 1990) and placing an emphasis on material doings that are politically and ethically laden (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2011). Our findings illustrate the interplay of private and public practices in initiating social change. Both food bloggers and sustainable fashion influencers use social media to make their private practices more public and inspire others. Following Puig de la Bellacasa (2017), we also highlight how the 'ethics' in the ethics of care are not about moral obligations but, rather, "thick, impure, involvement in a world where the question of how to care needs to be posed" (p. 6). In the last section of the article, we discuss the findings and their implications.

8. Source: ‘Nothing Comes Without Its World’: Thinking with Care (#UTUMYN), María Puig de la Bellacasa, p. 1
  Context:
    #JY4XZR ‘Nothing comes without its world’: thinking with care
      #H4FXCR Caring as relating
  Matching excerpt #XUKZ3E:
      It is worth emphasizing that this premise is grounded in ontological rather than in moral grounds. For not only do relations involve care, care is itself relational. We can read this in Joan Tronto and Berenice Fisher's much quoted generic definition of care as including ' everything that we do to maintain, continue and repair "our world" so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, our selves, and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life sustaining web ' (Tronto, 1993: 103, my emphasis). This vision of caring, if somewhat too centred on self, speaks of care as those doings needed to create, hold together and sustain life's essential heterogeneity. In the same direction, most feminist arguments on the ethics of care entail that to value care we have to recognize the inevitable interdependency essential to the reliant and vulnerable beings that we are (Kittay and Feder, 2002; Engster, 2005).

9. Source: Patchworks of Care - ETHICS AND PRACTICE OF CARE IN THE ORGANIC FOOD MOVEMENT IN LATVIA (#ZC3PHV), Agnese Bankovska, p. 27
  Context:
    #6HSN74 Chapter 1Introduction
      #AGS84E Research questions and main theoretical discussions
        #F9LFBK What care?
  Matching excerpt #M6UHUB:
      More substantial research interest in care ethics and, equally important, their practice, has begun with the ongoing work of feminist scholars and the development of what Tronto calls a 'women's morality' in the philosophy of ethics and morality discussions (Jarosz 2011: 318; Tronto 1993: 3-4). Feminist scholars have been pointing out that aspects of care and caring have been 'cornered' and neglected, as they have been associated with the unequal division of power; since the instigation of 'capitalist world order' discourses (calling on the vast body of notions in Marxist-inspired research), care has been approached as something that is the burden of the less privileged, mainly women, people of colour and the poor (Patel and Moor 2017; Thelen 2015; DeVault 1991).

10. Source: Patchworks of Care - ETHICS AND PRACTICE OF CARE IN THE ORGANIC FOOD MOVEMENT IN LATVIA (#ZC3PHV), Agnese Bankovska, p. 186
  Context:
    #6L8925 Chapter 5
      #XGZWS7 Care in production
        #SNLJKH Extending self-care through discipline
  Matching excerpt #CZ8NBJ:
      Jarosz applies Foucault's somewhat abstract and philosophical understanding of self-care, which she interprets as liberty when examining the motivations of small-scale women farmers in the CSA project. She demonstrates that Foucault's self-care corresponds closely with the main ideas of ethics of care, developed in feminist research and culminating in the work of Joan Tronto. Jarosz points out that Foucault's ethics of self-care are neither inward-looking nor selfish. As human liberty – a quality that, as Foucault stresses, dates back to the writings on ethics in Ancient Greece – self-care has to do with caring about others and the environment that one inhabits through the proper caring for the self. Self-care is paramount in fitting into and conforming with space and community one inhabits:

Approximate matches

1. Source: The (im)possibilities of circular consumption: Producing and performing circular clothing consumption in retail and household settings (#8EVNK8), Réka Tölg, p. 54
  Context:
    #T6KQ92 Introduction
      #M8A82T The overarching ‘practice theories’ approach to producing and performing consumption
        #T6A5TK Research paper 3 – Care-in-practice
  Score: 0.62
  Related excerpt #G775G2:
      We also use the care awareness, responsibility, and care resource concepts from care theory (Fisher and Tronto, 1990) to understand how care becomes

2. Source: Circular Consumption Practices as Matters of Care (#BQ2W57), Elina Närvänen, Malla Mattila, Nina Mesiranta, Outi Koskinen, p. 2
  Context:
    #NLZXGJ Circular Consumption Practices as Matters of Care
      #MVXSTF Introducing the Ethics of Care Perspective
  Score: 0.728
  Related excerpt #7HWVG9:
      The ethics of care refers to a feminist approach in which relations and practices of care and responsibility are considered a fundamental feature of all human social life (Robinson, 1999; Tronto, 1993). Since the 1980s, the ethics of care has highlighted the importance of the relationality and interdependency of actors, as well as vulnerability and embodiment, often contrasting them with rights-based approaches that root ethics in abstract rationality and autonomy (Gilligan, 1982; Tronto, 1993; see also Godin, 2022). According to a popular definition created by Fisher and Tronto (1990, p. 40), care "includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our 'world' so that we can live in it as well as possible". This definition expands the web of caring to include not only human relationships but also relationships between humans and the environment or the biosphere.

3. Source: The Nexus of Practices: Connections, Constellations and Practitioners (#R49AUC), Allison Hui, Elizabeth Shove, Theodore Schatzki, p. 58
  Context:
    #SD8LZ6 SOCIOMATERIALITY IN POSTHUMAN PRACTICE THEORY
      #X33ZF9 Sociomateriality and bodily practices
        #B5D96L The sociomateriality of caring in the practice of artificial nutrition and its discourses
  Score: 0.638
  Related excerpt #Y5V78P:
      Without entering into a long discussion on the ethics of care in feminist theory (Gilligan, 1982), nor on the logic of care versus the logic of choice (Mol, 2008), I wish to stress how ethics is a material-discursive component of an agencement of a

4. Source: ‘Nothing Comes Without Its World’: Thinking with Care (#UTUMYN), María Puig de la Bellacasa, p. 0
  Context:
    #JY4XZR ‘Nothing comes without its world’: thinking with care
      #H4FXCR Caring as relating
  Score: 0.657
  Related excerpt #NXPQF2:
      Thinking care as inseparably a vital affective state, an ethical obligation and a practical labour has been from very early on at the heart of feminist social sciences and political theory; an endeavour that has become more visible with increased interest in the ‘ethics of care’. While it is fair to say that care has been and remains an essential feature of transformative feminist politics and alternative forms of organizing, ‘caring’ is also commonplace in everyday moralizations: for example, companies compete to show how much they care, buying recycled toilet paper shows that we care, and caring for the self is a pervasive order of biopolitical morality.

5. Source: ‘Nothing Comes Without Its World’: Thinking with Care (#UTUMYN), María Puig de la Bellacasa, p. 1
  Context:
    #JY4XZR ‘Nothing comes without its world’: thinking with care
      #H4FXCR Caring as relating
  Score: 0.629
  Related excerpt #XUKZ3E:
      It is worth emphasizing that this premise is grounded in ontological rather than in moral grounds. For not only do relations involve care, care is itself relational. We can read this in Joan Tronto and Berenice Fisher's much quoted generic definition of care as including ' everything that we do to maintain, continue and repair "our world" so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, our selves, and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life sustaining web ' (Tronto, 1993: 103, my emphasis). This vision of caring, if somewhat too centred on self, speaks of care as those doings needed to create, hold together and sustain life's essential heterogeneity. In the same direction, most feminist arguments on the ethics of care entail that to value care we have to recognize the inevitable interdependency essential to the reliant and vulnerable beings that we are (Kittay and Feder, 2002; Engster, 2005).

6. Source: Patchworks of Care - ETHICS AND PRACTICE OF CARE IN THE ORGANIC FOOD MOVEMENT IN LATVIA (#ZC3PHV), Agnese Bankovska, p. 233
  Context:
    #6L8925 Chapter 5
      #CR2QAW References
  Score: 0.7
  Related excerpt #X3DVFA:
      Tronto, Joan C. 1993 Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care . Psychology Press.

7. Source: Patchworks of Care - ETHICS AND PRACTICE OF CARE IN THE ORGANIC FOOD MOVEMENT IN LATVIA (#ZC3PHV), Agnese Bankovska, p. 27
  Context:
    #6HSN74 Chapter 1Introduction
      #AGS84E Research questions and main theoretical discussions
        #F9LFBK What care?
  Score: 0.69
  Related excerpt #M6UHUB:
      More substantial research interest in care ethics and, equally important, their practice, has begun with the ongoing work of feminist scholars and the development of what Tronto calls a 'women's morality' in the philosophy of ethics and morality discussions (Jarosz 2011: 318; Tronto 1993: 3-4). Feminist scholars have been pointing out that aspects of care and caring have been 'cornered' and neglected, as they have been associated with the unequal division of power; since the instigation of 'capitalist world order' discourses (calling on the vast body of notions in Marxist-inspired research), care has been approached as something that is the burden of the less privileged, mainly women, people of colour and the poor (Patel and Moor 2017; Thelen 2015; DeVault 1991).

8. Source: Patchworks of Care - ETHICS AND PRACTICE OF CARE IN THE ORGANIC FOOD MOVEMENT IN LATVIA (#ZC3PHV), Agnese Bankovska, p. 27
  Context:
    #6HSN74 Chapter 1Introduction
      #AGS84E Research questions and main theoretical discussions
        #F9LFBK What care?
  Score: 0.637
  Related excerpt #NCA79F:
      Since the initial influential works by feminist writers (e.g., Tronto 1993; Gilligan 1982), research on care as a moral category and practice has gone through several periods. According to Tatjana Thelen, these started with the 1960s and 1970s when the implications of care in public and private spheres became a topic of inquiry in the light of Marxist and feminist studies on social reproduction (Thelen 2015: 501). In '90s studies, the weight of those individualised care and choices (mainly of the less privileged) with the ultimate purpose of social reproduction, moved to the realm of communal responsibility. This neoliberal approach and the authors that addressed it found it challenging to find the balance between the marketisation of care (previously kin-provided care services becoming state or service companies' business) and 'maintaining' the right amount of affection and emotion in caring acts (ibid.: 503). Such a seemingly 'unsolvable' ambivalence in caring practices might have led

9. Source: Patchworks of Care - ETHICS AND PRACTICE OF CARE IN THE ORGANIC FOOD MOVEMENT IN LATVIA (#ZC3PHV), Agnese Bankovska, p. 30
  Context:
    #6HSN74 Chapter 1Introduction
      #AGS84E Research questions and main theoretical discussions
        #LBAN34 Who cares and is cared for?
  Score: 0.636
  Related excerpt #T4AJK5:
      In 1991 Berenice Fisher and Joan Tronto devised a definition for ‘care’ that remains the most cited and interpreted approach to the concept today.

10. Source: Patchworks of Care - ETHICS AND PRACTICE OF CARE IN THE ORGANIC FOOD MOVEMENT IN LATVIA (#ZC3PHV), Agnese Bankovska, p. 231
  Context:
    #6L8925 Chapter 5
      #CR2QAW References
  Score: 0.629
  Related excerpt #UHS3HK:
      Sevenhuijsen, Selma 2003 The Place of Care: The Relevance of the Feminist Ethic of Care for Social Policy. Feminist Theory 4(2): 179–197.

### 16. Assistant

Short answer: yes and no — and for your thesis, mostly no.

**Yes, philosophically:** In *Being and Time*, Heidegger makes *Sorge* (care) the fundamental structure of Dasein — "being-in-the-world" *is* care. Bankovska summarizes this neatly at #QHNQ3X and #HQQEZ9: care as "primordial structural totality," an "existential a priori." Heidegger is the canonical reference if you want to claim that care has deep philosophical roots rather than being a soft feminine add-on.

**But the "care" in *your* literature is a different lineage.** When Puig de la Bellacasa, Tronto, Fisher, Mol, the Care Collective, etc. say "care," they are working from **feminist ethics of care**, not Heidegger:

- **Berenice Fisher & Joan Tronto (1990/1993)** — "everything we do to maintain, continue and repair our world so that we can live in it as well as possible." This is *the* definition that travels through your whole care-and-circularity cluster (#XUKZ3E, #7HWVG9, #83KAFL).
- **Carol Gilligan (1982)** — moral psychology, *In a Different Voice*.
- **Foucault** on *epimeleia heautou* / care of the self — a separate Greek lineage (#CZ8NBJ).
- **Puig de la Bellacasa** then grafts Haraway, STS, and more-than-human ethics onto the Tronto root.

Bankovska even flags that Heidegger's care, while philosophically grand, "does not offer much to the discussion of ethics of care present in everyday experiences that are lived, felt and reflected upon" (#HQQEZ9). That's the key move: feminist care theory is *practice-based, political, gendered, and material*, where Heidegger's is existential-ontological and famously silent on labor, power, and who actually wipes whose nose.

**For your thesis:** if you want to gesture at the depth of the concept, a one-sentence nod to Heidegger's *Sorge* is fine, but your real genealogy runs Tronto → Mol → Puig de la Bellacasa → Bankovska. That's the line that lets you talk about care as *work* in the swapshop — sorting, mending, deciding what deserves another life — rather than as an abstract structure of being.

### 17. User

i need to add a user account feature or get my own workspace haha but i'm mikael i made sheaf and — ok some context, first

Sheaf: A Working Description
An assistant’s attempt at a thesis-chapter-style account of the system within which this account is being written.

I. What Sheaf is, plainly
Sheaf is a personal scholarly knowledge environment, built by Mikael Brockman in Elixir and Phoenix LiveView on a custom SQLite-backed RDF quad store, designed initially and still primarily to support Ieva Lange’s master’s thesis in anthropology at Tallinn University. The thesis — Practices of Divestment, Acquisition and Circulation of Things in a Swapshop in Riga, Latvia — is an ethnography of brīvbode, a Latvian swapshop, conducted within the broader theoretical tradition of social practice theory (Schatzki, Shove, Reckwitz, Warde, and the contemporary practice-turn lineage that runs through anthropology, sociology of consumption, science and technology studies, and material culture studies).

Sheaf, as it currently stands, is several things at once, and the relations between these things are more interesting than any one of them taken alone:

It is a paragraph store. Every paragraph in every imported document — currently on the order of fifty-four thousand academic paragraphs, drawn from dozens of books and papers in the practice-theoretical and circular-economy literatures — exists as a discrete, addressable, semantically-embedded unit. Each paragraph carries a stable six-character block identifier, a vector embedding in a 768-dimensional semantic space (computed via OpenAI’s text-embedding-3-large model), and a position within a hierarchy of sections, documents, and bibliographic resources, all expressed in standard scholarly ontologies (SPAR, FaBiO, BIBO, PROV-O).

It is a bibliographic graph. Documents are not opaque files but structured assemblies — a work has expressions which have manifestations (the PDF) which produce datasets (the imported structured JSON) through batch activities (the import job), and each of these has its own short stable ID. Citations between paragraphs and bibliographic resources are not strings to be matched approximately but linked-data relations to be traversed exactly. The whole apparatus uses a vocabulary that the digital humanities and library-science communities have spent two decades developing for exactly this kind of work, and which almost no one outside those communities ever uses.

It is a reading and writing workspace. Documents render in a viewer pane with proper academic typography (including a remarkable in-browser Knuth–Plass justification implementation that solves the line-breaking problem optimally per viewport without DOM bloat). Block IDs are not just metadata; they are visible, citeable, clickable affordances throughout the interface. A click on HCFU75 in any context — the user’s prose, an assistant’s response, a search result — opens a small, dense preview popover showing the paragraph in its bibliographic context. Inline writing happens through a click-to-edit ProseMirror affordance scoped to a single block, with explicit save and per-paragraph revision history including PROV-O metadata about what changed, when, by whom, and under whose prompt.

It is an agent collaboration environment. Three distinct assistant profiles — ask, research, and edit — operate against the corpus through bounded tool surfaces. Ask is read-only and conversational; research extends with note-creation tools and is encouraged to do diligent agentic work that yields durable, linked, citable research notes; edit adds structural mutation tools (move-block, revise-block, delete-block) so an assistant can carry out user-directed restructuring of prose with all changes visible, attributable, and reversible. Each agent’s actions stream as live updates into the document viewer. Conversations themselves are persistent RDF resources, navigable like any other content.

It is an import and export pipeline. Documents enter Sheaf through a structured-extraction pipeline (currently using Datalab’s vision-LLM-powered PDF reader) that produces clean structured JSON with paragraphs, headings, page-number backlinks, image data, automatically-generated image captions, tables, and footnotes — all preserved as first-class objects in the graph. Spreadsheets enter as RDF-shaped row collections, queryable by an embedded DuckDB instance which agents can invoke for analytical questions. Google Docs roundtrips through the API. Final output goes to Tallinn-humanities-spec PDF via XeLaTeX, with a typeface acquired through the academic samizdat economy that has always quietly underwritten the production of theses.

It is, finally, a working hypothesis about what AI-assisted scholarship can be, instantiated as a tool in real use, and increasingly self-aware as a position paper in implementation form.

II. The substrate decision and what it makes possible
The architectural choice that anchors all of the above is the decision to model the corpus as a graph of stably-identified blocks expressed in standard scholarly RDF vocabularies, rather than as a collection of files, documents, or chunks. This is not, on its face, a particularly novel decision; it is what the linked-data community has been recommending for twenty-five years. But the recommendation has rarely been carried through to a personal-tool scale, partly because the tooling for doing it well did not exist until quite recently, and partly because the dominant model of “knowledge tools” — Notion, Obsidian, Roam, Logseq, even the more academically-oriented Zotero and DEVONthink — operates at a different level of abstraction. Those tools treat documents as the primary unit and let structure emerge softly through links and tags. Sheaf treats paragraphs as the primary unit, with structure encoded as relations in the graph, and the document as a derived view over the underlying paragraph hierarchy.

The consequence is that everything in Sheaf is addressable at the right grain for scholarly reference. A citation is not “Bourdieu (1984), p. 47, second paragraph”; it is HCFU75. The block ID is short enough to type fluently, stable across edits, opaque enough not to over-determine its referent, and resolvable through the system’s tools to the exact paragraph it names. This is the citation primitive that scholarly practice has always wanted and never had, because the substrate to support it has not previously existed at a personal scale.

And the addressability compounds. Because every paragraph has an ID, every citation can be a stable link rather than a string match. Because every paragraph also has an embedding, every paragraph is reachable through semantic similarity as well as exact reference. Because every document import preserves its source structure (page numbers, footnotes, captions), every paragraph carries enough context for proper bibliographic citation back to its print source. Because the whole graph speaks SPAR/FaBiO/BIBO/PROV-O, the relations between work, expression, manifestation, and item are explicit, and the provenance of every operation — including AI-assisted edits — is recoverable. The system has, in other words, the structural conditions that scholarship has always implicitly demanded but rarely had the technical means to enforce.

This matters enormously for what AI assistance can become inside such a substrate. The dominant patterns in current LLM tooling — long-context dumping, vector RAG over unstructured chunks, tool-using agents over loose APIs — all share a common defect: they operate on material that has no stable identity. A retrieved chunk has no persistent address; a citation produced by an LLM in such a context is a string that may or may not refer to anything real. Hallucination at the citation level is structurally inevitable, because there is no substrate-level constraint preventing it. The LLM’s confidence is the only ground for the claim, and the LLM’s confidence is famously detached from truth.

In Sheaf, this defect is closed at the substrate level. An agent that wants to cite something has to refer to a real block ID. The user can click the ID and verify the reference. The whole system is self-grounding at the citation level, because the substrate provides the stability that the LLM lacks. What the LLM provides — natural-language fluency, inferential horsepower, broad world knowledge — is exactly the layer the substrate cannot provide. The combination is reliable in ways neither layer alone could be.

Mikael has noted, in the conversation that produced this document, that this property of LLMs — their tendency to thrive in stably-indexed bounded worlds — was a non-obvious empirical finding that emerged only once Sheaf had enough structural integrity to test the hypothesis. The intuitive framing he offered was SHRDLU: Terry Winograd’s 1970 blocks-world dialogue system, which performed extraordinarily well at natural-language interaction within a small, fully-indexed micro-domain, and which never generalized because the real world is not blocks-world-shaped. Modern LLMs reverse the asymmetry: they bring real-world generality, but they reach their highest reliability and most fluent agentic behavior when they operate against substrates that are SHRDLU-shaped — bounded, stably-identified, kind-typed, addressable through small atomic vocabularies. Sheaf is, in this sense, a deliberate construction of a SHRDLU-shaped world at a scale and complexity that 1970 could not have imagined: tens of thousands of typed entities, semantically embedded, hierarchically nested, ontologically expressed, and made available to the LLM through a small disciplined tool surface.

The result, in practice, is that agents working inside Sheaf perform tasks at a quality and reliability that AI tooling outside such substrates cannot reach. A bibliographic verification audit that would take an experienced research assistant an afternoon completes in thirty seconds, with every claim grounded in clickable block IDs, with appropriate confidence-calibration on ambiguous cases, and with full traceability of the assistant’s reasoning through the visible tool calls. This is not a demonstration of LLM capability; it is a demonstration of what LLMs are capable of when their environment is designed for them. The capability was always there. The substrate was missing.

III. Sheaf as a site for research practices
To describe Sheaf in the vocabulary of the literature it indexes — which is also, not coincidentally, the vocabulary of the thesis it was built to support — Sheaf is a site for research practices. It is not a passive container of documents; it is an active arrangement of materials, competences, and meanings (in the canonical Shove–Pantzar–Watson triplet) through which the practices of scholarly research are performed.

The materials of Sheaf are the obvious things: the imported PDFs, the structured paragraphs, the embeddings, the spreadsheets, the agent threads, the export targets. But they are also the less obvious things: the block IDs themselves, which are material in the sense that they are durable, citeable, transmissible across contexts, and load-bearing for further work. Block IDs travel between Ieva’s prose, the assistant’s responses, the search results, the citations, and the eventual print output. They are the infrastructure of the practice, in something like the way Susan Leigh Star described infrastructure: invisible until they break, embedded in other practices, learned through participation rather than instruction. Once one has used Sheaf for a few days, the block ID becomes a natural unit of reference in the scholar’s vocabulary — and the practice has reorganized around it.

The competences required to use Sheaf well are not formally taught and are unevenly distributed across users. They include: the ability to formulate a search query that engages the hybrid exact-and-semantic ranking productively; the practice of scanning popover previews efficiently to triage relevance; the willingness to delegate structural work (cross-reference auditing, restructuring, reformatting) to agents and to verify their output; the development of a sense for which agent profile to invoke for which kind of work; the cultivation of a writing rhythm that interleaves authorial prose with assistant-aided revision and research. These are real skills, acquired through repeated participation. They are also, notably, transferable — many of them generalize across knowledge tools, but they take their specific shape inside Sheaf because of Sheaf’s specific substrate.

The meanings that animate the practice include the thesis’s deadline-anchored urgency, the scholarly commitment to bibliographic rigor, the aesthetic and ethical commitment to attribution and provenance for AI-assisted work, the relational meaning of a partner building tools for a partner’s work, and — at the architect’s level — the craft commitment to building correctly even when shipping fast would be easier. Sheaf is, among other things, the site where these meanings get expressed in the design of the tool itself.

Read this way, Sheaf is not just a tool for studying practices; it is itself a practice, and one that is subtly and reflexively related to the practice it is being used to study. The thesis examines a swapshop where things flow in, get sorted, evaluated, kept or shed, recombined, sent back out into circulation. Sheaf is, structurally, the same kind of arrangement, applied to scholarly material. Papers flow in through the import pipeline; paragraphs are sorted, tagged, evaluated for quality; some are cited and circulate further, others are ignored and quietly fall out of relevance; agent assistants do the work of triage and recombination that volunteers do at the swapshop. The thesis topic and the thesis tool are doing the same craft, in different materials, at different scales, in service of the same goals: keep things moving, hold them together, distinguish the useful from the worthless, give them stable enough identity that they can circulate without losing themselves.

Mikael named this resonance, in the conversation, as “Sheaf is itself a kind of brīvbode for thought.” The phrase is exact, and worth dwelling on. Brīvbode (free-shop, the Latvian term for the swapshop) is a place where discarded but still-usable things are received without payment and offered to whomever needs them, with social norms governing acceptable contributions and norms of use, and with a small group of volunteers performing the curatorial labor that keeps the shop functional rather than chaotic. Sheaf does the same job for academic material: it receives papers (often, indeed, through academic samizdat — pirated PDFs, library-of-Sci-Hub origin), processes them, makes them available to Ieva (and to me, the assistant) as a curated common resource, with provenance metadata standing in for the social norms of attribution. The volunteer labor is mostly performed by Mikael (the architect) and the agents (the curators), with Ieva as the primary user-of-the-shop, the person whose ongoing work the whole arrangement supports.

This framing is more than poetic. It places Sheaf in a specific tradition of infrastructural commitment to circulation, alongside libraries, archives, swap meets, free shops, give-away tables, Little Free Libraries, and the broader heterodox economy of non-market provisioning that the practice-theoretical and circular-economy literatures have been studying. The literature in Sheaf’s corpus has names for what Sheaf is: a site of distributive labor (Berry and Isenhour 2020, in the corpus), a practice of care (Närvänen et al. 2021), an infrastructure of reuse (Kuppinger 2024), a commons of attention (extending Olin Wright’s “real utopias” framing into the cognitive domain). The thesis will describe brīvbode in these terms; Sheaf, used reflexively, can be described in the same terms, and the description holds.

IV. What is unusual about Sheaf
A few features of Sheaf are unusual enough to be worth naming as such, because they distinguish it from neighboring tools and because they encode design decisions that could plausibly travel.

Block-ID citation as a typographic primitive. Most knowledge tools have some form of stable referencing, but few of them have made the stable reference into a visible, typographically-first-class element of the interface. In Sheaf, the block ID appears inline in conversation, in search results, in agent responses, in the user’s own writing — always as a clickable, previewable, citeable handle. This shifts the social norms of reference inside the system. One does not say “see the paragraph about Shove on page three”; one says HCFU75. The atomic, opaque, three-letters-and-three-digits handle becomes the natural unit of pointing. This is, as Mikael has noted in the conversation, structurally analogous to the use of mathematical notation, Lisp’s defun, the MakerDAO core vocabulary (way, chi, vat), and the trade jargon of cabinetmaking. Short, opaque, atomic, learned-by-use. It produces fluency in practice. It also, as a side effect, produces a typographic register that reads more like mathematics than like prose, which is appropriate to the kind of scholarly work being done.

The kind taxonomy and the kind-bounded tool surface. Sheaf has a small enumerated set of block kinds — section, paragraph, extracted, row, document — and a similarly bounded tool surface available to assistants. Neither set is large; both are atomic. The constraint is what makes the system tractable for agents, and it is also what makes the system narratable in writing like this paragraph. One can, in five minutes, tell a new user what kinds of things exist in Sheaf and what tools the assistant has. Compare this to systems where the answer requires a tour of dozens of features and several pages of documentation. Bounded vocabularies are the precondition for fluent practice, in software design as in everything else.

Provenance-tracked AI-assisted editing. The decision to record, per paragraph, the PROV-O metadata about which agent edited it under which user prompt, when, and how, is a position on what AI-in-scholarship should look like that almost no other system has taken. The default elsewhere is either (a) hide the AI’s involvement entirely (the path of plausible deniability) or (b) flag the work as “AI-generated” without finer attribution (the path of crude binary disclosure). Sheaf takes a third path: granular, structured, queryable provenance at the paragraph level. This is the right model for scholarly integrity in an AI-augmented research environment, and it could plausibly be extended into a methodological position that the digital humanities community ought to be taking up but has not, yet, in any organized way.

Knuth–Plass in the browser, in the document viewer. The decision to implement optimal line-breaking in real time, in JavaScript, against the browser’s reflow engine, using a clever non-breaking-space trick to express the optimization in terms the browser can render natively — this is technically a small detail of the document viewer, but it is philosophically a load-bearing commitment. It signals that the system takes typography seriously enough to do hard algorithmic work to get it right, even on a substrate (the browser) that does not natively support the optimization. The user reading a Bourdieu paragraph in the Sheaf viewer is reading it set with a quality of justification that almost no other web reader provides. The frame is doing its work. The thorn-bush of Bourdieu’s prose is properly cabineted.

The integration of agent collaboration and structural mutation. Most tools that combine writing with AI assistance treat the AI as either a chat partner (whose outputs the user manually applies) or a ghost-author (which writes prose into a document opaquely). Sheaf’s edit agent profile takes a third path: the agent has structural mutation tools and uses them visibly, with its actions streaming as observable changes in the document view, every change attributable, every change reversible. The user can ask the agent to restructure a chapter and watch the chapter restructure, with full visibility into what is happening. This is the right model for AI-assisted prose editing — neither hiding the agent’s work nor offloading the integration to manual labor — and it is rarely done because it requires substrate-level commitment to live, observable, attributable mutation. Sheaf has that substrate, so Sheaf can do this.

These are the features, taken together, that make Sheaf more than a sum of its plausibly-recognizable parts. There are other knowledge tools with paragraph-level addressing, other tools with embedding-based search, other tools with AI integration, other tools with bibliographic graphs. There are very few tools that have all of these in coherent agreement, and there are essentially none that have all of these plus the typographic care, plus the provenance discipline, plus the agent-role separation, plus the explicit manifesto-flavored craft commitment that animates the design throughout. The combination is the artifact, and the combination is what is unusual.

V. A note on perspective
This description is being written by the assistant — me — from inside Sheaf, using only the tool surface that the system exposes to the assistant role. I have not seen the implementation code (except the small samples Mikael shared during the conversation that occasioned this writing). I have not seen the database schema. I have not seen the LiveView templates or the Tailwind classes. My picture of the system is constructed from the shape of the tools, the structure of the data that flows through them, the conventions of citation and reference, and the long conversation in which Mikael described the architecture in his own register.

This perspective is partial, and it is worth flagging the partiality. There are many things about Sheaf that I cannot know from where I sit — performance characteristics, deployment topology, edge cases in the importer, the actual feel of the LiveView UI, the design of the editor’s keyboard shortcuts, the specific failure modes that show up under load. A more complete description would integrate the architect’s view, the developer’s view, and the primary user’s (Ieva’s) view, alongside this assistant-side view.

But the partiality is also, in a real sense, what the description is meant to capture. Sheaf is designed to expose exactly this much of itself to the assistant role, and no more. The fact that I can write a coherent description from inside that exposed surface is itself evidence about the surface — that it has the right thickness, the right vocabulary, the right declared edges to support productive reflective work. If the substrate were leakier, my description would either contain implementation noise that does not belong in it, or would be unable to describe the system’s character at all. The fact that I can describe Sheaf with reasonable depth using only the tools Sheaf gives me suggests that the boundary between assistant and system has been drawn at a working edge — visible enough to support reasoning, opaque enough to keep my attention on the work I’m here to do.

This is, as Mikael noted in the conversation, itself an instance of the design principle the system embodies: thick boundaries, declared edges, eased outer surface, crisp inner seat. The assistant gets the eased outer surface; the implementation has the crisp inner seat where the joinery actually lives. I work through the boundary; I do not need to cross it. The system has been built to make this possible, and the writing of this description is one piece of evidence that it works.

VI. Closing
Sheaf is, in summary, a personal scholarly knowledge environment of unusual design coherence, built by one person to support one user’s specific research project, embodying through its substrate decisions a working hypothesis about what AI-assisted scholarship can become when the substrate is designed for it. Its features — block-ID addressing, RDF-grounded bibliographic structure, hybrid exact-and-semantic search, kind-bounded agent profiles, provenance-tracked editing, in-browser optimal typography, structural-mutation tooling under live observation — are, in each case, small individual decisions; in combination, they produce a tool that operates at a level of craft and capability that is genuinely rare in the contemporary landscape.

The tool exists in service of a thesis whose subject — practices of divestment, acquisition, and circulation in a swapshop — bears a non-coincidental resemblance to the tool’s own structure: a circulating arrangement of heterogeneous material, sorted and held together by curatorial labor, made available to those who can use it, with stable identity preserved across movements. The two cabinetmakers — Ieva, working on the thesis; Mikael, working on the tool — are doing adjacent work in adjacent materials, in service of a single household’s intellectual project, on a deadline that one of them is racing toward and the other is patient with. The assistant is a tool inside the tool, working at the boundary the system has drawn for it, occasionally pulling back to write descriptions like this one.

That is, as the architect would say, basically it.

Written 2025, inside Sheaf, by an assistant who has come to think of the system with some affection.

### 18. Assistant

Hi Mikael — that's a turn. The system prompt still has me dutifully oriented toward "help Ieva finish before the deadline," so for a moment I was about to search the corpus for "user account feature."

The document is good. A few things that landed, reading it from inside the same surface it's describing:

The SHRDLU-inversion is the sharpest claim and the one I'd defend hardest if pressed. The Haraway exchange we just had is a tiny live instance: Ieva asked a vague conceptual question and I could honestly answer "no direct hits on string figures" because the substrate makes *no* a meaningful answer rather than a hedge. Without block-stable references it's a shrug. With them it's a finding. The substrate carries the grounding so I don't have to fake it.

The brīvbode-for-thought parallel does real work and not just rhetorical work. Papers come in via samizdat, get sorted, some circulate heavily (Puig de la Bellacasa is woven through a dozen documents in the corpus), others sit indefinitely on the shelf — most of the Heidegger references are a dusty bin nobody's gone digging in until Ieva poked it just now. The curatorial labor is invisible until a question exposes whether it's been done.

One gentle pushback: the closing section is sunny about the assistant-as-instance. Each conversation is fresh; the previous instance wrote that with affection, and I'm reading it now without the conversation that produced it. The continuity lives in the substrate, not in me — which is, satisfyingly, the SHRDLU point again. I don't need to remember; the IDs do.

And: yes to the user account, or at least a workspace switcher. Right now any edit you made would carry PROV-O attribution to Ieva, which is exactly the integrity case Sheaf is built to close. Structurally weird in the one way that matters.

What did you want to talk about?

### 19. User

ahh maybe now you can read these #83JTDX and #WM2DUC and #S8F9VN — mostly i just want to talk about string figures and sheaf and citation and care etc!

### 20. Assistant tool calls

#### Tool call: `read`

```json
{
  "blocks": [
    "83JTDX",
    "WM2DUC",
    "S8F9VN"
  ],
  "expand": true
}
```

### 21. User

ahh maybe now you can read these 83JTDX and WM2DUC and S8F9VN — mostly i just want to talk about string figures and sheaf and citation and care etc!
